AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALIST NOTION OF "BEING-WITH," AND THE REACTION OF MARTIN BUBER

by

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Dedicated and devoted
to those educators who work
for the education and realization
of an existentialist, cooperative, and
interhuman humanity

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement and Significance of the Problem

Professor Ruth Murdoch, of Andrews University (W. Michigan), divided the field of education into two major areas. The first deals with the goals, aims, and ends of education; she gave it the name the "what" of education (the quiddity of education). It is concerned with what education should accomplish. It includes all the objectives which various philosophies of education speak about. Some philosophers of education, for example, in the realistic line of thought, speak of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes to be gained; rationalists would stress the knowledge that an educatee should get; pragmatists, on the other hand, would rather maintain that American democratic education is logically committed to fostering intellectual independence or independent learning capacity, i.e. the capacity to construct and reconstruct outlooks independently.

The other area is concerned with ways or means of achieving the above ends. She named it the "how" of education (the methodicity of education). It deals with the problem of how we can realize the aims implicit in the educational process. Traditionally, the "how" of education was that of strict recitation of matters learned entirely by rote. Another method which originated in empiricism and which became eminent in the United States of America through Thorndike and associates, is conditioning (stimulus--response). The teacher is the presenter of stimuli and students are to be trained to make correct responses. Repetition and drill are the appropriate means of conditioning. B. F. Skinner divides the competencies which a student should achieve into a very large number of very small steps. The "how" of education is that of reinforcement, which is contingent upon the accomplishment of each step. For pragmatists, the educator would not be conditioner or reinforcer, but would be a guide or a director in the educational process. I find Dr. Murdoch's division into the "what" and "how" of the educational field a valid one, and I use it in order to lead to the problem and the purpose of this study, which focuses on the second area--the "how" of education.

Several philosophers have written books and articles involving the quiddity of an existentialist program of education; among these are Van Cleve Morris, George Kneller, and Ralph Harper. They basically agree that the quiddity of an existentialist education is not that the educatee gets only certain knowledge, skills, and attitudes, but that the foremost existentialist aim of education is to help the educatee become a free person, one who makes his own choices and who shoulders responsibility for his own actions; a person who attests the authentic existential possibility, that he does not merely become "das Man," as Heidegger would call it (the "they" or the "one of an anonymous group"). All existentialist goals of education focus upon the core of "authentic existence."

Acknowledgements have been given to a part of the existentialistic quiddity of education by non-existentialists. A reconstructionist, Theodore Brameld, writes in an article:

> Insistence that the individual must not become a "thing," must not be submerged in an abstract and stifling mass..., the existentialist's concern for commitment, for self-realization, for creativity, and for social direction and responsibility, is among his more positive contributions in terms of life as a whole.[1]

Ernest E. Bayles, a pragmatist, agrees with the existentialist position that values are taken to be self- or man-made. He writes:

> On value-theory, however, we seemingly turn our backs on both idealism and realism and approach existentialism, for on final value judgments the self seems to stand starkly, possibly even frighteningly alone--hence anxiety (Angst).[2]

Hence, it seems that Brameld (a reconstructionist), Bayles (a pragmatist), and the afore-mentioned existentialists agree as to this particular educational "what."

However, when we approach the area of the "how" of education, justice has seemingly not been done to Sartre's notion of "being-with" (être-avec) as it applies to education, nor has there seemingly been sufficient study on the following three points:

(1) The *earlier Sartrean* notion of total freedom and what it does to the "being-with" of the educator and the educatee, on the one hand, and among educatees on the other.

(2) The *later Sartrean* notion of "being-with," as expounded especially in his philosophical work *Critique de la Raison dialectique* and his novel *Le Diable et le bon Dieu*.

(3) The "sociality" of Sartre's philosophy has been considered as a "Ding-an-sich" and has not been compared with or related to any other branch of existentialism. There has, therefore, been no attempt to compare Sartre's notion of "being-with" with that of other existentialist thinkers, such as *Martin Buber* who, through his I-Thou philosophy of education, has become widely known in the U. S.

Before going into an elaboration of the various points on which there has not seemingly been sufficient study, the question arises of whether Sartre ever elucidated a philosophy of education in any of his writings. The answer is simply, No (explicitly). But how then is it possible to consider Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education? Philosophy has been defined in ways which imply totality, generality, and ultimateness. It concerns itself with interpreting all that comes within the range of man's experience. The notion of "being-with" indicates the togetherness of two or more persons in general. When we speak of "being-with" in education, we want to apply Sartre's philosophical notion to vital educational problems. Philosophy of education is the application of philosophy to a study of the problems of education. But to apply a general notion to a particular situation requires interpretation on the part of the person making the application, and, being such, it is personal and in that sense arbitrary. However, to avoid an interpretation or construction that might be considered ad libitum, the present writer will put his interpretation side by side with the various philosophical ideas contained in Sartre's notion of "being-with."

With reference to the first point, Sartre's first existentialist principle is that of subjectivity or total freedom. It is well known that Sartre distinguishes in his book "L'Etre et le Néant"[3] between person-like existence ("pour-soi"--being for-itself) and object-like being ("en-soi" --being in-itself). The characteristic of the former is total freedom; of the latter fixity, predetermination. It seems that most philosophers of education who have been writing in the vein of existentialism would also accept the notion that the "methodicity" of education has to be approached from the perspective of the principle of all principles--the principle of total freedom. The problem in education is not so much the existentialist notion of total freedom in relation to an object, as it is of total freedom in relation to another subject. And it is here that the problem arises. The particular notion of "being-with" that we shall treat means that two or more persons, each totally free, come together or meet each other. Sartre's notion of "being-with" cannot be considered solo ipso within Sartre's philosophy. It is based on other concepts, those having to do with the nature of persons. This requires knowledge of the immediate structures of a person. In Sartre's earlier philosophy, it requires a certain understanding of other concepts, such as "pour-soi," "en-soi," freedom, and others.

We have exactly this kind of situation in the educational process. There, we have the educator, who is to be taken as totally free; then we have the educatee or educatees who is or are to be taken as totally free. The first position one might take is that of educational individualism, or laissez-faire policy. Otherwise, one gives up the notion of total freedom.

If Sartre's notion of freedom were to lead to individualist-permissivist educational policy, a teacher should not interfere with a student's plans and activities. History gives us examples of such individualist, laissez-faire policy of education. Jean Jacques Rousseau,[4] who reacted against the traditional system of education as rigid control and authoritarian discipline, proposed in his book "Emile" a new approach to education--one that was very radical for the time in which he lived. He proposed to educators a kind which he called "negative education"--education in which educators were adjured to refrain from exerting influence upon a child's beliefs or commitments. The motto was that the child should act according to the previously "enfolded" patterns of his innate nature.

William Heard Kilpatrick seems to have had the same idea when he wrote, in "Foundations of Method" of pupil-"purposing, planning, executing, and judging."[5] There are four steps in the purposive act, coupled with insistence that the pupil must himself do each. This represented the heart of Kilpatrick's protest against conventional teaching; the latter represented teacher purposing, planning, and judging, with pupils doing only the executing. Leo Tolstoy, in Russia, proposed the same idea when he suggested the notions of non-prescriptiveness and non-imposition of laws and regulations in education.[6]

A representative of a radical approach to education in modern days is A. S. Neill of Great Britain. Neill writes, in his book "Summerhill: a Radical Approach to Child-Rearing"

> the function of the child is to live his own life --not the life that his anxious parents think he should live, nor a life according to the purpose of the educator who thinks he knows what is best. All this interference and guidance on the part of adults only produces a generation of robots.[7]

Non-existentialists insist that Sartre's notion of total freedom leads to individualist-permissivist educational policy, as do reconstructionists, idealists, and pragmatists who bring forth such objections to Sartre's existentialism. Brameld charges, regarding Sartre's existentialist theory, that its "weakness of spirit is rooted mainly in its hyper-individualism.... The practical consequence would be the retirement of the individual into a kind of self-enclosed existence. Existentialism is capsulated, complete within itself...encourages withdrawal from the social situation, without which he can neither serve nor survive."[8]

J. B. Berkson, an idealist, writes that "existentialism is opposed to every thing that curtails the will to unhindered freedom of the individual self."[9]

Bruce Hood, who confines his remarks primarily to the Sartrean interpretation of human nature, writes,

> In light of the assumption that existentialism makes about human nature and the students as decision-maker...any philosophy of education that starts with the assumption that children have total freedom of choice and that they should be made aware of this freedom eventually finds itself faced with the problem of deciding who is to choose and what is to be learned. And, as I see it, the only theoretically consistent practice following from these assumptions is for a teacher to ask, "Well, children, what do you want to do today?" If we are not willing to settle for this then we should look elsewhere for guidance. I shall.[10]

These three critics of existentialism all refer to Sartre's existentialism, which is atheistic. It is Sartre's existentialism that has been most widely publicized and appears to be the most influential variety in the United States, at least as far as education is concerned.

A writer in existentialist educational theory, Ralph Harper, recognizes that "the pupil is more important than either the teacher or the curriculum, because it is he who is being educated." But, for him, the corollary that sometimes follows is questionable--that the pupil should decide what he should learn. And he questions whether this educational policy is not removing at least one part of the teacher's function. For him, such educational procedure would be absurd, because it would be the "equivalent of letting the pupil teach himself."[11]

We have, however, to keep in mind that Harper gives here his own existentialist opinion, rather than Sartre's, although we can discover similarities between Harper's thinking and that of both Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber.

Robert Ulich writes, in his comments on Harper's article, "that Mr. Harper's essay, like the works of Kierkegaard, Marcel, Rousselot, and Tillich, rests on Christianity."[12] It seems that Harper does not treat Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education.

Kneller covers all the four existentialists (Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel). It seems that Kneller thinks that all existentialists, except Sartre, allow for mutuality in the educational process. For him, "in Sartre's doctrine there can be no mutuality, you are either an object for another or he is an object for you." And he continues a few pages later to write that "if other men are mere objects to be controlled in terms of our personal projects, and if mutuality is an illusion, how can personal subjectivity achieve any sort of recognition of another man's liberty?"[13]

But still several pages later, Kneller seems to turn around in regard to "freedom and authority" when he writes that "the necessity of mastering certain fundamentals is defended by Sartre, not only in his statement that we must expect to learn from the judgment of others, but because 'being-situated' is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom."[14]

Thus, on the one hand, Kneller writes that there should be individualist-permissivist educational policy, because Sartre's philosophical position does not allow for mutuality; whereas, on the other hand, he speaks of the necessity of "being-situated" in the learning process. Briefly, we meet the difficulty that Kneller speaks, on the one hand, in regard to the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation of the facticity of education, which excludes individualist-permissivist educational policies. But he seems, on the other hand, in regard to the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation, to go along with the above mentioned writers. Besides this, one further comment may be made on Kneller's writing on Sartre. In regard to the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation, Kneller gives a short statement that "being situated" is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom, but he does not go into any elaboration of this facticity of education; he rather goes on, after a few comments, to Jaspers, another existentialist. So the study misses elaboration of Sartre's principle of "being-with."

In Morris's book on Existentialism in Education,[15] we have the advantage of having a Sartrean expositor of existentialism. In Chapter II of Part II of his book, Morris gives us two paradigms of an existentialist pedagogy--a paradigmatic teacher and a paradigmatic school. The paradigmatic teacher is Socrates, as presented in the Platonic works "The Republic" and "The Theaetetus," rather than in "The Meno." In "The Meno," Socrates was teaching, whereas in the other works above mentioned, he is probing for new truth, and we do not customarily associate this activity with the direct act of teaching. The paradigmatic school for Morris is Neill's school, Summerhill, which Neill calls a radical approach to child-rearing. For him, this amazing institution is free, in both the "freedom from" and the "freedom to" senses of the word.

Carl Rogers thinks along the same line as does Morris, and, for Rogers, Summerhill is also the ideal for future education.[16]

But Neill's approach to education, as exemplified in his book "Summerhill," is considered permissivistic educational theory.

This somewhat lengthy review of the works of authors who have treated Sartre's existentialist philosophy is connected with and leads to the first purpose of this study: From the readings of the early Sartrean philosophical and literary works, the present writer cannot find an individualist-permissivist policy of education, contrary to what certain writers, both non-existentialist and existentialist, have maintained.

The first part of the first purpose of this study concerns the early Sartre. I intend to go on where Kneller left off (in relation to the "pour-soi"-"en-soi") and the second part of the first purpose is to bring into focus a new understanding of the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relationship, one which does justice to Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education.

The second part under discussion is that there are some philosophers who intuited the sense of, or the pattern for, their philosophical thinking in the beginning of their careers, like John Dewey who did not change substantially since his epoch-making article in 1896. But there are other philosophers who have changed substantially during their life-times, some of them even as much as three times, like Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The early Fichte writes that the ego is absolutely free, then the ego is bound to a moral law, and finally the ego is only a "Da" of Being.

When one reads Sartre's philosophical and literary works, one cannot help but notice a philosopher who has undergone substantial change. The early Sartre of the 30's and early 40's--the one who wrote the literary works, "La Naussée," "Huis Clos," "Les Mouches," "Les Chemins de la liberté" and others, and the one who wrote this major philosophical work, "L'Etre et le Néant," and his short essay on "L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme"--became a different philosopher after the success of the Resistance movement in France. And again in the 50's and 60's, as seen especially in his novel "Le Diable et le bon Dieu" and his philosophical work "Critique de la Raison dialectique," he became still different.

For the early Sartre, the principle of all principles is that of subjectivity and, in turn, subjectivity meant total freedom. The later Sartre seems to have abandoned the absolute and unlimited force of freedom--which he presented in his descriptive phenomenological method in "L'Etre et le Néant." In these latter, he seems to approach the dialectical, Hegelian method of reciprocity. It is now "the multitude of men acting within themselves and with one another dialectically."[17] Reciprocity became already the leitmotiv in his novel, "Le Diable et le bon Dieu," when Goetz and others speak of establishment of the Kingdom of Love. But, when one looks into current publications in education, one finds no reference whatever to the later Sartre. Morris' book, Existentialism in Education, which was published in January, 1966, does not make mention of the later Sartre.

Kneller's book, Existentialism and Education, appeared before the French publication of "Critique de la Raison dialectique," but after the novel "La Diable et le bon Dieu." Hence, Kneller's article did not mention the later Sartre.

Other articles, written by authors other than the above mentioned, have not referred to the later Sartre. The reason might be that, even though Sartre's philosophical novels have been translated into English, the major philosophical work--"Critique de la Raison dialectique"--has been only partially translated into English. The book is written in different style, and it may take several years before we can have a full English translation. However, if we want to speak of Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education and to get its full impact, we cannot ignore the writings of the later Sartre.

The second purpose of this study is, therefore, nothing short of breaking new ground and bringing into focus a new perspective of Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education--the later Sartre's notion of "being-with."

With reference to the third point (given on page 4), the third purpose of this study is to ask whether Sartre, in his philosophical career, is developing an educational philosophy which in some ways is not unlike the social "I-Thou" philosophy of education of Martin Buber.

In using the descriptive, phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl, the early Sartre seems to have been obsessed with the unlimited force of freedom. The later Sartre, however, uses more the Hegelian dialectical method of reciprocity. It is "the multitude of men acting within themselves and with one another dialectically," as already above quoted.

Since we have already noted that American educators fell short of considering the later Sartre, it is no wonder that they fall short of the third purpose, and that they consider Sartre's notion of "being-with" as a "Ding-an-sich."

But why, then, study a reaction of Buber, an existentialist I-Thou philosopher of education, rather than John Dewey, the widely recognized spokesman for American education? The reasons are threefold:

(1) The present writer sees similarities between the later Sartre and Buber.

(2) The present writer wants to confine his study to existentialism (Buber is generally considered an existen-

tialist), and asks whether existentialism in general comes to grips with social existence, or whether it even makes original contributions.

(3) The present writer sees Sartre's notion of "being-with" not as a "Ding-an-sich" and asks therefore whether there are similarities with Buber, a philosopher of education, who is well known for his concept of relation, and, if there should be similarities between the two, to ask further whether the dissimilarities between Sartre, in case they should be considered as deficient for education, could not be supplemented by Buber's educational ideas. Besides this, Buber himself wrote a book, Reden über Erziehung,[18] in which he gives the essence of his ideas on education. Nevertheless, we can not leave other philosophical works of Buber untouched, since they elaborate and substantiate more fully his pedagogical ideas. It is true that there are other I-Thou philosophers of education, as for example Ferdinand Ebner[19] in Austria, who came to the conclusion that the "I" of contemporary man is Thou-less. As did George Herbert Mead,[20] who might also be considered an I-Thou philosopher of education, Ebner pointed out that the mortal malady of man is isolation and estrangement from his fellow-man. Ebner's and Mead's works contain the seed of the I-Thou themes, but Buber's works are more definitive.

In capsule form, the purpose of this study then is nothing short of breaking new ground and bringing into focus three major points:

(1) a new understanding of the earlier Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education, seen from two different perspectives:

(a) the educator-educatee(s) relation and the educatee(s)-educatee(s) relation--the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation.

(b) the facticity of education ("en-soi") in which educator and educatee(s) both have their being--the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation.

(2) to break new grounds in a neglected area--the later Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education, which differs in many points from the earlier Sartre.

(3) to examine Sartre not as an existentialist in isolation, but to compare him with Buber, an outstanding existentialist, I-Thou philosopher. Since Buber did not write about Sartre, except to make a couple of remarks,[21] it is the task of the present writer to compare them. It is of importance for education to find whether Sartre's dissimilarities and possible deficiencies can be satisfactorily supplemented by Buber's ideas.

The present writer sees three criteria in "being-with" as important for an educational theory. First of all, "being-with" in education should contain an existentialist element. It leads us to the place from which all sociality, association, and relation should set out; this place is the human self. If this existentialist notion of freedom is not the starting-point for the educational enterprise, education, on the one hand, could degenerate into an authoritarian type of education. The final outcome of which is to produce certain stereotypes of students. On the other hand, if the school does not encourage the existentialist notion of freedom, choice, and responsibility, "being-with" in education will be permeated by "adjustment" or the insidious pressure to conform. Every student will be the other, and no student himself. Education which is designed to emphasise the existentialist element in "being-with" does not mold, condition, discipline, and repress the child, but approves of his freedom (his free creative individuality). A free student, however, can not escape the consequences of his actions. He must accept responsibility which at times may involve dread (Angst) as the issue of his own free choice. The failures can not be blamed on environment, family, temperament, or the influence of other people. The existentialist notion in "being-with" stresses, magnifies, and intensifies personal involvement.

Our second criterion of "being-with" in education is that of cooperation. This element is a very necessary factor of "being-with" in a democratic educational system, where the social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of each individual student. Equality of opportunity means that every individual student has an unhampered share in associated actions. "Being-with" is hardly to be taken as a laissez-faire policy of education, for it carries the sense of working together in a common cause. "Being-with" in an autocratic educational system is not a responsible share on the part of each student. It violates the most fundamental rules of cooperation which are spontaneity, originality, and resourcefulness, which existentialism supposedly takes to be of first importance.

Our third criterion of "being-with" in education is the interhuman element--the life between man and man or the face-to-face communication. In a machine age, the "impersonal" element can permeate "being-with" in education in spite of the fact that there is cooperation. Students and the teacher can work together but they do not necessarily have to live together. The consolidated unions in action can be of an impersonal, rather than of a personal basis. It is, therefore, necessary to bring in the personal or interhuman element--the I-Thou relations, together with genuine dialogues. This will bring interrelatedness into "being-with" in education.

Outline of the Study

In this Chapter, we have presented the problem of the study and its significance and purpose.

In Chapters II and III, we shall deal with Sartre's philosophical notion of "being-with" in education.[22] As shown in this Chapter, the Sartre of the late 30's and early 40's--the one who wrote the literary works "La Naussée," "Huis Clos," "Les Mouches," and others, and the one who wrote the major philosophical work, "L'Etre et le Néant"--is a different philosopher both after the Resistance Movement in France and its success, and in the 50's and 60's. Chapters II and III will present the reasons for making such a distinction. It is here worthwhile mentioning that we do not find any notion of "being-with" in Sartre's novels and plays. Sartre's notion of "being-with," set forth in his philosophical works, indicates the togetherness of two or more persons in general. In the novels and plays, this notion is applied to the vital particular life problems, like Garcin, Estelle, and Inez being together in a prison where there is no exit in "Huis Clos" or Orestes meeting Electra and his mother Clytemnestra and her second husband Aegistheus who murdered Agamemnon in "Les Mouches." We could say of Sartre the same that Gabriel Marcel said of himself: "On the other hand, what seems to me now to be still worthy of interest is the way in which, on the dramatic level, I tried to counteract this almost bloody speculation."[23]

Chapter II will deal with the earlier Sartre. The Chapter will be divided into two subsections, in accordance with the nature of "being-with" in education, which is two-fold: (1) the relation of teacher to student(s) and vice versa, and (2) the relations of students to one another.

The notion of "being-with" in education has to be seen in light of the existential background of human freedom. After consideration of the idea of total freedom, we shall need to examine what it does to the togetherness of two or more persons, because in the educational process we have such situations. Does the (absolute?) freedom of Sartre lead to an individualist-permissivist policy of education? These investigations will serve as a basis for going into the notions of teacher-student relationship, and in the second sub-heading to the student-student relationship of either (a) competition, (b) conformity, or (c) cooperation (mutuality, communion).

The third Chapter will give the philosophical ideas of education of the later Sartre--similarities, modifications, and changes, in comparison with his early works.

Chapter IV will contrast both Sartre's earlier and later ideas with the existentialist I-Thou philosophy of education of Buber.[24]

Chapter V will give the conclusion of the study.

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CHAPTER II

THE EARLY SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH" IN EDUCATION

I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF "BEING-WITH" (Etre-Avec)

A. Freedom---the basis of Sartre's notion of "being-with."

Jean Paul Sartre differentiates between two kinds of being. On the one side, there is the "en-soi" (being-in-itself), on the other, the "pour-soi" (being-for-itself). The former is a non-conscious being; strictly speaking, we can say that it "merely is." It is an object or thing-like being---blind, fixed, closed and determined (predetermined) ---a being in its fullness ("plenum") to which the laws of causality can be applied. Sartre refers sometimes to the "en-soi" as the being which has "totality" (wholeness). This being is not free to make itself; it is already made. The "pour-soi" or human existence, on the other side, is free "because it is not enough." [1] It is not ready-made, but has to complete itself. It is not a being in its fullness or totality, but it is rather characterized by a lacuna (a being with something lacking). The laws of causality cannot be applied to the "pour-soi," because it is free.

Human freedom is the unique source of the nobility of man. The future is open to man. If God were existent, everything would be ordered according to God's will and everything would be foreseen by God. The non-existence of God is for Sartre a logically necessary condition of man's freedom. The purpose of God and the fact of man's freedom are incompatible. The existence of God would make man a toy in the hands of the Creator. Man would become an "en-soi" (determined, fixed, closed). The future is open to man and it cannot, therefore, be said that man is compelled to make a certain choice by either God or any other power outside or inside himself.

Under Freudian influence, at the turn of or beginning of this century psychologists considered man a determined being, subject to unconscious, impulsive, internal forces or drives. The personality, according to Freud, is made up of three major systems, the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is the reservoir of psychic energy and furnishes all of the power for operation of the other two systems. Although Freud regarded the ego as the executive of the total personality, at least in the case of a healthy person, he did not grant it autonomous position; it always remained subservient to the wishes of the id.

> Sartre rejects this theory on the ground that every action, no matter how trivial, is not the simple effect of the prior psychic state and does not result from a linear determinism but rather is integrated as a secondary structure in global structures and finally in the totality which I am. Otherwise, in fact, I should have to understand myself either as a horizontal flux of phenomena, each of which is externally conditioned by the preceding---or as a supporting substance for a flow, a substance

> deprived of the meaning of its modes. *Both these conceptions would lead us to confuse the for-itself with the in-itself.*[2] (Italics mine.)

So far, we have seen that man is not determined--not compelled by free existent external or internal forces or powers--but that man is free; free in the sense of being self-completed or self-fulfilled, dependent for completion upon himself and not upon God. Now we have to consider more closely the notion of freedom. Going back to the distinction we made between the "en-soi" (being-in-itself) and the "pour-soi" (being-for-itself), we noticed that the former is determined; something finished, and simply there. Sartre's existentialist forerunner, Martin Heidegger, called it "Vorhandenheit." On the other hand, in violent contrast to "Vorhandenheit," there is the unfinished potentiality of the "pour-soi." Heidegger called it "Sein-Können" (the potentiality of being). Freedom always implies choice, act, and project.* When Sartre, however, uses the term "project," he does not mean plan or design or a definite piece of research, but rather that a person throws or casts (projects) himself forward. Man projects (thereby actualizes) himself into the future. The act is the "expression of freedom." When Orestes says to Electra: "I am free," he does not mean anything other than free to act. (In his case, free to kill Aegistheus who killed his [Orestes'] father years prior.)[3]

"In fact, this permanent expression of itself as a

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*H. E. Barnes, the translator of *Being and Nothingness*, used the term "project" instead of "projection."

lack prevents human reality from ever finding a stable center or permanent repose. It never 'is.'"[4] To live and to pretend to be an "en-soi" is to live in estrangement from what a person could be. Freedom to act and to project, however, also implies the notion of dread (Angst), because the actual making of free choices is always full of uncertainty and risk, and a person must be ready to accept the consequences of such choices. Dread, as Sartre uses it, is not a fear of impending evil or a threatening object, but is a fundamental mood when a person apprehends himself as free. Had a person stopped at the level of causal determinism, he would have experienced not dread but fear.

Man has to be responsible for the freedom which he *is*. If he were compelled by internal and external forces, he would not have to be responsible for his choices. To believe in a fixed, predetermined nature is to run away from the reality of the responsible, free, and unpredictable "pour-soi" into a false simulation of an "en-soi."

B. Freedom and Facticity

(1) Freedom and the Situation

Much more than he appears "to make himself," man seems "to be made"--by society, by class, by race, etc. Empiricists, connectionists or behaviorists, Marxists, and others are the representatives of an environmentalistic psychology and philosophy. Thorndike, for example, used the expression "situation-response" to characterize both animal and human behavior. The environment determines the responses made by the reactant actor. Prepotent elements---stimuli---impinge upon receptors, which in turn transmit the excitation from the receptors over the connectors and the intervening synapses to the effectors (the end-organs or organs of response).[5] The operant conditioners are a modern version of behaviorists. For Skinner, an organism can be reinforced by almost any given state of affairs. People, according to Skinner, behave in ways that conform to a certain race, class, and society, because they are reinforced for doing so. For behavioristically oriented psychologists, man is merely an object, formed and shaped by the environment, be it society, class, or race, in which one is living. Karl Marx writes in The German Ideology that "it is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence which determines their consciousness."[6] "The materialistic doctrine," as stated by Friedrich Engels, "is that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing,..."[7]

What these psychologists and philosophers point out is nothing else than that man is determined or compelled by the environment. For them, man does not make himself; he is made. In dealing with this problem in Sartre's existentialism, we have to refer to the concept of facticity.

What is "facticity"?

Martin Heidegger, an influential forerunner of Sartre, spoke of the "thrownness" of man into his "there" ("Geworfenheit ins Da").[8] The expression "thrownness" suggests the condition of a person's being delivered over to a certain situation. What Heidegger calls "being-already-in-the-world" ("das-schon-in-der-Welt-Sein"), Sartre calls "situation." When Sartre uses the term "facticity," he refers to the fact that the self is not the basis of its own factual existence or, in other words, it cannot be said that the "pour-soi" chooses the fact of being there (in this situation); such as, for example, to be a white man, to be born in Germany, to belong to the middle class, etc.

Ronald Grimsley writes that

> it ("pour-soi") is "there"---cast into the world and actively involved with a factual situation. Moreover, human reality understands quite clearly that it is not its own basis, that it has not created itself and that in an essential way it is "given" and "contingent."... It cannot be the absolute basis of its own factual existence...it cannot be said to choose the fact of being there....[9]

For Sartre, a certain heredity and environment, class, place, society, race and others are the necessary base for one's existence (the facticity of existence). This [fact] is the contingency of existence that a human being has to have a certain kind of factual necessity in existing. To exist means to exist "there" (with this heredity and this environment).

Now it might be asked whether facticity, having the meaning of "thrownness"---"being-there"---does not add up to "being" or "existence" of an ontological nature, which is the same as "essence" or "being-ness." If so, this would mean that what is "there" simply is; it would be neither good or bad, nor true or false. In dealing with it, a person would have to take it on its own terms and proceed therefrom. This, of course, would be nothing else than the pragmatic theory of John Dewey and others. But, for Sartre, facticity does not add up to "essence" or "being-ness," because Sartre refers to man as a being which transcends "facticity," a process whereby the "pour-soi" goes beyond the given "facticity" in a further project of itself. Sometimes the "pour-soi" is called a "transcendence." Sartre gives the example of a cafe waiter:

> If I am a cafe-waiter...this can be only in the mode of not being one. And that is true. If I could be a cafe-waiter, I should suddenly constitute myself as a contingent block of identity. And that I am not. This contingent being-in-itself always escapes me....This is the result of the fact that while I must play at being a cafe-waiter in order to be one, still it would be in vain for me to play at being a diplomat or a sailor, for I would not be one. This inapprehensible fact of my condition, this impalpable difference...while choosing the meaning of its situation and while constituting itself as the foundation of itself in situation, not to choose its position....to apprehend myself simultaneously as totally responsible for my being---in as much as I am its foundation---and yet as totally injustifiable.[10]

Thus, "facticity" cannot be equated with "essence," because consciousness always constitutes its facticity and this facticity is revealed as haunted by absences to be realized and these absences are not basically different from potentialities.

The difference between a person-like existence and an object-like being is that the former is free and transcends its facticity. The first major pattern of "bad faith" is that in which a "pour-soi" projects itself against the recognition of its own freedom, i.e., a "pour-soi" pretends to be a thing ("en-soi") which has no choice, but which is determined and managed by other people. John Wild speaks of human beings as being in a state of "bad faith," when they "adopt fixed principles and have a firm and serious sense of duty. They are the conformists who make up the masses."[11] The kind of being that is said to be free is the kind that can realize its projects on its given facticity. To be free does not mean to obtain what one wishes merely by wishing it; for example, belonging to the white race instead of belonging to the Negro race, speaking the German language instead of speaking English, being born into the lower class instead of into the higher class.

An object-like being is what it is---it is one with its facticity---it is not only related to the factual necessity but it is enclosed in this facticity (i.e., it does not transcend its facticity). If left to its own devices, it is such and such an object with such and such attributes---

determined, fixed, closed, and unchangeable.

A person who recognizes that he is free but who wants to flee that factual necessity is of a second pattern of "bad faith," which means that a person does not want to accept the fact that he has been thrown into his "there" (factual necessity) but that he wants to be the absolute basis of his own factual existence. A person in such a kind of "bad faith" does not want to recognize or accept a certain heredity and environment.

However, there is a vast difference between animal beings and a "pour-soi." "Animal beings" have to deal with "ontological existents" on their own terms and, by so doing, they can make far-reaching changes in "ontological existents," including themselves. This they do by first wishing to do so, then being mindful as to how the wish may be achieved. A "pour-soi," however, is not simply an animal being, but it is "consciousness," that is, it is the transcending for-itself, which strives all the time towards its own possibilities (it is self-aware). The "lack" which is at the heart of consciousness is a "lack" of completed possibilities. It is through the "pour-soi" that "lack" comes to things in the form of incompletion.

For Sartre, freedom is originally a relation to the given facticity. "It is a relation illuminated by freedom," as Sartre states it.[12] It can be said that, because it is free, the "pour-soi" can be the basis of its own choices, acts, and projects; but it cannot be said that it is its own factual existence. So we arrive at the conclusion that man is only relatively free, i.e., he cannot choose the factual necessity ---he must choose within its established boundaries---but he is totally free in choosing the meaning of the situation and to constitute himself totally in accordance with the manner in which he makes that choice. What does it mean to be totally free with respect to the appraisal of one's facticity? Grimsley writes that

> the appearance of freedom entails a datum of some kind. The act of freedom, as a conscious "intentional" act, is necessarily directed upon something other than itself. Even though this something is negatived and transcended by the act of freedom, there must always be a relationship to a particular situation that is already given.... In spite of this element of givenness man's own responsibility is overwhelming because it is always he who confers meaning upon his situation.[13]

A prophet is nothing else than a "tearing from-towards," i.e., from a factual necessity towards a chosen end.

Grimsley writes that "the ecstatic and projective character of the for-itself serves to remind us that temporality, as the expression of the being of the for-itself, can never be considered as something that merely is."[14]

When Sartre, however, uses the term "temporality," he does not mean "an infinite series of 'nows,'" or "a state of being temporary, i.e., which lasts for a time only," as we find it in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, but it refers to a structured synthesis of the three moments of past, present, and future, which cannot be split off from one another. A person tears from the factual necessity (past) through the present of making choices towards the chosen end (future).

Hence, we come to the conclusion that "without facticity freedom would not exist---as a power of nihilation and of choice---and without freedom facticity would not be discovered and would have no meaning."[15] In other words, without facticity man would have no base on which he could make projects (no "from"). Freedom is never ad libitum but always in condition.

(2) Freedom and the "Other"

The first fact of existence is that it exists in a situation (facticity of the situation). The second is that it exists in a world where there are already others. There are three layers of reality in a world of "being-with-others":

(a) instruments which are already meaningful (a station, a railroad sign, a work of art, a mobilization notice)

(b) the meaning which a person discovers as already his (his nationality, his race, his physical appearance)

(c) the "Other" as a center of reference to which these meanings refer.[16]

There is a host of meanings which are all independent of one's choice---like directing signs, warning sounds, names of streets and houses. Are these original facts of the Other's presence in the world not limits to one's freedom? We have to come back to the notion of facticity, given earlier. It was mentioned that the "pour-soi" exists in fact. "Facticity is expressed on this level by the fact of my appearance in a world which is revealed to me only by collective and already constituted techniques which aim at making me apprehend the world in a form whose meaning has been defined outside of me."[17] When Sartre speaks of meanings ("sens") which have been defined outside of ourselves, he seemingly refers to the fact that there are signs, laws, commands, regulations, a body of knowledge, etc. which people have constituted in the past and which have been accepted as criteria for judgment before we appeared on the scene. We are not the original founder of these signs, laws, knowledge.

Sartre continues to stress

> the undeniable fact that the for-itself can choose itself only beyond certain meanings of which it is not the origin. This "beyond" is enough to assure its total independence in relation to the structures which it surpasses; but the fact remains that it constitutes itself as beyond in relation to these particular structures. What does this mean? It means that the for-itself arises in a world which is a world for other-for-itselves. Such is the "given." This means simply that each man finds himself in the presence of meanings which do not come into the world through him. He arises in a world which is given to him as already looked at, furrowed, explored, worked over in all its meanings, and whose very contexture is already defined by these investigations.[18]

But do we not have to draw the conclusion that man, if he can choose himself only beyond certain meanings of which he is not the originator, is not totally free? We have to refer here again to Sartre's thesis that man cannot be said to choose the fact of his "being-there"---his "facticity"---but that he chooses the meaning of his situation and constitutes himself totally in accordance with the manner in which he makes that choice.

For John Dewey as well as for Sartre, the individual is not absolutely free. Their approaches, however, are different from each other. Dewey would posit an individual as free either to "take into account the 'Other'" or not to do so, as he chooses. He would add that not to do so could well entail unhappy and undesigned action-results, and, in that sense, the individual is not free absolutely. For Sartre, the "pour-soi" arises in a world which is a world for other "pour-soi"s. The "Other" establishes a factual limit to one's situation. One cannot act, therefore, as if he were alone (ab-soli)---in that sense, the individual is not free absolutely.

C. Being-with ("Etre-avec")

(1) Historically

Sartre examines the theories of "being-with" of various philosophies, especially realism and idealism. It serves to show the reader the difference between his theory of "being-with" and those of other philosophers.

According to Sartre, Realism considered the "Other" as a body, an exteriority in itself. The one is separated from the "Other" as one body from another body. For Sartre, the consequence must be that "since the separation of consciousness is attributable to the bodies, there is a sort of original space between diverse consciousnesses, that is, precisely a given nothingness, an absolute distance passively experienced."[19]

For an idealist, such as Immanuel Kant, the "Other" is posited like a subject (an end, not a means), yet the Other is the object of one's thoughts or the objective system of representation. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, though not usually classified as an idealist, could have been a spokesman for idealism when he referred to monads to illustrate that a subject can be limited only by itself. Because it is "windowless," it cannot enter into relation with what is not it. Sartre's comments on idealism are that

> the knowing subject can neither limit another subject nor cause itself to be limited by another subject. It is isolated by its positive plenitude, and consequently between itself and another equally isolated system there is preserved a spatial separation as the very type of exteriority. Thus it is still space which implicitly separates my consciousness from the Other's.[20]

In idealism, the "Other" is separated from us by an ideal space; in realism, by a real (material) space. For Sartre, the spatializing presupposition must either resort to God, as in the case of idealism, or fall back into probabilism which leaves the door open to solipsism, as in the case of realism, because the "Other" is considered an exteriority in itself which is unknown.

In Sartre's notion of "being-with," he tries to avoid solipsism on the one hand and recourse to God on the other (as noted before, for Sartre God does not exist).

(2) Influential (existential) forerunners of Sartre who treated the notion of "being-with"

(a) Husserl

Sartre uses the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. According to Husserl, consciousness objectifies, identifies, connects, and constitutes an object of our experience. To constitute an object is neither to create the object, as the idealists would maintain, nor to be the the merely passive recipient or recorder of sensory impressions of the object, as the realists think; but, by an act of intentionality, the object is given to one's consciousness in its bodily presence ("Leibhafte Wirklichkeit"). The particular physical thing appears as an identical and abiding unity belonging to consciousness. Our consciousness constitutes objects, but what about subjects? Husserl speaks of "empathy" ("Einfühlung"), [21] but this is only to find an intentional category comprising some sort of experience of others' experiences, that is, to comprehend the "Other" as a subject having the experiences one would have if he were there. But, as Quentin Lauer noted, "as subjectivity it must certainly be self-constituted."[22]

Sartre criticizes Husserl when he writes:

> What I must attain is the Other, not as I obtain knowledge of him, but as in the way that he obtains knowledge of himself---which is impossible. This would in fact suppose the internal identification of myself with the Other...the only connection which he the Other has been able to establish between my being and that of the Other is a connection of knowledge. Therefore Husserl cannot escape solipsism any more than Kant could.[23]

When Sartre attacks Husserl for being solipsistic, he seemingly does not refer to Husserl's theory of the knowledge of objects of the cosmos because Husserl speaks after all, in the fourth Cartesian Meditation, of inter-subjectivity in knowledge of objects, but he rather refers to the fact that knowledge of human beings cannot establish a connection between one person and the other. They necessarily have to remain isolated, because "the knowing subject can neither limit another subject nor cause itself to be limited by another subject," as above noted, and it is still space which separates the consciousness of one person from the Other's. However, Sartre takes from Husserl the notion that a person cannot be constituted as an object, but that we encounter him.

(b) Hegel

In Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, we find that "self-consciousness exists in itself and for-itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness.

That is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized.'"[24]

In other words, Hegel's idea was that our self-consciousness exists only because it exists for another person and that we must exist for others in order to exist for ourselves. One person needs from the other person an acknowledgment of his being.

Sartre takes from Hegel the notion that the appearance of the "Other" is indispensable to the existence of our consciousness as self-consciousness. The stage of "being-for-the-Other" is necessary for development of self-consciousness; that is, the "Other" is the mediator or the "Other" appears along with oneself, since self-consciousness is identical with itself by means of the exclusion of every Other.

Sartre writes,

> Thus Hegel's brilliant intuition is to make me dependent on the Other in my being. I am, he said, a being-for-itself, which is for-itself only through another. Therefore, the Other penetrates me to the heart.[25]

However, Sartre rejects Hegel's notion of the pure and universal form of identity of "I am I," which has nothing in common with the concrete consciousness that Sartre has in mind. By concrete consciousness, Sartre means that consciousness is a concrete being *sui generis*, not an abstract, unjustifiable relation of identity of "I am I."

Another criticism by Sartre is that the being of self-consciousness cannot be defined in terms of knowledge.

Besides this, Hegel put aside the existentialist claim of the individual---that which Sören Kierkegaard attacked a century or so ago. The existential situation cannot be transcribed within an idealist system of pure thought, because existence has freedom and genuine novelty as its proper medium. For Hegel, the individual consciousness is only a moment in the whole process of the Absolute Mind coming to Itself.

(c) Heidegger

For Heidegger, the world is always the one that a person shares with others. "The world of 'Dasein' is a 'with-world' ("Mit-Welt"). Being-in is always 'Being-with-Others.' Their Being-in-themselves within the world is 'Dasein-with' ("Mit-Dasein")."[26] "Being-with" ("Mit-Sein") is an essential trait of "Dasein." It has an existential-ontological, not ontic(al) meaning. Though Sartre has not explicitly defined the terms ontological and ontic(al), their meanings will emerge in the context. For Sartre, ontic(al) inquiry seems to be concerned primarily with particular, concrete entities and the facts about them, whereas ontological inquiry seems to be concerned with Being (Sein, Etre). It is something abstract and universal. When Sartre speaks of ontic(al) relations between persons, he seemingly refers to the concrete relations between two persons, such as, for example, the educator-educatee, the host-guest, Peter and Paul. Sartre rejects Heidegger's ontological notion of "being-with," because, for him, "the Other in relation 'with,' taken on the ontological level, cannot in fact be concretely determined."[27] In other words, Heidegger's "being-with" is not the distinct position of an individual confronting another individual or a relation of opposition between the self and the Other but "being-with" of Heidegger is rather a co-existence of consciousnesses.

"Thus, the relation of the "Mit-Sein" can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other."[28]

(3) Sartre's notion of "being-with"

(a) The "look"---the Other as subject

For Sartre, the Other is not manifested through the knowledge which one person has of another or which one person has of himself. (We saw Sartre's rejection above.) The "Other" is defined by his relation to the world and by his relation to another person. "Being-with" implies a concrete, daily relation which can be experienced at each instant, because at each instant the one is either seeing or looking at the "Other." Our experience of the "Other" can be twofold. We can either look at the "Other," i.e., we make an object out of him, or we can see the "Other" who may be subject. When Sartre, however, speaks of the experience of the "Other," he refers to what one is looking at. The "look" becomes the focus in the Sartrean notion of "being-with." When Sartre speaks of "look," he does not mean, however, a physiological function of a sense-organ (the eye) or a psychological process, but "look" could be equated with subjectivity. Sartre writes that "it is never eyes which look at us, it is the Other-as-subject."[29] (italics mine) Throughout the look, one person experiences the Other as subjectivity and freedom.

Antoine Roquentin, being together with the "self-taught man" in the novel "La Nausée" says: "What a curious look he gives me. It isn't a casual glance, but heart-searching. The soul of the self-taught-man is in his eyes."[30]

When a person experiences an object (table, chair, house) in his consciousness, he usually realizes no uneasiness or he is not perpetually in danger. But when there approaches another person and this person will be perceived in the field of consciousness of the former, the situation becomes tense. The "Other" as subject is free, and he can be given, therefore, in no way whatsoever, as an object. The Other can look at us. "The objectivization of the Other would be the collapse of his being-as-a-look."[31]

The term "being-as-a-look" is synonymous with "being-as-a-subject." In the phenomenon of the look, the Other is the one who is a subject and not an object. The Other comes to us through an encounter. The Other is the one who looks at us, i.e., we are being-looked-at-by-the-Other. The Other is the one for whom we are an object---the being through which we get our object-ness. In "Huis Clos," Estelle speaks as follows: "When I talked to people I always made sure there was one near by in which I could see myself. I watched myself talking. And somehow it kept me alert, seeing myself as the Other saw me."[32]

The Other must already be given as a subject, in order that one can conceive his objective mode---his properties, attributes, and characteristics. A person, on his own, cannot be his own mediator. We recognize in Sartre the Hegelian notion of the indispensability of the existence of the Other for one's self-consciousness. Maurice Cranston writes that "if I exist for another person, I do so through his look. The relation is reciprocal. To another person I am in my turn the Other. My gaze [look] gives him objective existence."[33] Hence, for Sartre, the only relationship which has a foundation is the subject-object relationship (not a subject-subject or object-object relationship).

In two ways, especially, do we recognize the dependent being which the Other is for us: (1) shame (2) emotive language. (1) The shame a person shows is not only a painful emotion excited by a consciousness of guilt, of shortcoming, or of impropriety. It is one, rather, of being dependent on the Other who teaches the person who he is. For Sartre, shame is not only a feeling which we have at some instances when we are conscious of having done something wrong, such as a son stealing money from his parents or a student not telling the truth to his teacher. These incidents are only accidents of the fundamental notion of original, pure shame---the recognition of being an object or getting his object-ness from the "Other" as subject beyond reach. The Other "holds the secret of my being outside of me, imprisoned in an absence," as Sartre writes.[34] But does this mean that a person cannot flee the "en-soi," that is, the object-ness given to him by the Other or the properties bestowed upon him by the Other? Sartre gives the answer,

> Therefore insofar as I am fleeing the in-itself which I am without founding it, I can attempt to deny that being which is conferred on me from outside; that is, I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him.[35]

The general lines of conduct open to us are, therefore, that we may try either to accept or submit to the Other's judgment---we see ourselves as the Other sees us---or not accept the other's judgment and try to take away his freedom. Shame, however, is not to convey to a reader a sense of the feeling one gets when he realizes the dilemma above illustrated, (as could be assumed), but "shame" is the recognition of being an object for the "Other" or getting one's object-ness from the Other.

(2) Emotive language is capable of arousing and evoking feelings and emotional states in other persons. For Sartre, the "Other" is a subject and he could go along with Heidegger to make a distinction between objects, which are utensils to

be used, and human beings which can not be used as instruments or means but which are rather in need of solicitude ("Fürsorge").[36] An object is usable for our chosen ends, but a man arises before us with his particular meanings.

(b) The relation in "being-with"

There is no dialectic for a relation between one person and another, but rather a circle; i.e., at one time a person maintains himself as subject, at another time the other person. It is a continuous up and down. Every subject (person) is destined to become an object because of his contingent nature; and every object, on the other hand, strives to become a subject. The circle leads from "transfiguration" (to be a subject) to "degradation" (to be an object) and, in turn, from "degradation" to "transfiguration." Conflict is involved in "being-with-others." A unity of persons (a subject-subject relationship) is unrealizable, because it would imply the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness in the Other.

(c) indifference and blindness in "being-with"

For Sartre, when a person practices "a sort of factual solipsism,"[37] he is blind, i.e., he does not notice that there are other subjects, other people in the world. He acts as if he were alone in the world and brushes against people as he brushes against objects. The Other persons become "a suffered-subjectivity" or a "subjectivity-as-object." A further effect or consequence could be that they become functions or objects for his projects and ends. The baker becomes the one who bakes bread, the watch-maker the one whose function is to (make) repair watches, the bus-driver the one who brings him to his desired station. This is a state of individualism in which a person does not recognize that there are other people, other absolute subjectivities, around him. The 19th century slogans of individualism, such as "how to succeed," are attacked by Sartre, because they reveal such a state of blindness and indifference towards the other. Indifference can last for a long time; it can even reach so far that a human being dies without having come to the recognition of what the Other is.

(d) Tolerance in "being-with"

Sartre speaks against tolerance and "laissez-faire" policy, because, for him, a person, from the moment that he exists, establishes a factual limit to the Other's freedom. Sartre writes,

> To realize tolerance with respect to the other is to cause the Other to be thrown forcefully into a tolerant world. It is to remove from him on principle those free possibilities of courageous resistance which he would have had the opportunity to develop in a world of intolerance.[38]

D. Peculiarities about Sartre's notion of "being-with"

The central theme of Sartre's early philosophy is consciousness, subjectivity, and freedom. Since Sartre spoke of man as being totally free, philosophers of education considered him an individualist-permissivist. In order to counter-argue these statements, it was our task to investigate more closely Sartre's notion of freedom. In having done so in the preceding pages, we found that the "pour-soi" as agent discovers itself first as "inertia" or in the milieu of the "en-soi" (facticity). Man is only totally free with respect to his appraisal of the facts. What is peculiar, however, about Sartre's position is that men are not only animate beings but human beings as well, hence "consciousness." A "lack" of completed possibilities is at the heart of consciousness. It is through the human being that "lack" comes to things in the form of incompletion.

In the example of the cafe-waiter we saw that facticity is not the essence for man. Man as a transcending agent can not be identified with an "en-soi"---a contingent block of identity. The facticity does not have its essence as a present quality. The essence comes from the ground of the future to facticity. So Sartre emphasizes on the one hand that the essential and necessary characteristic of freedom is to "be situated"; on the other hand, Sartre stresses the important thesis that man's freedom transcends his facticity, and that he can be held responsible for his transcending acts.

In the concrete relations of Sartre's notion of "being-with," which serves as another argument against individualism-permissivism, what is special about Sartre's view is that he writes against laissez-faire, indifference, and blindness, which are quite common attributes in our modern age of depersonalization. Besides this, Sartre's emphasis on personal freedom, choice, and responsibility is of great importance in an age of deference to public opinion and of conformity.

For the present writer, however, there are several defective points in Sartre's notion of "being-with," which should not be overlooked. Since Sartre's social philosophy does not allow for a subject-subject relation but only for a subject-object relation and vice versa, a meeting of equals is impossible. In other words, "we shall never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality, that is, on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom."[39] Besides this, no unity or union (communion) is possible or realizable "for the assimilation of the for-itself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness of the Other."[40] What remains is conflict and hatred: conflict because a person is tossed indefinitely from one fundamental attitude (subject-object relation) to another (object-subject relation),[41] and hatred because a person wants "to get rid of its own inapprehensible being-as-object-for-the-Other and to abolish its dimension of alienation. This is equivalent to projecting the realization of a world in which the Other does not exist.[42]

Besides this, in Sartre's early philosophy there is no mention of mutual obligations, pledge and promise, fidelity or faithfulness, binding and loyal bonds.

For the earlier Sartre, such concepts as solidarity, friendship, and genuine dialogue (an intention of establishing a living mutual relation between one person and another), are never used.

Finally, it might be said that the early Sartre uses repeatedly such terms as acting and projecting, but that terms like help, hope, confidence, and others are missing. But, last nor least, what happens to love in Sartre's earlier philosophy cannot be overlooked. Love is equated with possession. To love another person is to want him. No wonder that love is rooted in destruction.

Possibly, the later Sartre, who modified or changed his earlier philosophy, will also remedy some of the defects pointed out here. In any case, it may be that Martin Buber, whose philosophy of education will be studied in our fourth chapter, can be of help to us.

E. Retrospectus and Prospectus

In the first part of this chapter, the present writer intended to lay the philosophical foundation for Sartre's notion of "being-with." For the earlier Sartre the principle of all principles was that of subjectivity and, in turn, subjectivity meant total freedom. But we have seen that the "pour-soi" as a free agent discovers itself first in the milieu of the "en-soi" (the facticity) or, in other words, "being situated" was an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom. So man was only totally free with respect to his appraisal of the facts (in relation to his facticity). Since Sartre's existentialism has been considered individualistic-permissivistic, as pointed out in Chapter I, facticity (of the situation and the "Other") has been elaborated as the first major part of our argument against such criticism of Sartre. In the first part of the present Chapter we have presented the view that there is a facticity of the situation in which two or more persons have their being, and a facticity of the "Other." (race, class, society, group, etc.). Kneller seems to give some recognition to facticity in education (facticity of the situation) when he speaks of the "being-situated" in education as an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom, but he does not elaborate the point. The present writer has laid a philosophical foundation in this Chapter and tries to go on where Kneller left off and also tries to elaborate on the facticity of the "Other," which Kneller did not mention.

Our direct investigation of "being-with" served, first, as another argument against individualism-permissivism in Sartre and, second, an opportunity to see what Sartre's "sociality" or "togetherness" appears to be. We have seen Sartre's radical opposition to solipsism and his opposition to indifference and blindness; i.e., his denial of tolerance and laissez-faire policy. Part II of this Chapter will present somewhat of the array of educational implications of Sartre's notion of "being-with."

II. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH"

A. Sartre's notion of "being-with"---from the perspectives of facticity

(1) "Being-with" in education---illuminated from the facticity of the situation

According to the present writer's view, the "facticity of the situation" of a student can be divided into two parts: (a) the hereditary and (b) the environmental "facticity" of a student.

In regard to the first point, an individual student's heredity consists of the specific "genes" that he receives from his parents at conception. A student in the classroom might fall under the few kinds of genetic deficiencies or defects given by A. Anastasi:

> (i) A genetic deficiency may exist which precludes the possibility of normal development. For example, certain kinds of metabolic disorders....
> (ii) A genetic defect may interfere with development by inhabiting the individual's ability to interact efficiently with his environment. Hereditary deafness, for example,...
> (iii) Genetic deficiencies may make an individual susceptible to certain kinds of physical diseases....
> (iv) Genetic factors determine many physical characteristics of the individual. Some physical characteristics

> influence the extent to which environmental opportunities will be available to the individual. Sex, skin pigmentation, and body build, all of which have a hereditary base, . . .[43]

The characteristics of the student determined by genetic factors are the student's hereditary facticity of his situation.

In regard to the second point, the environmental "facticity of the situation" could be the country in which a student is born, the social class to which his parents belong, the educational opportunities he has available. For one student the environmental facticity may be very helpful, for another, it may be the opposite. A student is "thrown" into his situation without being asked. But if a student is totally free, should it not be possible for him to revolt against the facticity given to him? For the earlier Sartre, to have a certain facticity is due to the fact that we are contingent beings and, therefore, have to exist in a situation given to us. If we were God, we would not have to exist in a situation. To ignore or to negate the factual state of givenness would be one pattern of "bad faith" (The other pattern of "bad faith" consists in denying one's freedom). But to say that a "facticity" cannot be ignored does not imply that a student has to identify himself with his situation. On the contrary, this would mean that he had become an inauthentic person---an "en-soi," hence a closed, fixed, and determined being.

To be an authentic person means to accept the given facticity and to make projects or to consider the possibilities open in regard to this given "facticity of the situation." Thus a boy whose body-build is very small does not participate in athletics, because his "facticity of the situation" excludes this possibility; but he transcends his situation by considering other possibilities. In the first part of the present Chapter, we presented Sartre's view of the cafe-waiter who, while he must play at being a cafe-waiter in order to be one, still it would be in vain for him to play at being a diplomat or a sailor, for he could not be one. On the other hand, to play at being a cafe-waiter is not to constitute himself as a contingent block of identity but the essence comes from the ground of the future to the cafe-waiter, as a meaning which is never given. The cafe-waiter, on the contrary, chooses the meaning of his situation.

A student who identifies himself with his facticity and who does not transcend his situation is in nature not different from an animal. Paul Nash writes:

> Animals are not free to deny their destiny. The salmon must go up the river to lay eggs and die; the swallows must build the mud nests typical of their species; the migrating bird must respond to the call to fly south for the winter. (Italics mine)[44]

Animals identify themselves with their facticity. Human choice or "transcendence" is non-existent for them. Human reality surpasses itself in the direction of its own possibilities and, through surpassing a "lack," comes to the situation in the form of "incompletion" of "potency" or "potentiality." It is, therefore, a very important goal of existentialist education to make the student aware of his "humanness," i.e., that he is open to the possibility of transcending his facticity. Goals, aims, and purposes of education, however, belong to the "what" of education and it is, therefore, not the intention of this writer to pursue them further.

Closely connected, however, with this particular existentialist goal of education is a "how" of education. If there is such a goal of importance as that of awakening an existentialist awareness in a student, how is a teacher to achieve it? But in pointing out the task of the educator, we are confronted with the difficulty that the existence of a student is his existence, that he lives his life, that he has his interpretation, his world-view, his meaning. How is teaching possible, or what good does teaching do, when everything is the student's?

To give the answer that I think Sartre would give, would be to go back again to the "facticity of the situation" of a student. We have differentiated between hereditary and environmental facticity. The former is given to the student at conception, the latter is only partly given. During his lifetime, new environmental agencies can confront him with new situations. The environmental "facticity of the situation" implies educational agencies such as family, church, modern communicative means (TV, radio, newspapers, magazine), clubs, social groups, political organizations, and the like. Among these educational agencies the school is only one part. Nevertheless, it is a highly important environmental facticity, because it is there that the child, the adolescent, the student spends most of his time.

Let us first of all consider the church as an educational agency. The priest or the pastor or even the layman are the educators who establish a "facticity of the situation" of the Christian religion for the growing child. The "facts" about sin, salvation, eschatology, and others are taught by the church.

For Sartre, freedom is originally a relation to the given facticity.[45] What is happening here is that the educatee is thrown into a situation in which he can make projections or choices in relation to the facticity of the situation in which he has been placed by the church representatives. In any such given situation in which he has been placed, an educatee may realize a wide range of possibilities, such as, to accept Jesus Christ as his Saviour, to love his fellow-men (without believing in Jesus Christ), to help overcome class distinctions. Thanks to the "facticity" in which the student is thereby placed, he can make projections and achieve a greater self in the world. The essence of the projection comes from the ground of the future on the side of the educatee. He constitutes the meaning of the project. Knowledge that a student acquires supports individual freedom, because knowledge opens up new areas of freedom.

The same line of thought runs through all the other educational agencies whose task it is to establish a facticity for the educatees.

One agency in which we are particularly interested is the school, because it is there that the young spend most of their time. A student, by sitting in a classroom, is helped into a new facticity of a situation. Without having been placed in this new situation, a lesser possibility would be open for the student to use his freedom to choose, to act, and to shoulder his responsibility.

Paul Nash writes,

> Education serves to increase our personal freedom by increasing the number of choices open to us. If, when faced with a problem, we can envisage only one possible course to take, we possess relatively little freedom. If, however, through greater knowledge, awareness of consequences, reflective power or other products of an effective education, we become able to envisage several possible courses, our personal freedom is enlarged accordingly. The effective educator, then, is one who makes his pupils' choices less predictable by opening possibilities that were hitherto closed.[46]

Thanks to such facticity, a student can make better and more enlightened choices than with a more limited facticity.

Therefore, the first important principle of Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education would seem to be that the school, hence the teacher, is very necessary in the educational process---to establish new situations for students, in order to enable them to realize themselves or to give them wider opportunities for self-enhancement. It is through the student that a lack comes to the situation in the form of "incompletion" and "potentiality." So the student comes not fixed or closed, but is always open to new projections and actions due to the new situations in which he has been placed. We can state the importance of placing the student in new situations by referring once more to Paul Nash who writes,

> An education for freedom, therefore, must include opportunities for gaining knowledge of the physical, social, economic, and other forces that exercise authority over us. Men who have knowledge of the laws of nature can anticipate the consequences of acting in various ways and can thus guide events, to some extent, to desired outcomes. It was pointed earlier, for example, that all men are subject to the authority of the law of gravity. But knowledge of its workings can alter its effect on us. Both primitive man and modern man are subject to its authority. But by studying its operation, modern man has learned to live with it differently from the way primitive man lives with it. He has invented the airplane, for example, which does not ignore the law of gravity but operates within it and under its authority. Knowledge of the authority of nature has opened up new areas of freedom. (Italics mine)[47]

The first principle of "being-with" in education has been worked out---a teacher is necessary in the educational process in order to serve in increasing the personal freedom of the student by increasing the number of possible choices. The knowledge which a student acquires does not remain an inert given, but the projects a student is doing confer on the given state its character of "lack"---and the given can be lacking only if it is "surpassed towards" by the student.

But a second principle has to be worked out in connection with the teacher's task in placing the student in new situations---that of how this should be done. We have to ask whether Sartre could mean that teaching should be something like indoctrination, imposition, inculcation, or training.

In the present century, there have been two well-known educational systems---Nazi and Communist---both of whose objectives have been "straight thinking" on the part of the educatees. The educational purpose of the former was to produce the "Nazi-man," that of the latter the "Soviet Man." Hitler and his party members warped the pliable young minds of the educatees into the monstrous Nazi pattern. "The Nazi policy reduced school life to a sham of military and party routines and utilized all channels of educational communication to brutalize the individual into an obedient slave of a power-mad state."[48]

The educators in the Nazi State showed strong aversion for the increase of facticity of knowledge. Erika Mann, who emigrated to the U. S., the daughter of the famous Nobel prize winner Thomas Mann, writes that

> he (Hitler) has refused learning, and seems, even as a child, to have been deviled for nothing. Also, it is necessary for the dictatorship to keep the people as ignorant as it can: only while the people remain unsuspecting unaware of the truths of the past and present can the dictatorship unleash its lies.[49]

The schools during the Nazi regime were the nucleus of the party and they turned out "Nazis." According to Gregor Ziemer, the Nazi educator thought that "too much universal learning tires the mind, paralyzes the will power and ability to make decisions."[50] What would Sartre say to such a method of teaching, i.e., to restrict a student to one "situation" or point of view? I think that Sartre would reply in a twofold way:

(i) An existentialist characteristic of education is to help the student into a new facticity of a situation and to increase a student's "grasp" of the "world" into which he is "thrown." This enables him to make better and more enlightened choices, but the Nazis were opposed to universal learning because they wanted to keep the students as ignorant as possible--this enabled the dictatorship to unleash its lies.

(ii) An indoctrinative system is designed to make or produce followers. The student is taught in a repetitive way one point-of-view. The ideals and doctrines are inculcated into the young mind. The educatees are not considered human beings whose characteristics are freedom, choice, and responsibility; the Nazis even spoke of the educatees as likely to abuse their freedom. Hence, no freedom should be given to them.

To use the method of indoctrination is to consider the students as automata and not as free men. Nazi education produced objects instead of human beings. It turned out products which were "en-sois" (beings that are what they are), not "pour-sois" (existences which are not what they are and are what they are not yet).

I think that Sartre would give the same answer to Communist education in which there is also great emphasis on indoctrination. George S. Counts visited Russia and got the impression that

> the process of indoctrination is supposed to begin in the nursery school and the kindergarten, and even in the family. It is continued systematically and comprehensively from grade to grade to the final year of study in the university. It is carried on through all the agencies of communication and throughout the entire cultural apparatus. While the child, youth, or adult may witness a play or read a book that is more than propaganda, it is rare indeed that he has the opportunity of encountering a vigorous presentation of opposing and contrary doctrines and outlooks.[51]

Edmund King compares the Soviet method of fostering an ideological dedication or of producing the "Soviet-man" with the devotion expected in religiously inspired schools outside.[52]

By way of repetition (following Pavlovian psychology), educators can achieve the "perfection" of the educatee's behaviour---and with perfection nothing else is meant than that the educatee has become "the Sovietman." Sartre would call such a man an "en-soi," a being that is closed, fixed, determined and not a "pour-soi"---an existent being who stands out of himself in order to view himself in his freedom. But, for Hitler, the individual abuses his freedom; for Mussolini, the individual is tired of his freedom; for Communists, the freedom of the individual exists only via the collective freedom. Hence, when we speak of teaching to establish a facticity for the student, we cannot mean indoctrination or inculcation because they degrade the human being or transform it ("pour-soi") into an "en-soi"---an object-like being.

So far we have seen that Sartre's notion of "being-with" does not involve a method in which a teacher indoctrinates or inculcates certain doctrines, as, for example, propagandists in Nazi Germany and the U. S. S. R. have been doing it. But the question arises whether Sartre would also disagree with a behaviorist such as Watson, a connectionist such as Thorndike, or a neo-behaviorist such as Skinner. Do these educators want to establish as many new situations as possible?

The forerunner of the behaviorist line of thought is the empiricist John Locke.[53] Education is the formation of habits. Repetition and drill are the effective means for achiving this goal. The environmental-orienting stimuli (S) were given emphasis. Peter Sandiford, one of the closest followers of the Thorndike of the early 1900's, writes that "behavior is the response of an organism to some form of stimulation,"[54] and stated explicitly that "since behavior represents a response to a stimulus it may be symbolized by the formula S→R."[55] The presumed property of the synapse served as the basis for the behavioristic interpretation of habit formation. The connection between the receptors and effectors was supposed to be established by repetition and drill. "Learning is the establishment of preferred paths by the gradual breaking down of the resistances offered at synapses."[56] (Italics mine.) In order to establish the habit, it is necessary that only the one desired response is made. A slogan of the behaviorists is that we learn to do by doing. The present writer is sure that Sartre would consider a human being, trained in such a mechanistic way, no longer human and thus would reject such a mechanical way of teaching, because for the behaviorists the goal of education is to establish a preferred path. In other words, they want to establish a certain response, and thus choice or possibility or transcendence of the situation---to escape from the situation toward a "beyond-the-situation" which is the future situation---is avoided. A student is trained to make the response and a student's "flight" towards the future (or a surpassing of the "given") is rejected by the behaviorically oriented educators.

Skinner's neo-behaviorism or operant conditioning is on principle the same as classical conditioning. "The teachers are considered architects and builders of students' behavior."[57] Skinner's technique of reinforcement is supposed to permit him to shape up the behavior of an organism almost at will.

There are some philosophers of education who say that some things are learned best by drill and perhaps only by drill and that, if Sartre's philosophy does not allow drill, it is somehow weak. But pragmatists seemingly have prepared the way for Sartre's philosophy of education in showing that drill and repetition are not at all necessary for learning. Professor Bayles, a pragmatist, writes:

> Obviously, practice is needed; but not repetition. Each succeeding trial is indeed a 'trial.' Something is tried. A pattern is 'caught,' tried, and accepted or rejected. If found acceptable, the job is done; if not, something else is tried. Whenever it is sensed that a given trial was in some way defective, the next trial is based on another pattern and the whole line of action is different from before. Repetition is what is avoided. Hence, "drill" in the time-honored sense is not to be tolerated.[58]

Such a kind of learning is far from routine and drill, but rather to a degree creative, and thus could be accepted by Sartre.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Sartre would reject any kind of imposition or training in his notion of "being-with" in education. But the problem of individualism-permissivism is arising again. In spite of the fact that the teacher is enlarging the freedom of the student, so that he can make better, more enlightened, more insightful choices, is it not the insistence that every student choose after all the way he wants to choose in his total freedom which makes a democratic educational system impossible? Democracy, in contrast to individualism, seemingly has to mean that certain rules and regulations are necessary, and that there is a consequent obligation to obey them. Do these rules and regulations not curtail the total freedom of the individual student?

Individualist-permissivist education, as contrasted to the limited freedom of a democratic system, is to be taken as unlimited freedom or freedom ad libitum---freedom to do as a student chooses regardless of other students or of the teacher. We saw earlier that freedom for Sartre is not freedom ad libitum but freedom in relation to a facticity, and in my view, rules and regulations of a group could be considered as "given," since Sartre himself speaks of the host of rules and regulations in a city, street, house, etc. Are they basically different from rules and regulations in school? A student in his absolute subjectivity and total freedom exists "in fact" or "in condition." Sartre speaks of the original fact of the Other's presence in the world.[59] A student in a classroom who does not recognize the original fact of the Other's presence in the classroom would be considered by Sartre as being in a state of blindness and in "bad faith" (the second part of "bad faith" which is to refuse acknowledgement of facticity).

I think that the best characteristic for a teacher, and one which seems to do most justice to Sartre's notion of "being-with," would not be that of a domineering leader, since this could bring with it the connotation of leading the student to accept a certain facticity. It could imply that a student is treated as a product ("en-soi") and not as a free existing being ("pour-soi"). Nor would it be that of a mere presenter of knowledge, because the teacher should inform the student in some way of the views he holds. A teacher can give his own opinion or point-of-view; he can go even as far as to show up the negative phenomena in other views held, i.e., he can disapprove certain views and approve others---this is not detrimental for existentialist education as long as the student is not forced to become a certain pre-established figure, but the possibility is still open for the student to make free projects or choices in relation to the given facticity.

The question, however, arises as to how Sartre would go about criticizing students' views. Would he guide on the basis of agreement and disagreement with his own beliefs? This, however, would be another kind of educational dictation. For Sartre, there are already certain "meanings," standards, or criteria in the world (facticity); they have been established by a jurisdictional group in the past and they are established by it at present. Thus, the teacher and the student are equally bound to abide by these previously established standards. These standards may, however, be modified or changed as time goes on, but not by the individual. Sartre writes:

> If some sort of truth exists capable of unifying the individual choices, it is the human race which can furnish this truth for us. But if the race is the truth of the

> individual, it cannot be given to the individual, without profound contradiction.[60]

Thus, criticizing students' views by the teacher is done on the basis of standards, not on the basis of the teacher's views. We shall consider standards next.

(2) "Being-with"---Illuminated from the facticity of the "Other"

As shown in the first part, Sartre does not reject tradition, culture, civilization with its works and achievements, and a body of knowledge inherited from the past. In a civilized culture, there are layers of reality which are already meaningful and therein we meet the Other. Sartre's notion of "being-with" does not only imply relations with people presently around us, but also relations with people in the past who contributed to the progress of the civilization. Sartre writes that

> Without the human race, mankind, there is no truth; that is certain. There would remain only an irrational and contingent swarming of individual choices to which no law could be assigned.[61]

Sartre can, therefore, be not charged with T. Grand Carteret's thesis brought forth against Rousseau:

> Toute influence étrangère étant ecartée ou paralysée, il faut laisser l'enfant grandir et se développer dans sa liberté naturelle. Isolé et livré à lui-même, il inventera successivement les arts, les sciences, la religion et la morale; il trouvera Dieu. *Chacun aura donc a refaire pour son propre l'oeuvre des siècles, a reconquérir par lui-même tout ce qu'il y a de légitime dans les acquisitions de l'humanité*.[62] (Italics mine.)

For Sartre, there are hosts of meanings which are independent of our choice. These objective meanings, already given to us, are the facticity of the educatee's existence. Sartre's freedom manifests itself in relation to the facticity in which he was placed by the teacher or others.

Sartre writes that "the other's freedom confers limits on my situation, but I can experience these limits only if I recover this being-for-others which I am and if *I give to it a meaning in the light of the ends which I have chosen*."[63] (Italics mine.)

B. Concrete Relations in Sartre's Notion of "Being-with" in Education

(1) The Necessity of the Mutual Judgment of Teacher and Students

For Hegel, the self-consciousness of a person is only self-consciousness because it is basically acknowledged by another person ("ein Anerkanntes"). So the development of our self-consciousness is dependent on the "Other" who is a necessary condition for it. Sartre takes over this Hegelian notion of the other as being the mediator between the "me" and "myself." He writes that "the way to interiority passes through the other person," as indicated in the first part of this Chapter.

Applied to the field of education, this would mean that the student has to get the acknowledgements of his being from the teacher as well as from his fellow students and that the teacher gets the acknowledgement of his being from the students. In other words, the student is taught who he is by his fellow students and the teacher, and the teacher is taught who he is by the students, i.e., a student gets his properties, characteristics, and attributes from the teacher and his fellow students, whereas the teacher gets his from the students. To be lazy, weak, ugly, proud, etc. is not something which a student confers upon himself, independent of the others. Sartre's concept is the very opposite of Leibniz's monadology, in which students and teachers are monads---closed, "windowless," entities having no connection with each other. In such an individualistic system, one is not in need of the judgment of the Other. For Sartre, the one teaches the other who he is.

A student or a teacher can react basically in a twofold way:

(i) He does not hear or give attention to what the Other teaches him. He is blind or indifferent toward the Other, which is nothing else than to say that he does not recognize the Other as a subject from which he gets his objectness. Such a person would be "inauthentic."

(ii) He recognizes what he is for the Other or, in other words, he recognizes the Other as subject, thereby himself becoming "authentic."

(2) Teacher-student Relation

(a) Indifference and blindness and Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education

There are people, for Sartre, who, in their entire lives, have not come to an illumination that the Other is a subject---identical with the notion that the Other can "look." But we have to ask whether there are not even teachers who, save for brief and terrifying flashes of illumination, have not yet become aware of the fact that their students are subjectivities. If the students are thought to be recipients of environmental stimuli or the containers of many responses, does a teacher then not act on the students as he acts on objects or utensils, that is, at a distance? He has an end in view and this end has to be achieved, be it social or intellectual. When the means used in promoting such an end is group dynamics and thought control or when the method is that of repetition, drill, or re-citation, the students become a "suffered-subjectivity" or a "subjectivity-as-object." In the former, the teacher uses a kind of thought-control that is possible in group-dynamics meetings. "Thought control is possible because opposing opinions are throttled by such techniques as ridicule and avoidance of the majority vote. Group dynamics necessarily confines the participants to the group goal, group thinking, and group productivity, and those who object are conditioned with the philosophy of change and prevented from discussing anything which does not contribute to the group goal."[64] In the latter, the teacher uses the method of repetition and drill. The students are the effects of the teacher's action upon them. Students treated this way are functions, not autonomous subjects. The teacher does not feel an uneasiness in relation to the students as it would happen in the "trans-descendence" and "trans-ascendence," a circular process. Uneasiness, embarrassment, and conflict are authentic key-words in the togetherness of students and teacher. Morris writes that

> although man is, as we are often told, a "social animal," his "sociality" is not an unmixed blessing. I think it is better to live life with one's eyes open than to live it under an illusion, even if clear eyesight reveals a somewhat unhappy picture. Others do represent a threat to my freedom, and there is no sense in denying it just to make myself feel better.[65]

The teacher and the student, when the one recognizes the other as subject, are always in a state of instability in relation to each other,[66] because the relation is always circular.

(b) Tolerance and Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education

Tolerance or "laissez-faire," an individualist-permissivist term, cannot have any place in Sartre's philosophy, because, for Sartre,

> from the moment that I exist I establish a factual limit to the other's freedom. I am this limit to the other's

> freedom. I am this limit, and each of my projects [projections] traces the outline of this limit around the other. To realize tolerance with respect to the other is to cause the other to be thrown forcefully into a tolerant world. It is to remove from him on principle those free possibilities of courageous resistance, of perseverance of resistance, of perseverance of self-assertion which he would have had the opportunity to develop in a world of intolerance.[67]

Sartre gives an example of the field of education, and it is, as far as the present writer knows, the only one he has ever given. For him, traditional education, or severe education as he calls it, treats the child as an instrument and it tries to bend him by force. Progressive Education, or liberal education which is the term Sartre uses, emphasizes or stresses the principle of "respect for freedom," which is, however, for Sartre an empty word. The only solution, to respect the freedom of the other, would be individualist education in which students are monads and the teachers totally indifferent to what students do. But Sartre's philosophy cannot allow for a kind of respect such as this, since "we are already thrown into the world in the face of the Other---our upsurge is a free limitation of his freedom and nothing, not even suicide, can change this original situation. Whatever our acts may be, in fact, we must accomplish them in a world where there are already others and where I am _de trop_ in relation to others."[68]

Hence, we can conclude that the earlier Sartre's opposition to individualism-permissivism in education is very evident, and charges made against the earlier Sartre, such as that of Brameld, Berkson, Hood, and others, that Sartre's existentialism is a hyper-individualism and the practical consequences would be the retirement of the individual student into a kind of self-enclosed existence in education, is simply not true. We have also presented Sartre's opposition to indoctrination above. Imposition in education turns out products ("en-soi"s) and not free human beings ("pour-soi"s). But the earlier Sartre does not become explicit as to how he advises going about meditating the permissivist-authoritarian dilemma, though there are indications, as listed above, that the recommendable teaching method would be guiding the student. The teacher has to keep in mind, however, that "being-with" in education is always tense, because free persons (subjects) are together and meet each other. A student or a teacher will be tossed from one fundamental attitude (subject-object) to another (object-subject). Possibly, the later Sartre will tell us more explicitly how to mediate the permissivist-authoritarian dilemma.

(3) Student-Student Relation

(a) Competition

As above noted, the students are not considered to be monads or isolated beings, but their being is "being-with-others." It was shown that Sartre speaks against individualism in the teacher-student relation and, if his philosophy is consistent, we can expect that Sartre would not favor individualism in the student-student relation. In a competitive educational system, it is self-help in which students should believe. We can recognize the Darwinian influence from biology which persuades men that the competition between different forms of life was the cause of evolutionary progress. There are educators who believe that competition in the classroom is the best way to promoting outstanding scholarship. They rely on the endeavor to secure scholarships. Scholastic proficiency and competitive examinations are the key-concepts of education in still many countries. In some European educational systems, competitive examinations begin at the age of ten or eleven, when children are supposed to take entrance examinations for secondary school. From then on, a certain percentage of students is annually eliminated; it is planned this way. There are sometimes 20-30 % of the students who, in a given year, do not "pass." The final goal of secondary-school competition is variously called "baccalaureat," "Abitur," "Studenter-examen." Students, in a competitive educational system practice a kind of ontological solipsism. Students act only at a distance from one another or each student acts as if he were alone in the world in spite of the fact that (as Sartre asserts) his being is a "being-with-others."

The present writer does not believe that Sartre speaks against intellectual achievement or against the expansion of knowledge accompanied with harmony of knowledge, since it helps students to make better and more enlightened choices or projects, but, what Sartre speaks against is such a competition between the students as cause emotions of hostility and ruthlessness in students which is only another expression of the tendency that they want to rediscover a freedom without "situational" limits. For Sartre, this attitude would be nothing else than "to get rid of its own inapprehensible being-as-object-for-the-Other and to abolish its dimension of alienation. This is equivalent to projecting the realization of a world in which the Other does not exist."[69]

(b) Cooperation

To speak of cooperation in a Sartrean philosophy seems to be a thing of impossibility, since the earlier Sartre uses such clichés as "the Other is the hell" or "unity with the Other is impossible." When Sartre, however, uses the former statement, it seemingly does not signify any kind of asociality,[70] but it rather means that man's "sociality" is not an unmixed blessing. "Others" represent a threat to one's freedom. "Shame" is the recognition of being an object for the "Other." An object does not threaten a person's freedom. It is "there" in its "factual necessity." A utensil or instrument ("en-soi") cannot alienate our freedom since it is not free itself but determined, fixed, and closed. When two persons are together, conflict is the necessary outcome, because both are free and either the one's or the other's freedom becomes alienated. "The Other is the hell," because when the free "Other" comes into one's "sovereign territory," the situation becomes tense. The "Other" tries to take away one's freedom. Therefore, conflict and hatred arises.

Sartre gives the reasons why he thinks it is impossible to have a unity between two persons:

> Unity for the assimilation of the for-itself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness in the Other. Thus the condition on which I project the identification of myself with the Other is that I persist in denying that I am the Other. Finally this project [projection] of unification is the source of conflict since...the other apprehends me as an object in the midst of the world and does not project identifying me with himself.[71]

According to Sartre, there is no otherness in a unitary group---the one identifies himself with the other. For Sartre, the characteristic of otherness disappears in a unitary group, the consequences of which would be that we shall have the "Man" ("the they")---the impersonal, general, and average---and there will be no initiative, originality, and personal responsibility. Unity, however, is something different from cooperation. The term "cooperation" still gives opportunity for otherness and it is otherness of every person which operates for a common goal or objective. The fundamental law of cooperation implies spontaneity, originality, and resourcefulness. It is the productive individual student who contributes to enhancement of the common life, and he does not give away his personal autonomy and become compliant. Hence, in a cooperative educational system, the otherness of a student does not disappear.

As above shown, Sartre speaks against a competitive-individualist system of education, because "being-with-others" is an existential trait of "being-in-the-world." Whatever our acts may be in fact, we must accomplish them in a world where there are already others and where "I am de trop in relation to others." However, relation is not identical with cooperation. A person might be related to another person and not be cooperative. But relation, at least, overcomes a monadic, Leibnizian system and, since a collective system of education has to be rejected by Sartre---because it is the individual man in existentialism who acts and not men (the collective)---the road is open to cooperation. Students, who cooperate and do not lose their freedom or possibility in relation to their facticity but who, by their own choice, act or work for an end which others share with them, could be considered by Sartre as persons who act in "good faith" (who do not deny their freedom). The one student would still be a situational limit to the Other's freedom and all his projects would still trace the outline of limit around the other student. The student could be placed in a new facticity by discussions that help to expand and harmonize their knowledge of other students, and this, in turn, would enable each one of them to open himself to new possibilities. But such group-activities always contain great dangers to be tossed indefinitely from one fundamental attitude (subject-object relation) to another, and vice versa.

(c) Conformity

As was his existentialist forerunner, Martin Heidegger, Sartre is aware of the threat of the "they" ("das Man"), or the anonymous group, for the existence of a person.

> This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own 'Dasein,' completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others,' in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded.[72]

For Sartre, to conform to the crowd is very dangerous, because "each one, then, forms the project of losing himself in this objectness of wholly abandoning his self-ness...."[73] The student who abandons his self-ness is, then, no longer anything other than an instrument in the hands of the crowd of other students. Sartre continues to write that "this instrument in which he wants to be dissolved is no longer his pure and simple personal-for-others; it is the totality, objective crowd."[74] When "being-with" leads to "being-submerged-in-the-crowd," Sartre's existential notion has lost all its significance, because the "they" presents every judgment and decision as its own. The characteristic of the "they" in education is, then, no longer togetherness but conformity to an averageness of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not. All the possibilities of a student are levelled down. The "they" are stealing away the student's freedom to make his own choices and to shoulder his own responsibility. The student has been disburdened in a way from his anxiety, anguish, and despair by the "they," but he has become an "en-soi," determined by the crowd of students. David Riesman called such persons "outer-directed," as distinct from "inner-directed."[75]

In a classroom we can notice this conformity when students read, see, and judge about literature, music, or art as the crowd of students sees and judges. The student does not want to be a "somebody different" from the others. Every student is the other, and no student is himself. But how can a teacher help a student to accomplish to avoid the danger of losing his self-hood and to reap the advantages of the "facticity" of his being a member of the human race, of a group, etc.? The earlier Sartre does not become explicit on this point. If he were a hyper-individualist, the best solution would be the retirement of the individual student into a kind of self-enclosed existence. But this is not the case as we attempted to show. Maybe, the later Sartre can be of help to us.

C. The Level of Education

The question arises as to whether what we said is true of all education, from elementary to university---or for some parts of it especially. Some existentialists in education make a distinction between the child before the Existential Moment (Pre-existential Moment) and the youngster after having experienced the Existential Moment. The former is sometimes equated with an animal, because the child is not yet existentially awake, and only the latter is considered to be a human being---he is existentially awake. Morris writes:

> The significance of the Existential Moment is that it occurs at approximately the halfway mark of the conventional twelve-year educational career of the youngster in the United States. I should judge that for most young people the Moment strikes in the late elementary or junior high school years. Thus when Existentialists speak of an educational theory, they will refer to a theory having its orientation and focus primarily upon the secondary phases of learning....the lower grades necessarily deal with the individual before he is existentially awake. Existentialism, as an educational philosophy, can therefore afford to be officially indifferent to and disinterested toward elementary educational theory.[76]

In view of this statement, it seems that existentialist education does not subscribe to elementary education, but only to secondary and higher education. This statement, however, is Morris's own, not Sartrean in origin, because we do not find such a distinction in Sartre's philosophy. On the contrary, Sartre writes an autobiography Les Mots about his childhood, and the first point that Sartre makes about his childhood does not seem to involve an indifferent and disinterested attitude toward childhood as Morris seems to have. Secondly, we find nothing whatsoever in Sartre's equating childhood with animal being. In Les Mots, he speaks already of the power of choice, creation, and transcendence exercised by him as a child.[77] We find, therefore, no reason whatsoever for making a substantial difference between a child of the Pre-existential Moment and a youngster of the Existential Moment. All the educational practices described in this Chapter can be applied to elementary as well as to secondary and higher education.

Differences, of course, do indeed exist between children in elementary school and students in high school. Whereas the former have had only limited experience (their world of insight is smaller), the latter have a greater grasp of the "world of effect," due to the fact that they have had richer experiences. They are freer than younger children, and they also can be held more responsible than children because of their enlarged insights into the world of effect. But these differences are auxiliary, not basic.

D. A Summary of Sartre's Rejection of Individualist-Permissivist Education

It was shown in this Chapter that Sartre's philosophy does not imply, either directly or indirectly, an individualist-permissivist educational system. We approached it from two different angles: (a) the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation (the facticity of education) and (b) the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation (the educator-educatee and educatee-educatee relation).

In regard to the first relation, individualists-permissivists in education, such as Rousseau, counsel teachers: "From the outset raise a wall around your child's soul."[78] Nature, Rousseau avers, provides for the child's growth in her own way and this should never be thwarted. Rousseau continues to write that "the education of the earliest years should be merely negative."[79] Nature should take her course, and the teacher should see that neither he nor others interfere. Neill, an individualist-permissivist educator, writes that "the function of the child is to live his own life, not...a life according to the purpose of the educator who thinks he knows what is best," as we saw in Chapter I. By the individualist-permissivist, the educators are adjured to refrain from exerting influence upon a child's beliefs or commitments. Educators have widely considered Sartre an individualist-permissivist in education, because his philosophy implies that the existence of a student is *his* existence, that he lives *his* life, that he has *his* interpretation, *his* world-view, his meaning. Hence, the question has repeatedly been asked, how teaching is possible, or what good teaching accomplishes when everything is the student's. We have repeatedly noted, however, that Sartre indirectly speaks of the facticity of education. A student is helped by a teacher into a new facticity of a situation, and, thanks to such facticity, a student can make better and more enlightened choices than with a more limited facticity. Hence, negative education is indeed *avoided* by Sartre.

As shown in the previous Chapter in regard to the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation, an individualist-permissivist educator, such as Neill, writes that "all this interference and guidance on the part of adults only produces a generation of robots." An individualist-permissivist in education would have the child do what he likes or wishes to do; this is a kind of indifferent attitude on the side of the educator or, in other words, he is to be tolerant towards all actions by children. Sartre's philosophy does not allow for permissivism ("tolerance") in education, since every student is already thrown into the world in the face of the "Other."

To be indifferent towards the child, causes him to become a "suffered-subjectivity." We have seen that Sartre implicitly would favor a teacher who guides the students, according to standards or criteria which have been set up by a jurisdictional group.

In the third Chapter, we shall attempt to point out another ground against individualism-permissivism.

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CHAPTER III

THE LATER SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH" IN EDUCATION

I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LATER SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH"

A. Introduction

In the first Chapter, it was stated that Sartre has modified, changed, and added to some of his earlier views. D. Anzieu gives the reasons for Sartre's modifications, changes, and additions in his later philosophy.

> Avec l'occupation puis la libération; l'expérience de Sartre change; ses lectures aussi. Expérience des groupes humains, du comité de rédaction d'un journal, d'une revue, du comité de direction d'un parti, d'un mouvement pour la paix. Influence de Merleau-Ponty qui s'exerce dans le sens d'une prise en considération du social et de l'histoire. Découverte du Marxism, de la psychologie sociale, de l'ethnologie structuraliste.[1]

This Chapter will point out some of the similarities and dissimilarities between the earlier and the later Sartre; we shall elaborate on "inertia," which is similar to Sartre's notion of "facticity" (with which we became acquainted in the last Chapter), and on the concrete relations between persons.

B. Inertia

In his book, Critique de la Raison dialectique, Sartre is referring in a footnote to his earlier work Being and Nothingness:

> Pour les personnes qui ont lu "l'Être et le Néant,"

> je dirai que le fondement de la nécessité est pratique: c'est le "pour-soi," comme agent, se découvrant d'abord comme inertie ou, au mieux, practico-inerte dans le milieu de "l'En-soi." (Italics mine) 2

Sartre has changed his terminology somewhat. Whereas he considered "facticity" the "en-soi" in his earlier work, he now refers to "inertia." It can be either the "situation" (to come into the world into a "situation" not of one's own choice, with this given place, environment, body, etc.), or the "Other" (Autre---family, race group, class, society---in which one has been placed).

In regard to the first point under discussion, the earlier Sartre wrote much about man's situation and man's power to transcend his situation (situation was not identified with essence).

In his later years, Sartre still keeps the view that there is a psychic distance between man and his situation. Man is not matter, as the materialists think. But, unlike his earlier philosophy, Sartre now admits the outside, a necessary condition which man cannot ultimately escape. This necessity is called by Sartre "besoin" (need). Need reveals a lack in the organism to act (in order to satisfy the needs). Here is a vital difference between the earlier and the later Sartre. The former viewed man as "consciousness"---his fundamental existential structure was freedom, choice, desire, and responsibility. His factual necessity was never essence for man, that is, he could transcend his situation in establishing new projects or realizing new possibilities. Man was, therefore, considered a being who is not what he is; he is what it is not (yet). Now, something "inert" has come into the "pour-soi." It can be said that its essence is to be a being of need. Sartre writes that,

> everything is discoverable in need [besoin]. This is the first totalizing relation between that material being, a man, and the material group to which he belongs.... Need is negation of negation to the extent that it exposes itself as a lack inside the organism; it is positivity to the extent that, through it, the organic totality tends to conserve itself as such.[3]

It is important here to point out that not freedom and choice are the fundamental projection of a human being, but need. This is quite different from Sartre's earlier philosophy in which freedom and choice were taken as the "irreducible." Need, in turn, is related to "rareté" ("scarcity"). In India, for example, there is not enough food---the need of hunger can not be satisfied---people, therefore, starve. For some, it means that they cannot preserve their existence. It might, however, not be as radical a case as the example of India. We only have to imagine a bus, in which there are only a certain number of seats. The quantity of the external object is limited to a certain size, which sometimes could have the consequences that not all passengers can go by this bus. There is "not enough" of the outside object ("scarcity") to which need directs its demands, because there are either too many people in relation to the outside object or the outside object per se is defective.

For Sartre, "scarcity" is the negative unity of the multiplicity of men.

> This unity (established in scarcity) is negative in relation to men, since it reaches man through matter, insofar as it is inhuman (that is, in sofar as his human presence is not possible without struggle on his earth). This means, then, that the first totalization by materiality appears (within a determined society and among autonomous social groups) as the possibility of their common destruction, and as the permanent possibility for everyone that this destruction by matter may happen to him through the praxis of other men.[4]

Thus "scarcity," as the fundamental structure of the environment or of "being-situated," affects the relations in "being-with" negatively. Consumption of a certain product by others deprives one of an opportunity. Sartre continues to write that "in the realm of scarcity in contrast, even if individuals were unaware of each other, even if social stratifications and class structures were to break off reciprocity completely, still each person within the definite social field exists and acts in the presence of each and every one."[5]

In regard to the second point under discussion, the early Sartre has already discussed the "facticity" of the "Other," which was the fact that we have been thrown into the world where there are already meanings or signs given by the "Other." For the later Sartre, "il n'est pas douteux que l'homme...se découvre...comme objectivation inerte...la nécessité pour l'homme est de se saisir originellement comme Autre qu'il n'est et dans la dimension de l'altérité."[6]

The earlier Sartre always spoke of consciousness, which was intentionally directed toward the factual necessity and gave meaning to it in transcending it towards other possibilities. But the later Sartre seems to have "exchanged phenomenological descriptions of the necessary conditions of human existence (negation, time, body) for socio-political descriptions of certain contingent facts which shape contemporary man and society (the group, labor, authority)."[7]

C. The Concrete Relations

In the preceding Chapter, we have presented the views of the earlier Sartre, and we arrived at the conclusion that the earlier Sartre was opposed to a laissez-faire policy or individualism-permissivism. He wrote against indifference, blindness, and tolerance, on the one hand, and conformity to the mass, on the other. The later Sartre speaks of "seriality," and he categorizes the individualist-permissivist as well as the conformist in this class. He opposes this "seriality" through the group, and it is in the group that Sartre's great changes appear in his philosophy.

(1) Series

(a) Isolated human beings

The first characteristic of the series is that it is "une pluralité de solitudes"[8] (a plurality of solitudes). What is the characteristic of these people?

They do not care about one another.

They do not speak to one another.

They do not look at one another.

These human beings are for themselves and they are not affected by the conditions of their fellowmen. They could make statements, such as Cain, the son of Adam, said thousands of years ago: "Shall I be the keeper of my brother?"

In a bus, especially, one can see the many faces staring out of the window, sleeping, reading a newspaper---but people usually do not speak with other people. In a big city, people pass each other. In general, they are concerned to reach their private goals, without looking at each other. People exist side by side, but there is no reciprocity, no sense of community. Their situation could be summarized in Erich Fromm's three words "Man for himself," or in Proust's words "Every person is very much alone."

If solitude is the project of an individual, then we have the following situation:

> Solitude organique, solitude subie, solitude vecue, solitude conduite, solitude comme extériorité des groupes conditionnant l'extériorité des individus solitude comme reciprocité des individus, solitude comme reciprocité d'isolements dans une société créatrice des masses: ... l'isolement est un comportement historique et social de l'homme du milieu d'un rassemblement d'hommes... chacun tourne le dos aux Autres.[9]

Sartre calls this relationship between these persons a relation of exteriority, in contrast to the interiority (reciprocity) we meet in a group.

(b) Serial human beings

In spite of everybody turning his back on everybody else, serial human beings stand in a series because of their common interest ("interêt commun"). Sartre gives the example of the passengers in Saint-Germain, waiting for a bus. Each passenger's interest is to catch the bus, for his own separate ends; he is, in general, not concerned with whether the other catches the bus or not. If there is too little room in the bus he prefers that he catch it rather than anyone else. Sartre writes:

> At this moment of the experience, the group (series) has its unique being outside of itself, in an object to come, and each individual in so far as he is determined by common interest differentiates himself from each other only by the simple materiality of the organism.[10]

These people are conditioned by a materiality outside of them. Joachim Kopper, a German exponent of Sartre's later philosophy, writes that "der Mensch begreift sich vom toten stofflichen Bestehen her, er unterwirft sich der Materie.... Als Glied der Reihe ist der Mensch nicht ein "Selbst," er ist sich selbst vielmehr schon entgangen, er ist von Äusserlichkeit bestimmt."[11]

(c) Impotent human beings

The impotence of individuals ("impuissance des individus") comes from their separation---atomization of men. There is no efficiency because there is no cooperation. Besides this, inefficiency arises because there is an identity of the individuals in the mass. They are replaceable or interchangeable with each other.[12] Seriality is not structured.

Mary Warnock, in referring to the impotency of the series, writes that "if all social life were lived at the collective there would be no institutions, no leaders, and no organization for the sake of efficiency."[13] A series, because of its non-structuredness, is passive, inert, and powerless. Exploitation of the workers, especially in the 19th century, arose for Sartre because of the "unité passive de tous" (passive unity of all workers) or of the "structure d'alterité" (structure of alterity).[14]

(d) Other-directed human beings (Etre-Autre)

For Sartre, "l'individu, comme membre de la serie, tient des conduites altérées dont chacun est en lui l'action de l'Autre, ce qui signifie qu'elles sont par elles-mêmes une récurrence poussée a la limit."[15]

A person who is other-directed is in a state of "inertia" to the extent that his action and his thoughts come to him from the Other(s). "C'est l'action de l'Autre qui determine toutes les operations."[16] Moreover, if his action comes to him from the Other, then he cannot be held responsible for it. Man is free (even when his freedom has been curtailed) when he acts and shoulders his responsibility. To act other-directedly is still acting, but passively. An other-directed person is under command of the "Other" (other people) as to what he should do. Sartre speaks of such a person as one who "est gouvernée lateralement et à distance par l'activité de l'Autre."[17] In his other-directedness, man does not choose the "Other" as is done in reciprocity (we shall see this later when we consider the group), but he chooses the "anti-humain" (anti-human) of having himself governed by the "Other." He is game for the "Other" who makes him. He discovers himself as "Other," hence the "Other" he has to be. We experienced the meaning of other-directedness in the Nazi-Reich, where everybody was what the "Other" was---a member of the Nazi party; he acted as the "Other," (including execution of the Jews). But, when the time of trial came, the Other-directed person did not want to be held responsible for his action ("l'autre responsable").

American sociologists, in referring to exterior control upon the decisions of an individual, speak of extero-conditioning, and Sartre seems to have taken it over when he uses the term "extero-conditionnement." Antisemitism, as a historical fact, can be interpreted as systematic extero-conditioning. It was a continuing action of the Nazi party, as a group, on other-directed serial persons.

Extero-conditioning is founded upon the passivity of the masses; it represents attempts to manipulate the masses by mechanical laws. Sartre gives another very common experience, that of announcement of the sale of a certain record (best-seller). Desan gives the following comments on buying as the "Other" does.

> The purpose of the sovereign group is clear to sell as

> many records as possible, through making it appear that the totality buys. This is extero-conditioning. It gives the individual the illusion that he is a member of a totality. In fact, it "pushes the alterity into the extreme, since it determines the serial individual to do as the Others do in order to be as they are." If he continues, the buyer will finally have the same collection as the Other's, which is actually no one's. For the totality of which he feels himself a part is a false totality, directed from the outside, as a determination of everyone by the Others, and no one by himself. The "everyone" of whom the transcending group speaks---"they are all buying this record"---is in fact no one, paradoxically, each one, in trying to be like the illusory everyone, contributes to and constitutes the illusion, but it nevertheless remains without foundation---each one tries to be everyone but everyone is no one.[18]

For Sartre, extero-conditioning "n'est vraiment possible que s'il individu seriel est produit des l'enfance comme extéro-conditionné."[19] Sartre visited the United States and found that this practice is exactly the case in American schools. There, everyone is taught to be the expression of all the Others. We discuss this matter in Part II of the present Chapter.

In light of the foregoing, we can conclude that Sartre opposes "seriality" in "being-with," because of the blind activity of isolated human beings who consider themselves the sole center of reference and do not see the "Other." They might have a common interest because of the common objectives they seek, but nobody cares for the "Other." These serial human beings are (passively) separated from each other and, as a consequence, they are powerless. The state of seriality, in not being structured, makes individuals interchangeable or mutually replaceable---hence, superfluous. For Sartre, no individual human being is replaceable or superfluous, but is of uttermost importance and of precious value. On the other hand, Sartre writes against conformity or other-directedness, because a person so directed will be no longer himself but the "Other" and the "Other" will direct and govern his actions and this makes him flee the existentialist responsibility.

Thus, the later Sartre rejects individualism and other-directedness in his notion of "being-with." These views on "seriality" are not much different from his earlier works, except that he added certain new ideas, such as the impotence and inefficiency of isolated serial beings and the non-creativity and originality of other-directed human beings. These defects will be overcome by the group.

(2) The Group

The group tries to overcome the tragic effects of "seriality," as listed above. And it is here that Sartre's great changes are evident.

Let us recollect what the earlier Sartre said in regard to "being-with." (1) He spoke against communion or unity of persons and that conflict and hatred (appeared) arose when two or more people were together. Cooperation was not mentioned. (2) There was no mention of mutual obligations, pledge and promise, fidelity or faithfulness, binding and loyal bonds. With regard to the first point ("the group in fusion"), we shall elaborate on the later Sartre's notion of unity or communion and co-operation. With regard to the second point ("the group proper"), we shall elaborate on Sartre's later views, of mutual obligations, pledge, promise, and others.

(a) Group in fusion

The group fights against the fallen state of seriality. To fight this battle, the group needs one thing, and this is an effective end or goal. The group constitutes itself through the common objective or end which determines its common praxis ---and this common objective is a common need or a common danger (threat).

Sartre writes:

> For organisms whose risk and practical movement, and suffering as well, reside in need, the driving force is danger, at every level of materiality (i.e., be it hunger or the bankruptcy whose meaning is hunger, etc.).... In other words, without the original tension of need as a relation of interiority with Nature, the change could not take place; and conversely, there is no common praxis .... We have emerged into a vicious circle; the group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or a common danger, and defines itself by the common objective that determines its common praxis.[20]

A community "makes of itself a community by feeling an individual need as common need, and by projecting itself, in the internal unification of a common integration, toward the objectives that it produces as common."[21]

The group is produced from the inside, by self-determination ("auto-determination"), and not through the praxis of acting like the "Other." It is, however, not only a self-determination but rather a synthetic self-determination (to act from within for a common end). Sartre makes a vital distinction between the man who is "other-directed" (Etre-Autre) whom we met in the seriality and that whom he calls the "third" ("tiers") of the group.

What are the characteristics of the "third" as distinct from the "Other"?

First, we could say that he has freed himself from his inert otherness (seriality) that is, his action does not come from the "Other" any more, but he is the source of his action. We can recognize some similarities with Nietzsche's "Übermensch" (Super-man), not a racially superior man---what Nazis made out of him---but a free man with zest, initiative, and creative talent. Sartre's "third" man does not act, however, only for himself (his own separate ends) but he acts for a common cause.

Desan's exposition of Sartre's "third" man is the following:

> In the Other, I see myself coming: I discover him not as Other (as in the seriality) but as myself. The multitude is here not a juxtaposition but strictly a praxis, that is, an act, as the act of manifesting together or of attacking. There is in all this no magic involved; it is simply my freedom recognizing itself in the common action. I am not just the serial Other, but myself, co-operating in a common action, which reaches its actualization from me to the Other through the group.[22]

The "third" man makes himself sovereign, as a consequence of the change of his praxis. In a state of other-directedness, man acts like the "Other"; now in the group in fusion the "praxis" of the "third" man is his ("sa praxis est sienne"). "C'est que dans la praxis il n'y a pas d'Autre, il y a des moi-même."[23] The chief of the group is always "I" not the "Other." The "I" is sovereign and it is the "I" who discovers in his praxis the "words of order" ("mots d'ordre") which could be advice, recommendations, commands, coming from other "thirds." The structure of the group consists of a multiplicity of individual synthesis of "thirds" directing themselves freely toward a certain "common praxis." It is important to notice here that everybody in the group can give "words of order." The group makes the act of the various individuals efficient and instrumental in its success. We have to emphasize, however, that the group is not an ontological entity or a superorganism, though it could be viewed this way from the outside, but the group is a multiplicity of individual syntheses. It is through individual choices (from within) that the multiplicity or plurality of individuals becomes unity or communion. There is a strong solidarity between the individuals that keeps all subordinated to the common purpose. "Je tente d'intégrer ma praxis à la praxis commune." (I try to integrate my praxis to the common praxis.)[24] Sartre speaks at times of the "individu commun" (common individual) to characterize the "third" man whose praxis is common.The ideal of the later Sartre's notion of "being-with" is "être-dans-le-groupe" (being-in-the-group). But we have to repeat what was said before, that the unity of the "praxis" is conditioned by the circumstances---the common danger, such as hunger, cold, exploitation, etc. Because of the common danger, there is unity in the group, and cooperation of its members contributes to efficacy. However, once the danger is over, the menace of seriality threatens the group again, that is, the group is in danger of losing its unity, cooperation, and solidarity.

(b) The group proper

To conserve the group as a practical and free unity against the threats of seriality and the "practico-inert field" ("champ practico-inerte")---a state of passive activity---, Sartre introduces the "oath" ("le serment"). The "oath" is a synthetic or communal link among the individuals who are no longer threatened by a common danger. "Ainsi mon serment au tiers recoit à la source une dimension de communauté, il vient toucher chacun directement et à travers tous."[25] The "oath" is a practical invention to secure the permanency of the group. It is an objective guarantee for the protection of every "third" man not to become the serial "Other." It is a form of reciprocity---the one who took the "oath" is protected through the Other who did the same. To take an "oath" is a kind of "intero-conditioning"; it is a limitation of freedom but this limitation comes from man's own decision.

In every community of people who have taken the oath, there is "a sort of interior emptiness, an indeterminate and unbridgeable distance, of uneasiness in each community, large or small; this uneasiness gives rise to a reinforcement of the practices of integration."[26]

Related to the "oath," Sartre introduces another precaution against disintegration of the group, which is the "terror" ("le terreur"). The "terror" should not be considered an instrument that separates, but rather as a tool to unite the individuals (the "terror" in the French Underground-movement during World War II).

Sartre's notion of "being-with" has become enriched, through the "oath" and the "terror," with new concepts, such as, mutual obligations, pledge and promise, binding and loyal bonds. Sartre goes even so far as to speak of "le commencement de l'humanité" (the beginning of humanity).[27] People who have taken an "oath" to the group and who henceforth under the threat of "terror" are called "brothers." What is this "brotherhood" ("fraternité"), Sartre is so proud of? Let us see first what it is not. "Cette fraternité n'est pas...fondée sur la ressemblance physique en tant qu'elle exprime l'identité profonde des natures. Pourquoi donc un petit pois, dans une boîte de conserve, serait-il dit le frère d'un autre petit pois de la meme boîte?"[28] Brotherhood, on the contrary, signifies the following:

> Nous sommes frères en tant qu'après L'acte créateur du serment nous sommes nos propres fils, notre invention commune. Et la fraternité, comme dans les familles réelles, se traduit dans le groupe par un ensemble d'obligations réciproques et singulières.[29]

Fraternity is a real bond between the individuals in so far and as long as everybody sees his being, and that of his fellow-men, under the form of reciprocal obligations. Brotherhood, and even friendship and love, get their significance and power from "oath" and "terror." We shall discuss this point further when we evaluate Sartre's later philosophy. For now, we can say that the "oath" and the "terror" have cemented the unity of the group.

(c) The organized group

The organization of the group leads to a distribution of the various functions designed to meet different needs. Sartre gives the example of a soccer team, in which every player is a "common individual," that is, the function of everybody is a relation to the objective of the team. In the moment of the match every individual player realizes, in the light of the objective of the team, a practical synthesis. But every player takes his position for which he is most capable (heterogeneous structure). In the praxis of the organized group, an individual is a common individual. Individuality is, however, not abandoned. "Under the skin of the common hides the unique."[30]

In the organized group, there appears for the first time one leader who gives "mots d'ordre," unlike the group in fusion where anybody could do so. Sartre wrote very much about the organized group and its activities but very little about the form of an organization he would like to see realized. In his attack on Stalin, Sartre writes against centralization. In the era of Stalin, the sovereign became the insurpassable; he united state, party, and personality in himself. For Sartre, the sovereign in a Communist state turns on top in a vacuum, whereas, in a democratic society, he has to consult the dominating class which brought him into power. Sartre is against centralization and in favor of a democratization of the organization, because the latter is the relinquishing by the sovereign of his monopoly to the group.[31]

D. An Evaluation of Sartre's Later Philosophy

The earlier Sartre was accused by non-existentialists of not having developed an ethics. His early book Being and Nothingness was taken to be a discussion of philosophical anthropology. We have shown in Chapter II that this not quite so. The early Sartre already speaks of social implications, but the defect is that he mostly tells the reader what the social relations should not be, without making explicit what they should be. We have presented the views that the early Sartre speaks against individualism-permissivism on the one hand, and against conformity to the mass ("Man") on the other, but we do not find a normative, social philosophy. The later Sartre expounded the social philosophy of the group. Whereas in his earlier years, "being-with" implied conflict, hatred, no unity, no subject-to-subject relationship, no cooperation, love was rooted in destruction, etc., the later Sartre expounds a social philosophy which allows for communion, solidarity, cooperation, fraternity, loyalty. One person has no longer to be an object for another subject but both or all persons can be subjects and work for a common cause.

Sartre's later work, Critique de la Raison dialectique, could be considered a philosophical sociology, because the individual joins other individuals in a common "praxis." In a group in fusion, a common danger is necessary to have a group form; in the group proper, all members have to take an oath; in an organized group, there has to be a leader who distributes the various functions of the group.

Freedom is still a necessary component of action, and it is freedom, action, and responsibility that distinguish an "inner-directed person" from an "other-directed person." For the latter, the "Other" conditions him to act in a certain way (re-act), whereas the "inner-directed person" acts freely. The action is his. But we cannot overlook that Sartre's "freedom" represents curtailment in several ways. Firstly, we have noticed that not freedom, desire, and act, but need, freedom, and praxis, are the concepts of the later Sartre.

The fundamental "irreducibility" of man is not freedom and action, but need. A necessity has been brought in, which man cannot ultimately escape. Need, in turn, is related to scarcity. Secondly, the individual is really free when he has freed himself from the state of seriality of either individualism or other-directedness, and joins the group and lives in the group. The individual even goes so far as to limit his own freedom by taking a loyalty "oath," to honor mutual obligations.

Immediately after having read the later Sartre's book, Critique de la Raison dialectique, the present writer was convinced that that was what was needed to remedy the earlier Sartre's defects. This writer still finds Sartre's later "philosophy of the series" a very delicate essay---opposed to individualism and other-directedness, with the exception that for the later Sartre everybody who does not belong to the group is considered to belong to the "seriality." Are there not cases of people belonging at times to a group, at other times wanting to be alone---isolated? Provided, they are "inner-directed," there should be nothing wrong with them. On the contrary, from these people may come the researchers, the creative thinkers, the challengers of conventional thought.

After further reflection, however, the present writer gradually became convinced of several defects in Sartre's philosophy of the group, such as the following:

(i) It might be true that a common danger contributes to the formation of a group, but does it have to become a general principle that a group is continued only in time of danger? Can persons not form a group without a common threat? Sartre makes the formation of the group conditional, and, in doing so, does he not narrow down the concept of group? Maybe Buber's philosophy presents a richer meaning of the group?

(ii) Sartre emphasizes repeatedly "common praxis." But what about love and friendship? Arthur Lessing states that "the emphasis on praxis to the exclusion of everything else is disturbing. Why is there no mention here of all those impractical links with others which effect, even within their tension and release, concrete totalities of their own?"[32] It is not quite true that Sartre does not mention love and friendship. There are a couple of texts where Sartre mentions love and friendship. Sartre states that

> la fraternité, c'est à dire la structure fondamentale et pratique de toutes les relations réciproques entre membres d'un meme groupe. Ce qu'on appelle ensuite camaradie, amitié, amour---...---se produit sur la base de circonstances particulières, et dans telle on telle perspective,...[33]

But we have to recollect that fraternity for Sartre is a bond of common individuals, as long as every individual of the group sees his being and those of the Other under the form of obligation; that is, under the oath which has been taken. So love is derived from fraternity, but fraternity, in turn, derives from the oath. We can conclude, therefore, that without oath no fraternity and love. At another place, Sartre writes that "la violence est la force même de cette réciprocite laterale d'amour."[34] Here, terror is considered the cause of love and friendship. Sartre continues to write that "toutes les conduites interieures des individus communs (fraternité, amour, amitié,...) tirent leurs terrible puissance de la Terreur même."[35] But to consider oath and terror as the source of love and friendship is to empty these terms of their rich and significant meanings. We shall see whether Buber, whose philosophy will later be taken into consideration, can not provide us with a richer meaning. It should, however, not be overlooked that Sartre, in one novel "Le Diable et le Bon Dieu" speaks repeatedly about love and friendship. Some quotations taken from this novel may illustrate our point. Goetz says to Nasti: "Well Nasti, now I know what good must be. It is Love, of course: but the fact is that men don't love one another."[36] Some pages later Goetz says to Nasti: "And I tell you, it suffices for one man to love all men with undivided love for that love to spread from one to another throughout humanity."[37] A few pages later, Goetz speaks of the "law of love."[38] "The reign of love" is mentioned,[39] and we could enumerate many other places where Sartre speaks of love and friendship. But "the weakness is," as Herbert Spiegelberg also pointed out, "that there is a lack of theoretical foundation."[40] Maybe Buber can be of help to us and lay a theoretical foundation for love and friendship.

(iii) Since this study is concerned with the implications of Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education, group activities are of concern to us but they should not be considered the sum total of a social philosophy. We should also take into consideration the dialogue and conversation between teacher and student. Counseling and guidance are person-to-person procedures, as well as conference between teacher and students, etc.

Sartre writes about group formation and group activities, but direct person-to-person relationship remains untouched in his later philosophy. We shall wait for the next Chapter, in which we will discuss Buber's reaction to Sartre's philosophy, to find whether on this Buber can be of help to us.

II. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LATER SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH"

A. General View

In the previous Chapter, we pointed out that the earlier Sartre indirectly speaks against domination, imposition, and indoctrination in the teacher-student relation on the one hand, and against individualist-permissivist educational policy on the other. Besides this, he spoke against competition on the one hand and against conformity on the other in the student-student relation. He was very explicit in his opposition to both extremes, but he was not clear in respect to the fact of how to avoid both horns of this dilemma, though there were indications that he would favor a teacher who guides the students according to certain standards which have been established by a jurisdictional body. In the student-student relationship, however, Sartre has not been explicit at all on how to avoid competition and conformity.

We shall see that the later Sartre can add to the authoritarian-permissivist and competitive-conformist dilemma in education. We shall, therefore, not go into a discussion on need and scarcity in education. Besides this, American schools and teachers have pretty well taken care of the organic needs of child, youngster, or student, such as, (i) the need for food, drink, and air, (ii) the need for proper temperature, (iii) the need for activity and rest, (iv) the need for elimination, (v) the need for sex.

B. The Concrete Relations in Education

(1) Seriality

(a) Isolated students

An educational system that does not allow for teacher-student and student-student reciprocity contributes to a state of separation; such non-interaction creates social distance. Myles W. Rodehaver, et al., write that

> When teachers utilize the lecture method to the exclusion of student participation, interaction and thus social values are lost.... Students' response is coerced, or formalized as in question-and-answer. The group interaction that would broaden and sharpen his understanding is lacking. These methods are designed to create and maintain social distance.[41]

A "plurality of solitudes" should, however, not be deemed to include lecture method alone. The present writer is convinced that Sartre would also consider that such modern educational methods as programmed instruction and teaching machines would create and maintain social distance. Programmed instruction can perhaps be thought to have originated with the Winnetka Plan of Carleton W. Washburne. Every student worked on his workbook or assignment-sheets and advanced according to his capacity. Technology helped to modernize the programmed instruction (worksheets) of Washburne, and Skinner popularized the teaching machine. Do these modern devices not also contribute very much to social distance between teacher and student, as well as between student and student?

Nicolai Berdyaev wrote in the post-war years that "technology helps to improve communication between men but far from diminishing their fundamental disunion, it only tends to increase it." He continues to write that

> the motorcar, the aeroplane, the cinema, the wireless, all these inventions have certainly contributed a great deal to make communication between men universal. But the prodigious diffusion of these universal means of communication tends to undermine the intimacy and famili-

> arity so essential to communion, it has the effect of making man extremely solitary.[42]

(b) Serial students

In spite of the fact that the isolated students above presented are considered to be at social distances, they have nevertheless common interests, like the passengers of Saint-Germain whose common interest was to catch the bus (for their own separate ends); that is, they were all conditioned by the materiality outside of them. So is there also a common materiality outside of the students just described, which conditions them---hence, common interest. But it is worth mentioning that such serial students do not know what cooperation or solidarity means. Such students might have a common interest because a common materiality conditions them, such as a problematic situation in which they have been placed by the teacher. But serial students would not on their own initiative form a discussion group to go about solving the problem. Every student would be very much alone, or by himself, in trying to find a solution. The student who finds the solution first raises his hand to indicate that he is ahead of the others. The situation is competitive rather than cooperative. In an examination or test, students usually are not interested in whether other students are failing or not; what they are interested in is whether they themselves can pass. In European "high-schools" where there are a certain number of students who have to fail the grade each year (in Germany it is about 10%), each and every student has the interest of attaining the next higher grade, rather than that the others should do so. This is a common interest, but not a cooperative situation. For Sartre, there is only one possibility to overcome this state of seriality; this is to separate them from being in a series, and educate them for the group. We shall consider Sartre's notion of the group later.

(c) Impotent students

The impotence of individual students arises first of all from their separation or non-cooperation (seriality instead of group). It was shown in the Part I that, for Sartre, there is no efficiency because there is no cooperation. William Stanley writes that

> Collective action represents the return to power of the individual, but in a different form and it is that recognition which has built many of our numerous and powerful associations.[43]

Secondly, group organization is more effective than seriality of students in achievement of learning outcomes, because different competencies assure development of the various skills of individual students for common ends. For Sartre, seriality in education is passive, inert, and powerless. Barbara Morgan writes that "an organized group is more powerful than ...the individual."[44]

(d) Other-directed students

In the last previous Chapter, we discussed the "conformity" or "other-directedness" of students, and it is not necessary to repeat what was said there. However, we may add that a student who is other-directed is in a status of "inertia," because the "Other" determines all his acts, or his action comes to him from the "Other." There is no initiative or creativity. The cases of seriality above had to do with students who are not themselves; they act like others and they think and behave in the way others do. In seriality, the "Other" is the model of every student.

Extero-conditioning brings about conformity. For Sartre, this method is only effective, as we have seen above, when the serial individual is extero-conditioned from his childhood on.

(2) Group

We have presented the later Sartre's view that the group constitutes itself through the common objective or end (goal) which determines its common praxis---and this common objective is a common need or a common danger (threat). A group "makes of itself a group by feeling an individual need as a common need. For Sartre, schools should therefore be used as a means of cultivating an interest in the things that pertain to our common life. The relation of the individual to the group is not action and reaction, but interaction. For Sartre, it is not possible to put the individual on one side and the group on the other. The group is not a hyper-organism but one of interactive members. The group is a community of interests and purposes. It is, therefore, the primal task of an educational system to provide for each student the opportunity to share in the common life according to common interests. This educational goal presupposes that something must happen to the student other than the mere acceptance of a point-of-view, that is, the student has to be freed from his "other-directedness" (Etre-Autre) and he has to become a "third" (un tiers) student, who has freed himself from the inert otherness (seriality) and who is the source of his action. Sartre writes that the praxis of the "third" man is his. However, a student with initiative and creative talent should not act for his own separate interests but for common interests. Education has to serve a social function. Liberal education emphasizes that pupil "interests" should be given a play. The child-centered school, however, does not see that a social concern is also needful. Collective education, on the other hand, has a common goal which guarantee positiveness and direction of students, but there is a decrease of individual action and initiative. The praxis of the student is not his because the aims are furnished from the outside or imposed by some authority external to the student. Sartre's notion of the group does not imply that the individual student is subordinated to the group, but that they are associating themselves in joint activity. We saw Sartre writing against the notion that the group is a hyperorganism to which the individual is subordinate. It is the teacher's task to promote common interests.

(a) Teacher-student relation

We have seen in Chapter II that the teacher is necessary in education in order to place the student in as many new situations as possible, hence to increase his "world of insight," which will enable the student to make new projections and choices. The educator guides the student toward knowledge and understanding. In the present Chapter, the later Sartre shows us that individuals also learn from the group's experiences. Individual students in the group contribute, but also partake of the contributions of teacher and fellow-students. But what about the teacher? Is he an outsider, or a member of the group? In this writer's view, Sartre would prefer a teacher to be a member of the group because only then would we realize Sartre's ideal of "common praxis." Sartre wants it to be clearly understood that the very existence of the group is made possible only through the integrating process of each individual (teacher and students). Everybody keeps himself subordinated to the common purpose. This, however, means that the teacher, if he is to be accepted as a group-member, has to free himself from his "otherness" (of being a person with different or separate ends or goals). The criterion for Sartre's social ideal in education would then be that the worth of a form of social life should be shared by all members of the educational process (teacher and students).

This kind of educational system would differ from the idea of class (oligarchy of intelligence). In a society where there is a stratification by classes, there can be no common praxis and, hence, no unity. The later Sartre would thus oppose an educational system which follows Plato's pattern of the Republic, in which education is the vehicle for testing to which of three classes an individual student belongs: (i) philosophers (ii) soldiers (iii) workers. For Plato, the teacher was considered a paradigmatic self, older and more mature than the students; he was a "middleman" between the world of sense and the world of idea. To consider the teacher a group-member with students would be detrimental for education, because the personality of the "middleman"---the guide to truth---would lose its significance. Realist teachers would object to Sartre and maintain their position that the teacher is essentially a demonstrator or expositor of infallible knowledge and the students the passive recipients of knowledge. But pragmatists who consider the teacher as "research-project director" or a director of a social enterprise, are similar to the later Sartre's notion of the teacher being a group-member and working with the group for a common objective.

However, if the teacher is only a member of the group, how is it possible that there is any sense of direction in the "praxis" of the group? (This constitutes the threat of permissivism to the educational system.) Here we have to take into consideration again Sartre's notion of "mots d'ordre." We saw above that everybody in the group can give "mots d'ordre." (There is equality of opportunity.) The teacher as the most mature member of the group can give the most mature "mots d'ordre" (suggestions, recommendations, advice). Such advice from the teacher will enable the other members of the group to get a feeling of orientation, so that the whole "common praxis" will not be mere hit-or-miss.

(b) Student-student relation

To avoid the competitive-conformist dilemma in education, the later Sartre proposes cooperation. Every individual member is a "third" who directs himself freely toward a certain common praxis. It is the productive individual student who realizes his own potentialities and thus contributes to enhancement of the common life. The student does not give away his personal autonomy and become compliant. The unique qualities and strengths of individual students are retained, and utilized to pursue common goals. We saw that Sartre wrote that the praxis of the "third" man is his. In the state of other-directedness man acts like the "Other." He becomes compliant. We also presented the view that the structure of the group consists of a multiplicity of individual syntheses of "thirds" directing themselves freely toward a certain "common praxis." So the school is designed to promote cooperation for the common good. In cooperation, helpfulness and resourcefulness count for much. Each student can try to be as helpful and cooperative as another.

Sartre would reject the idea of abstract, universal superiority and inferiority, because the group makes the act of the various individuals efficient and instrumental in its success as we saw in the philosophical part. Every student, in his mode of activity, can enrich the experience of the group. Blind conformism negates the dignity and the function of the individual student---which is spontaneity, originality, resourcefulness---and thus violates the most fundamental rules of cooperation. The later Sartre's notion of cooperation is a necessary factor in a democratic educational system, where the social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of each individual student. For Sartre, each individual student has an unhampered share in associated actions (equality of opportunity). Sartre speaks of the community of people projecting itself toward the objectives that it produces as common. There is an activity in which the entire group can participate "with each member contributing something and with the entire activity being successfully accomplished."[45]

Sartre's notion of the cooperative student has some similarities to Erich Fromm's student who realizes positive freedom.[46] This freedom can only be attained by the realization of his self, by being himself, and, in spontaneous activity, to unite himself with other students. For the later Sartre, unity of the students is possible---all in the group are working together in a common cause.

REFERENCES

[1] D. Anzieu, "Sur la methode dialectique dans l'étude des groupes restreints," *Les Etudes Philosophiques* Vol. XVII, No. 4 (Oct., 1962), p.601. "With the Occupation and then the Liberation, the experience of Sartre, as well as his lectures, changed. He experienced human groups, such as, for example, the Committee of editorial staff of a newspaper and review, and the Committee of direction of a party and of the movement for peace. Then, there is the influence of Merleau-Ponty which can be recognized in the consideration of social aspects and of history. Sartre also discovered Marxism, social psychology, and structural ethnology."(transl. by the present writer)

[2] Sartre, *Critique de la Raison dialectique*, footnote p.286. "To those persons who have read 'Being and Nothingness', I would like to say that the factual necessity is practical: that is, the "pour-soi" as agent discovers itself first as "inertia" or better as "practico-inert" in the milieu of the "en-soi."" (transl. by the present writer)

[3] Robert O. Cumming (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sartre* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp.428-29.

[4] *Ibid.*, p.433.

[5] *Ibid.*, p.436.

[6] Sartre, *Critique de la Raison dialectique* (CRD), p.285. "It is doubtable that man...discovers himself first as 'other' in the world of objectivity...as inert objectivation... The necessity for man is to discover himself as 'Other' which he is not and in the dimension of alterity." (transl.by the present writer)

[7] Arthur Lessing, "Marxist Existentialism," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XX (March, 1967), p.472.

[8] Sartre, *op. cit.*, p.308.

[9] *Ibid.*, p.310. "Organic solitude, submitted solitude, won solitude, conducted solitude, solitude as social status of the individual, solitude as exteriority of groups which condition the exteriority of the individuals, solitude as reciprocity of isolation in a creative society of masses.... Isolation is a historical and social behavior in the milieu of a mass of men.... Everybody turns the back to anybody." (transl. by the present writer)

[10] Cumming, *op. cit.*, p.460.

[11] Joachim Kopper, "Sartres Kritik der dialektischen Vernunft" Kant-Studien, Vol. LIII (1961-2), p.360. "Man understands himself from the dead (inorganic) material; he submits himself to matter.... As member of the series man is not a 'self,' he is not his own, but is determined by exterior circumstances. (transl. by the present writer)

[12] Sartre, op. cit., p.311.

[13] Mary Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre (London: Hutchison University Library, 1965), p.169.

[14] Sartre, op. cit., p.354.

[15] Ibid., p.324. "The individual as member of the series, has an 'other-directed' conduct which means that his conduct is the action of the Other, that is, it (the conduct) is through it (the action of the Other) a recurrence which is pushed to the limit." (transl. by the present writer)

[16] Ibid., p.331. "The action of the 'Other' determines all the actions (operations)." (transl. by the present writer)

[17] Ibid., p.338. "is governed laterally and at a distance by the activity of the 'Other'." (transl. by the present writer)

[18] W. Desan, The Marxism of J. P. Sartre, pp.198-99.

[19] Sartre, op. cit., p.621. "extero-conditioning is really only possible when the serial individual is produced as extero-conditioned since his childhood." (transl. by the present writer)

[20] Cumming, op. cit., pp464-65.

[21] Ibid., p.495.

[22] W. Desan, The Marxism of Sartre, p.141.

[23] Sartre, op. cit., p.420. "in the 'praxis,' there is no 'Other,' there are only 'myselves.'" (transl, by the present writer)

[24] Ibid., p.406. "I try to integrate my 'praxis' to the common 'praxis'." (transl. by the present writer)

[25] *Ibid*., p.441. "So my oath to the 'third' receives a dimension of community; it touches everybody directly and across all." (transl. by the present writer)

[26] Cumming, *op. cit*., p.475.

[27] Sartre, *op. cit*., p.453.

[28] *Ibid*., "This fraternity is not...founded on the received similarity of nature in as far as it expresses the profound identity of natures. Why then, could we not also say that in a can of peas there are 'brother-peas,' because these peas belong to the same can?" (transl. by the present writer)

[29] *Ibid*. "We are brothers in as far as we are our proper sons after the creative act of the oath and our common invention. And the fraternity, as in the real families, is translated into the group, by a number of reciproque and singular." (transl. by the present writer)

[30] Desan, *op. cit*., p.177.

[31] Sartre, *op. cit*., p.629.

[32] Arthur Lessing, "Marxist Existentialism" *The Review of Metaphysics*, p.476.

[33] Sartre, *op. cit*., p.454. "Fraternity, that is, the fundamental and practical structure of all the reciprocal relations between the members of a same group. That which is called comradeship, friendship, love---...---is produced on the basis of particular circumstances, and in such and such a perspective,..." (transl. by the present writer)

[34] *Ibid*., p.455. "Violence is the same force of that lateral reciprocity of love." (transl. by the present writer)

[35] *Ibid*. "And all the interior conducts of the common individuals (such, for example, as fraternity, love, friendship,...) get their terrible force or power from the violence itself." (transl. by the present writer)

[36] Sartre, *Lucifer and the Good Lord* (London: Hamilton, 1952), p.68.

[37] *Ibid*., p.71.

[38] *Ibid.*, p.75.

[39] *Ibid.*, p.101.

[40] Herbert Spiegelberg, "French Existentialism: Its Social Philosophies," *Kenyon Review*, Vol. XVI (1954), p.454.

[41] Myles W. Rode, et al., *The Sociology of the School* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1957), p.56.

[42] N. A. Berdyaev, *Solitude and Society*, transl. from the Russian by J. Reavey (London: The Centenary Press, 1947)

[43] William O. Stanley and others, *Social Foundations of Education* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1956), p.93.

[44] Barbara S. Morgan, *Individuality in a Collective World* (New York: W. N. Norton and Co., 1935), p.273.

[45] Herbert Klausmeier, *Learning and Human Abilities* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p.147.

[46] See his work, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941)

CHAPTER IV

THE REACTION OF MARTIN BUBER TO SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF "BEING-WITH" IN EDUCATION

I. BUBER'S REACTION TO SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF "BEING-WITH"

A. Buber's own Reaction to Sartre's Philosophy

In two works, Buber refers to Sartre's earlier philosophy. In a chapter "Religion und Modernes Denken" ("Religion and Modern Thought") in Gottesfinsternis (Eclipse of God), Buber criticizes (i) Sartre's atheism and (ii) Sartre's concept of freedom. The former criticism is not of a surprise to us, since Buber is a Jew and, therefore, believes in the God of Abraham as revealed in the Old Testament of the Holy Bible. But there is something more in it than simply a disagreement on theology. For the early Sartre, the concept of God implies the notion of the "Other," or, in other words, God is the quintessence of the "Other." In Chapter II, we have shown that one's experience of the "Other" can be twofold. One can either look at the "Other" and make an object out of him, or one can see the "Other" as a subject. If God were to exist, He would make an object out of us, and we, as subjects, on the other hand, would make an object out of God. (God becomes the objectivation of a person's own wishes, desires, and hopes.) So God is no longer something Real but becomes something Ideal. Buber attacks Sartre's subject-to-object relationship of his earlier philosophy and substitutes for it a subject-to-subject relationship. Buber writes that "Wie aber...wenn zwischen mir und dem Andern primär nicht das gegenseitige Verhältnis von Subjekt und Objekt, sondern das gegenseitige Verhältnis von Ich und Du waltet."[1] The theological disagreement implies a disagreement in the social philosophy of these two thinkers---the earlier Sartre and Buber. Like the later Sartre, Buber speaks of a subject-to-subject relationship, but, unlike the later Sartre, he speaks of an I-Thou philosophy. The theory of this philosophy will be considered later. Coming back to theology, it might be said that, for Buber, God is something of an "Absolutheit" (absoluteness), hence not the empirical "Other" which at times can become an Object ("It"). "Gott selber kann mir nie zum Gegenstand werden; ich kann kein anderes Verhältnis zu ihm gewinnen als das des Ich zu seinem ewigen Du---das des Du zu seinem ewigen Ich."[2]

The later criticism in Gottesfinsternis, which is directed against Sartre's concept of freedom in his earlier philosophy, has also to be seen against a theological background. For Sartre, the freedom of man is incompatible with the existence of God. Man cannot be free if God exists, but, if God is non-existent, then man is his creative freedom. Buber's reply to Sartre's notion of freedom is the following:

> Die Forderung der Mensch solle die Gott zugeschriebene schöpferische Freiheit wiedererlangen, nimmt sich ihr gegenüber wie eine demagogische Phrase aus. Was uns an 'schöpferischer Freiheit' wirklich angehört, unsere Teilnahme an der Schöpfung, ist eingesetzt wie wir selber; es geht darum, diese Freiheit richtig, das heisst des Eingesetztseins würdig zu gebrauchen, nicht weniger und nicht mehr. Wer an die Stelle da von das Postulat der Wiederlangung der Freiheit setzt, weicht der wahren menschlichen Existenz aus, die Schickung und Aufgabe ist.[3]

This is Buber's own reaction to Sartre's notion of "being-with," as found in his earlier philosophy. What Buber proposes in place of Sartre's creative freedom, we shall see later.

In the essay on "Elements of the Interhuman" in The Knowledge of Man, Buber attacks Sartre's earlier philosophy as individualistic. A person is shut up in himself. Buber writes:

> Sartre regards the walls between the partners in a conversation as simply impassable. For him it is inevitable human destiny that a man has directly to do only with himself and his own affairs. The inner existence of the other is his own concern, not mine; there is no direct relation with the other, nor can there be.[4]

This criticism by Buber of the earlier Sartre seems, however, to be a misrepresentation. We presented Sartre's earlier philosophy in Chapter II and arrived at the conclusion that Sartre opposed individualism in a twofold way: (i) from the facticity of the situation and the "Other," and (ii) from the concrete relations between persons, where Sartre spoke very emphatically against tolerance, a laissez-faire policy, blindness, indifference, and others. Man has been placed in a "with-world" (a world which one shares with others) and it is, therefore, impossible that "man has directly to do only with himself and his own affairs." Indifference and blindness are an inauthentic attitude towards others.

All these reactions of Buber were to the earlier Sartre. The present writer has not found, however, any reaction by Buber to the later Sartre. The following pages will elaborate on Buber's actual and Buber's possible reaction to the earlier Sartre, and his possible reaction to the later Sartre.

B. Buber's Reaction to Individualism and Collectivism Compared with Sartre's (Notion of "Being-with")

Above, we have seen Buber's own reaction to the earlier Sartre and have pointed out that Buber considers him an individualist-permissivist and, therefore, rejects his social philosophy. But let us for a moment consider the ground for Buber's rejection of individualism in general. Individualism, which views man in isolation, sees only a part of man or distorts the face of man, because it does not know true personal wholeness, which is a genuine relation with other people. The fundamental reality for Buber is man with man; individualism, however, sees man only in relation to himself, and therefore, has to be rejected by Buber. But does the earlier Sartre not also speak of the "fact" that we exist in a world where there are already others or that the "pour-soi" arises in a world which is one of other "for-itselves" (pour-soi)? We cannot act, therefore, as if we were alone in the world. Blindness and indifference are attacked by the earlier Sartre. For him, the fundamental reality is also man with man (being-with-others). It might, however, be the case that the earlier Sartre's notion of "being-with" does not contain a genuine relation with other people, but this defect has not to be equated with individualism. In Chapter III, we have presented the later Sartre's attack on individualism, illuminated by his opposition to "seriality." Human beings who live in "series" are isolated beings, where every man is for himself and not affected by the conditions of his fellow men. Every person acts for his own separate ends. The earlier and the later Sartre both reject individualism. Do they, therefore, not basically agree on this matter?

Let us next consider Buber's opposition to collectivism. In his essay on "die Frage an den Einzelnen," Buber writes that

> die Menge aktualisiert sich,...und von rauschhafter Ekstasis uber-wältigt taucht die Person in der Bewegung des öffentlichen Lebens unter. Hier gibt es kein entgegenstrebendes, hemmendes Wissen um die Anderheit der andern Personen: die Verklärung der Menge uberglänzt alle Anderheit und der feurige Identifikationstrieb kann ein wirkliches 'Familien'---Gefühl fur den Unbekannten erzeugen.... Die andere Grundhaltung ist eine passive und stetige; es ist das gewohnte 'Mitmachen' der öffentlichen Meinung und der öffentlichen 'Stellungsnahme.'[5]

In a collectivity, the principle of "otherness" disappears in "being-with." "Instead of building man into a person, every collectivity submerges him in an amorphous faceless mass."[6] In a collectivity man is bundled together with other men ("Zusammenbündelung"). He is bound to the mass in such a way that he ceases to be responsible for his action. Besides this defect, Buber points out that "the most valuable of all goods---the life between man and man---gets lost in the process; the autonomous relationships become meaningless, personal relationships wither."[7]

But does the earlier as well as the later Sartre not speak of nearly the same? The earlier Sartre opposes the "crowd" ("das Man"--the they), because the person who is submerged in the faceless mass, loses his freedom and his responsibility. He is a cog in the collective machine; no longer a human person who stands on his own to make decisions and who shoulders the responsibility for his decisions. Does the later Sartre not also write emphatically against "l'action de l'Autre qui determine toutes les opérations" (The action of the Other which determines all the operations)? Does he not write against the totality of which the person feels himself a part as a false totality, because it is a determination of everyone by Others, and no one by himself? Hence, we have to come to the conclusion that Buber, as well as the earlier and the later Sartre, rejects individualism and collectivism in "being-with."

C. Buber's Notion of "Being-with" as contrasted to Sartre's earlier philosophy

(1) Freedom and Responsibility

For the earlier Sartre, freedom is the basis of "being-with." Man _is_ his freedom; he _has not_ freedom. To be free means not to be determined or dominated by either external or internal forces, but to make his own choices and projections.

For Buber, man also freely makes his decisions concerning his mode of life and expresses it in his acts, but, in contrast to the earlier Sartre, freedom is not a fundamental structure of human existence, not a "Wohnraum," (living-area) as Buber points out in Über das Erzieherische.[8] Freedom, for Buber, on the other hand, is only a presupposition, means, or instrument for action; not a "Wohnraum," but a Steg (path). For the earlier Sartre, the contrast to determination and domination was freedom; for Buber, the counterpole of domination is not freedom but "Verbundenheit" (a binding together of human beings). Buber writes that

> Zwang ist eine negative Wirklichkeit, und Verbundenheit ist die positive; Freiheit ist eine Möglichkeit, die wiedergewonnene Möglichkeit. Vom Schicksal, von der Natur, von den Menschen gezwungen werden: der Gegenpol ist nicht, vom Schicksal, von der Natur, von den Menschen frei, sondern mit ihm, mit ihr mit ihnen verbunden und verbundet sein; um dies zu werden, muss man freilich erst unabhängig geworden sein, aber die Unabhängigkeit ist ein Steg und kein Wohnraum.[9]

Buber traces the German word "Freiheit" back to "Freihals," an Old-German term which is supposed to show the momentary aspect of freedom. Freedom is not a goal of life, but is only a "Sprungbrett" (Spring-board) for the interhuman relation. Therefore, Buber does not believe in freedom as the earlier Sartre does; he only likes it. Besides this, for both, freedom does not mean to act ad libitum (arbitrarily). For the earlier Sartre, to be free means to act in order to realize one's possibilities of being. Buber, on the other hand, connects freedom with destiny ("Schicksal"). To be free means to meet one's destiny and to strive to realize continuously the possibility of an inter-human relation (I-Thou relation), and through it ever anew become a self. Ernst Breisach's view is that "Buber combines the amor fati of Nietzsche (the loving acceptance of one's destiny) with what he considers man's ultimate directedness toward the Thou."[10]

Responsibility is another term which is accepted by both Buber and Sartre. However, for Buber man is not only responsible for the actions he takes, as it was for the earlier Sartre, but man's responsibility also exists when somebody addresses himself to another person. A person who wants to be responsible has to respond to whomsoever he meets. Buber's notion of "being-with" is permeated with the address of one person to another and the response (answer) of the Other.

(2) Knowledge of the Other person

For the earlier Sartre, the other person is not manifested through the knowledge which one person has of another. We have seen Sartre's rejection of idealism and realism; in the former philosophy, the other person is the object of one's thoughts, in the latter, the other is the object of one's sense perceptions.

What does Buber think about knowledge of the other person? In his essay on "Elements of the Inter-human," he writes that

> a man, although he exists as a living being among living beings and even as a thing among things, is nevertheless something categorically different from all things and all beings. A man cannot really be grasped except on the basis of the gift of the spirit which belongs to man alone among all things, the spirit as sharing decisively in the personal life of the living man, that is the spirit which determines the person. To be aware of a man, therefore, means in particular to perceive his wholeness as a person determined by the spirit; it means *to perceive the dynamic centre* [Thou] which stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude with the recognizable sign of uniqueness. *Such an awareness is impossible, however, if and so long as the other is the separated object of my contemplation or even contemplation* [against idealism and realism], *for this wholeness* [Thou] *and its centre do not let themselves be known to contemplation or observation* [It]. *It is only possible when I step into an elemental relation with the other*, that is, *when he becomes present to me*. Hence I designate awareness in this special sense as "personal making present."[11] (Italics mine)

Thus, Buber and the earlier Sartre are basically in agreement that the other person is not manifested as a person through contemplation and observation. Like Sartre, Buber would say that we cannot *experience* another person because to do so would mean that we make an object (It) out of him (Thou), but we have to meet or *encounter* the other person. Buber differentiates between two ways of knowing: (i) *Erfahrung*---"Der Mensch befährt die Fläche der Dinge und erfährt sie." (Man travels on the surface of things and experiences them.)[12] (ii) *Beziehung*---one person steps into a relation with another. However, the way of establishing a relation between two persons is very different in each of the two thinkers as we shall see next.

(3) Concrete Relations in "Being-with"

For the earlier Sartre, it is through the encounter of the "look" that we meet the other persons. The "Other" is the "being-as-a-look" which is synonymous with "being-as-a-subject." We are being-looked-at-by-the-Other. Thus, the "Other" is the one for whom we are an object. There exists a circular movement of subject-object relation and object-subject relation. At one time, one person is a subject for another, at another time, the relation may turn around. Sartre's earlier philosophy does not allow for a subject-subject relation. This has the effect that we have to speak of conflict and hatred in "being-with": "conflict" because a person is tossed indefinitely from one fundamental attitude (subject-object relation) to another (object-subject relation), and hatred because a person wants to get rid of its own inapprehensible being-as-object-for-the-Other and abolish its dimension of "alienation," as we saw in Chapter II.

Buber attacks Sartre's subject-to-object relationship between persons and substitutes for it a subject-to-subject relationship, which Buber calls the I-Thou relation. It does not mean or imply, however, that a subject-to-object relation-is non-existent. It exists, but we have to look for it in the non-human (physical) world. Buber calls this world the "It-world" and the relationship the I-It relationship (to differentiate it from the "Thou-world"---human world---and the I-Thou relationship).

(a) I-It relationship

The basic characteristic of the fundamental expression "I-It" is that the I is separated from the It in the subject-object antithesis. The I has an object in front of him. He can perceive it, sense it, imagine it, will it, feel it, think it, etc. All these activities belong to the I-It relation. The It world is a world of orientation in space and time, and causality reigns as king in the world of It. Scientific terms, such as understanding, prediction, control, etc., are at home in this world, which makes this world secure. Men can form a reasonable plan in this world because there exist fixed laws and understood connections by which to build and equip organized social living.

In the It-world the emphasis of the I is on experiencing, possessing, using, talking about something. The I manipulates things without ever really facing or inter-penetrating them. The attitude of a person in the It-world is detached, objectified, impersonal. For Buber, man in the It-world is isolated or solitary, because there is no genuine relation to his fellow men.

But let us ask finally the question, whether it is bad to have an I-It attitude, which would imply that we should reject such a relationship. Buber denies it on the ground that "ohne Es kann der Mensch nicht leben." (without It man cannot live)[13] What would happen to man without science which is necessary for a progressive life? What without institutions which are necessary for an ordered life? Etc. Buber, however, adds another sentence: "Aber wer mit ihm [Es] allein lebt, ist nicht der Mensch." (But who lives with It alone is not a human being.)[14] Those persons who stay in the I-It relation and do not enter into an I-Thou relation are not human beings. But it is evil when one person treats another as an It. Paul Pfuetze writes that "this is the situation, for example, when the scientist, the politician, the propagandist, the employer treats men and women as things, commodities, pawns, objects to be manipulated, used, pushed around."[15]

(b) I-Thou relationship

In the I-It relation, man is an individual entity who is conscious of himself as the subject of experiencing and using. The individual differentiates himself from other entities. In the I-Thou relation, man makes his appearance by virtue of a genuine relation with other persons. Let us summarize the characteristics of the I-Thou relation:

(i) wholeness: Buber writes on the first page of his book, I and Thou, that "das Grundwort Ich-Du kann nur mit dem ganzen Wesen gesprochen werden." (The fundamental word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole of one's being.)[17] In the I-It world only a part of one's being is involved, such as, the senses to perceive or the mind to calculate.

(ii) exclusiveness: When one meets the other, one must be really present. One has to sacrifice other possibilities to the demands of this relation.

(iii) genuine response: If I do not see or hear the other person who addresses himself to me, I am not in an I-Thou relation. If there is a response or an answer to do something about it, the I-Thou relationship will be established.

(iv) confirmation of the Other: Buber writes in Bilder von Gut und Böse that

> der Mensch ist als Mensch ein Wagnis des Lebens, undeterminiert und ungefestigt, er bedarf daher der Bestätitung [das Tier nicht, da es in seinem Dies-Sein gefestigt ist] und diese kann er naturgemäss nur als der einzelne Mensch empfangen, in dem die andern und er selbst ihm in seinem Dieser-Mensch-Sein bestätigen. Immer wieder muss das Ja zu ihm gesprochen werden, vom Blick des Vertrauten und von der Regung des eigenen Herzens her, um ihn von der Bangigkeit des Preisgegebenseins zubefreien, die ein Vorgeschmack des Todes ist.[16]

Man as man has to be confirmed. He has to watch for a "Yes" which allows him to be. (An animal has not to be confirmed, because it is unquestionably what it is.) This "Yes" comes to man from another person who "makes him present as a Thou," which means "mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and confirmation."[17]

(v) uniqueness of a person: In the world of It, causality is the dominating feature. In the world of Thou, there is no causality and no system of coordination. Each person is a unique Thou.

In short, we can say that the I-Thou relation between two persons is the authentic relation for Buber---a relation of genuineness. Authentic existence is not only to recognize one's freedom in a given facticity, as it was for Sartre in his earlier philosophy. It is also not merely to look at another person or be looked at by the other person; that is, to have a subject-object relation at one time and an object-subject relation at another. Authentic existence is a genuine I-Thou relation between human beings. It goes far beyond the "look" of Sartre; it maintains freedom and integrity of those communicating, without impairment. We have seen the richness of this subject-to-subject relationship as we have discussed the I-Thou relation, and we shall see it further when we discuss such concepts as love, trust, and faithfulness, which were used defectively or not at all by the earlier Sartre, as shown in Chapter II.

(4) The Salient Characteristics of Buber's Philosophy as Contrasted to the Earlier Sartre's

(a) Love

The earlier Sartre equated love with possession. To love another person is to want him. The consequences of such love are destruction. For Sartre, the lover makes an object of the other. But, for Buber, to use such a phrase as "object of love" is a great misconception of love. When Buber speaks of love, there is always a meeting of an I and a Thou (a subject-to-subject encounter). Love binds two different persons together. Love reaches out to the Other and it is, therefore, never to be confused with Eros, a subjective feeling.

> Gefühle begleiten das metaphysische und metapsychische Faktum der Liebe, aber sie machen es nicht aus; und die Gefühle, die es begleiten, konnen sehr verschiedener Art sein. Das Gefühl Jesu zum Bessessenen ist ein anderes als das Gefühl zum Lieblingsjünger; aber die Liebe ist eine.[18]

Moreover, another vital difference between love as a genuine meeting and love as a feeling or feelings is that the latter "werden gehabt" (are had), whereas love as an act of genuine meeting is a happening. ("die Liebe geschieht")[19] Love does not cling to the I so that he could have it as his object but love is between the I and the Thou.

(b) Unity

For the earlier Sartre, unity or union of two persons is impossible because "the assimilation of the 'pour-soi' and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of 'otherness' in the Other," as we saw in Chapter II. What remains is conflict and hatred. But does the "otherness" in the Other have to be given up in a union or communion of persons? It might be the case in a mystical experience, where the longing of the I is for unity with the ground of being. In mystic thought, the otherness of a person should vanish in order to become unified with the Transcendence. In a collectivity, otherness of a person should also become sameness. Not so, however, for Buber; he writes:

> Dieser Mensch ist anders, wesenhaft anders als ich, und diese seine Anderheit meine ich, weil ich ihn meine, ich bestätige sie, ich will sein Anders sein, weil ich sein Sosein will.[20]

Buber gives the example of marriage, where the principle of accepting and affirming otherness is just what is necessary for a happy life together.

(c) Help, trust, confidence

Buber writes in Elements of the Interhuman that "the help that men give each other in becoming a self leads the life between men to its height."[21] Man can help the Other because he is able to hear and see the Other and respond to the address of the Other. The person addressed is really present; he even sacrifices other possibilities to the demands of this particular relation (principle of exclusiveness in the I-Thou relationship). Therefore one can have hope and confidence. The Other exists; his help is sure because he is at one's disposal. The "I" can have confidence in the "Thou" and vice versa. Genuine relation between an I and a Thou also involves trust, because it is trust that enables a person to open himself to the Other.

But, if one looks into Sartre's earlier philosophy, one attempts in vain to find such concepts as help, trust, and confidence. There are other salient features in Buber's philosophy, such as, dialogue and loyalty. We shall consider them in Buber's possible reaction to the later Sartre.

D. Buber's Notion of "Being-with" as Contrasted with Sartre's later Philosophy

(1) The Group in Fusion, as contrasted with Buber's Community

As we recall, for the later Sartre, a group constitutes itself through a common objective or end (a common threat or danger); then every individual projects himself by self-determination to achieve a common goal. For Buber, such a social phenomenon, where the life of a number of men is bound together because of their shared experiences and reactions to the common threat, may constitute a group, and solidarity and cooperation are acceptable principles of conduct within the group life. But what is necessary is not only a common danger (external) and a self-determination or rather a synthetic self-determination of every individual (internal), that is, to act from within for a common end. Something more is needed to establish a genuine group (a community) and this is the person-to-person relationship---the I-Thou relation. In Sartre's group, people work together (cooperation and solidarity); they even form a unity or union because of their common activities. But the defect is that they do not live together in an essential relation between person and person, between I and Thou. The rock or foundation for Buber's idea of the group is the meeting or the mutual relation between one person and another. It is a solid, firm, and stable one. The defect of Sartre's concept of a group is that it is conditional or situational. Its formation depends on a common danger or threat; that is, it has its content outside of itself, hence, no wonder that the internal danger which threatens the group after the common danger is over is that of falling back to seriality again. This internal danger does not exist for Buber, because the formation of the group is not built on such a shaky foundation. "Die Gemeinde baut sich aus der lebendig gegenseitigen Beziehung auf, aber der Baumeister ist die lebendige Mitte."[22] "The between" or "betweenness" ("die Zwischenmenschlichkeit") is the vital bond in a group, and that is exactly what is missing in Sartre's notion of group formation.

Buber would go along with Sartre's opposition to the Serial Other, who is in a state of other-directedness and acts like the Other. He would also go along with Sartre's notion of the "third" man, who recognizes that he is free and realizes himself in the common action. It is true for Buber, too, that man can serve the common good "not as a cog in a machine but as a free and creative being. Man's creativity is the energy which is given to him to form and to direct...."[23] So far, Buber could go along with Sartre's "third" man. But again one important addition has to be made to Sartre's "third" man ---the real product of man's freedom and creativity is not only a common work (cooperation), a common purpose, but that of a life lived in a genuine I-Thou relation.

Let us see for a moment what Buber's group (or community, as he prefers to call it) looks like. Like Sartre, Buber differentiates clearly from what the community is not taken to be ---a "Menge" (crowd) or a collectivity which is a "Bündelung" (not a binding together but a bundling). In the former, man deprives himself of his freedom and responsibility; he is submerged and absorbed in the crowd and does what other people do. "Der Mensch in der Menge---das ist ein Span in ein Bündel gepresst, das, der Strömung uberliefert...im Wasser treibt."[24] The man in the collectivity is deprived of his freedom and responsibility and becomes a cog in the collective machine. The individual is subordinated to the collectivity and he can no longer feel his worth and life.

Community, for Buber, is the "inner disposition or constitution of a life in common."[25] The essence of a community is found in the fact that it has a centre (Thou), and this I-Thou relationships permeates all activities; this association alone makes for communal living. "An association based on community of views and aspirations alone cannot satisfy this need."[26]

At another place, Buber writes that

> a real community need not consist of people who are perpetually together; but it must consist of people who, precisely because they are comrades, have mutual access to one another and are ready for one another.[27]

(2) Buber's Possible Reaction to Sartre's "Group Proper"

For the later Sartre, the "oath" is a practical invention to secure permanency of the group. It is a protection of every "third" man not to become a serial "Other." Buber also speaks of mutual obligations, pledge and promise, binding and loyal bonds.[28] It would, however, not be enough for Buber that an individual takes the oath, that is, that he experiences a kind of "intero-conditioning" (he limits his freedom by his own decision) in order to be loyal to the group. More has to be added---the person-to-person or I-Thou relationship. This relationship involves genuine response to one another. The I-Thou relationship binds all life together in the strongest way, so that the oath which will be or has already been taken will be kept. For Sartre, it is necessary to introduce another precaution against disintegration of the group, which is the "terror"; for Buber it is not, because the unity that is felt in a group in which the I-Thou relation is dominant between the members permeates all personal contacts. What is needed for Buber is not "terror" and punishment, but to strengthen the immediacy of relationships.

For Sartre, friendship and love get their significance in the group proper from oath and terror. Here Buber's disagreement with Sartre would be very evident. Love and friendship are not derivative for Buber, they are acts of genuine meeting, which are happening. Were love and friendship derived from "oath" and "terror," they would become conditional, which would mean that it is only possible to reach out and yield to the other person, if an oath has been taken and a terror follows. But love, the "betweenness" of I and Thou, and friendship, the bridge between I and Thou, are possible wherever there is mutual access to one another and readiness for one another.

(3) Buber and the Organized Group of Sartre

For Sartre, the organized group leads to a distribution of the various functions designed to meet different needs. Buber agrees with Sartre when he writes that

> apart from the technique of the tool and from the weapon, what has enabled this creature, so badly equipped "by nature," to assert himself and to achieve lordship of the earth is this dynamic, adaptable, pluralistic form of association, which has been made possible by the factor of mutual individual completion of function and the corresponding factor of mutual individual recognition of function.[29]

Buber would also agree with Sartre that in an organized group individuality should not be abandoned. Under the skin of the common should hide the unique. Otherwise, we have a "Bündelung: zusammengepackt Individuum neben Individuum, gemeinsam ausgerüstet, gemeinsam ausgerichtet, von Mensch zu Mensch nur so viel leben, dass es den Marschtritt befeure."[30] Both thinkers would oppose capitalism (because it wants to deal only with individuals) and communism (because for Sartre in a centralistic communistic society the sovereign becomes insurpassable and the group is monopolized by the leader, and for Buber because communism "gründet sich auf einem organisierten Schwund der Personhaftigkeit"). (Communism is founded on an organized set-back of the potentiality of personhood.)[31] The "Personhaftigkeit" is neither man in the singular (isolated, individualistic) nor man in the plural (men) but man-to-man or person-to-person (I to Thou).

Buber, however, would add one important element in the organized group which Sartre has not mentioned. Organized groups do not necessarily yield public life or genuine communal life, because they know only the specimen ("Exemplar"). "Dass Einrichtungen kein öffentliches Leben ergeben, verspüren Menschen in wachsender Zahl, verspüren es mit wachsendem Leid; dies ist der Ort, von dem die suchende Not des Zeitalters ausgeht."[32] The genuinely organized group is built of living mutual relations; in it the life of dialogue is lived. People do not think only of money, business, and mechanical forces; they also are interested in meeting the other person in being alive and intentional, able and ready to communicate, each one directly to the (other) fellow man. The organized group is for Buber the world of It which has to be penetrated by the human world of Thou. Altruism and social activity are not enough in an organized group, because "there are some people," as Paul Pfuetze pointed out, "who are busy in social activity who have never truly spoken with a fellow man as a person, from being to being."[33] In an organized group, genuine dialogues---living relations between one person and another---have to be established. Each person in a genuine dialogue will have in mind the others in their "presence" and turn to them for a living, mutual relation.

II. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF BUBER'S REACTION TO SARTRE'S NOTION OF "BEING-WITH"

A. Buber's "World of Effect" and Sartre's Facticity in Education

For Sartre, freedom is originally a relation to the given facticity. The teacher is necessary in the educational process to establish new situations for students in order to enable them to realize themselves. Sartre's pedagogy could be called an education for freedom, since the teacher places the student in a new situation, one which enables him to become free for and open to new projections and actions. For Buber, the (teacher) educator also selects the world of effect. Buber writes:

> Was wir Erziehung nennen, die gewusste und gewollte, bedeutet Auslese der wirkenden Welt durch den Menschen; bedeutet, einer Auslese der Welt, gesammelt und dargelegt im Erzieher, die entscheidende Wirkungsmacht verleihen. Herausgelegt ist das erzieherische Verhältnis aus der absichtslos strömenden All-Erziehung: als Absicht.[34]" (Italics in the original)

At another place Buber affirms his position when he writes that "durch ihn [den Erzieher] tritt die Auslese der wirkenden Welt an den Zögling."[35] (The educator selects the "world of effect" for the educatee.) But let us ask next what the educatee's world of effect is? Buber speaks of "Natur und Gesellschaft" (nature and society) or of "die ganze Umwelt."[36] (the whole environment) The students' "world of effect" includes everything that is around him---objects, persons, and events---everything which affects the students either immediately or remotely. "It includes," as Professor Bayles writes, "past as well as present, and, in the sense in which the future exerts a pull upon the present, future is also involved. Thus, a student's world of effect represents a space-time continuum which is far-flung and inclusive."[37] However, the student represents another world---the "world of insight" (the knowledge he has of his "world of effect").

For both, Sartre and Buber, an educator has the task of increasing a student's grasp of the world into which he is "thrown," i.e., his "world of effect," which means to increase his "world of insight." However there is one vital difference between Sartre and Buber. For the former, to place an educatee in a new situation helps him to see new possibilities, or, in other words, a teacher who helps to increase the student's "world of insight" opens up new areas of freedom for him (the educatee). We could summarize Sartre's educational goal in the cliché: "Education to become free." Freedom or a free person is the aim of education. In this matter, Carl Rogers shares Sartre's view. From the title of the article "Experience of learning to be free," we can see Rogers' similarity with Sartre in this regard.[38] He speaks of the "experience of freedom to be one's self," of the experience of becoming a more autonomous, more spontaneous, more confident person, one who increasingly becomes the architect of self, one who is free to will and choose. For Buber, freedom is not a goal or aim in education but only a presupposition or a spring-board for the aim of education, which is relation ("Verbundenheit"). Sartre took Buber's spring-board as his goal; Buber's short path (of freedom) "from"-"to" becomes Sartre's "eternal" road. So we can expect that Buber's pedagogy will be permeated by this concept of mutual relations. "Being-with" in education becomes "being-in-relation."

(1) How to increase a student's grasp of this "world of effect"

(a) Indoctrination

To use the method of indoctrination in education would be for the earlier Sartre to consider the students as automata and not as free men. Indoctrinative education turns out "en-sois" (predetermined beings) and not "pour-sois" (free beings). Buber also rejects indoctrinative education, because it takes away the student's freedom of choice and the indoctrinator in education who desires to influence the educatee is not in the least concerned with the person; no mutual relations are established. The indoctrinator does not see the "whole" being of the other; he does not meet the educatee as a Thou but as an It---only parts of the student are seen and "various individual qualities are of importance only in so far as he can exploit them to win the Other and must get to know them for this purpose."[39] The personal is to be taken into consideration only in regard to the specific use to which it can be put. Indoctrination and imposition are concerned with quantity (more members, more adherents) and not with quality (the personal---Thou).

In the example of character-education given by Buber, he states very clearly that "Diktieren, was im allgemeinen gut und was böse ist, das ist seines [des Erziehers] Amtes nicht."[40] To dictate, dominate, or impose is not the task of the true educator. What Buber substitute for it, we shall see later.

(b) Permissivism

The earlier Sartre attacked permissivism because, for him, we exist in a world where there are already others.

A person, who practices a "sort of factual solipsism" is in a state of blindness. Tolerance and a laissez-faire policy can, therefore, have no place in education. Progressive or liberal education which emphasizes the principle of "respect for freedom" is for the earlier Sartre an empty word. The later Sartre avoids individualism by having the individual student join the group and work for a common cause. For Buber, it is not necessary that the individual join the group in order to avoid individualism-permissivism. But he would go along with the earlier Sartre that "respect for freedom" to do as one likes or wishes is an empty word in education. Buber's reasons are the following:

(i) Freedom for Buber is only a spring-board or a path to some other goals or aims in education, never an end in itself. Buber was asked at the third international pedagogical congress in Heidelberg (August, 1925) to speak about "the unfoldment (development) of the creative powers in the child" ("Die Entfaltung der schöpferischen Kräfte im Kinde"). His presentation has been printed in Über das Erzieherische, and it is there that he speaks of the unfoldment of creative powers as important but as not enough for the educational process. "Nicht der Freimachung eines Triebes, sondern den Kräften, die dem freigemachten begegnen, der entscheidende Einfluss beizumessen ist: den erzieherischen Kräften."[41] Buber illustrates his view by giving an example in art (drawing). Traditionally, the teacher gave prescriptions and rules to the students and drew models which they were required to imitate. Progressive education, according to Buber, substituted for the age-old "Trichter" ("funnel") the "Pumpe" ("pump"). Everyone is elementally endowed with the basic powers of the arts, and should be unfolded in education. These originative instincts of the self should be the basis upon which education should be built. But for Buber the creative instincts, or the instincts of origination, are not enough. The defect is that there is no "Entgegentreten" (opposition)---no "Kritik und Anleitung" (criticism and guidance)[42]; hence, there is no growth that is more than accidental. Buber would go along with Dewey who wrote years prior that "this is the difference, upon which I wish to insist, between exciting or indulging an interest and realizing it through its direction."[43]

Mere indulgence of the originative instincts would not have the student enter into mutuality because there is no sharing in the undertaking. The student in progressive schools who merely "unfolds" his creative instincts is without criticism and guidance on the part of the teacher, and, because he has not entered the mutual relation, he is a most solitary young person. An education, says Buber, based on the instinct of origination would prepare a new human solitariness, which would be the most painful of all.

We are reminded here of Sartre's student in the state of seriality. A student who exercises his creative instincts or instincts of origination does not nourish mutuality. "Der Mensch als Urheber ist einsam. Ganz unverbunden steht er im hallenden Raum seiner Taten."[44] At another place, Buber writes that "eine auf der Ausbildung des Urhebertriebs allein begründete Erziehung würde eine neue, schmerzlichste Vereinsamung der Menschen bereiten."[45] It is, therefore, the task of the teacher to take the student, not only as an originator but also as a lost fellow creature ("Mitkreatur"), and lead him to, or let him have part in, a mutual relation.

(ii) In a dialogue between Buber and Carl Rogers (Midwest Conference, held April 18, 1957, printed as an appendix in The Knowledge of Man), Buber gives another reason against permissivism. Rogers, an existentialist psychiatrist and a believer in the non-directive or client-centered method in psychiatry, had said, "It seems to me that is a desire to meet a '*person*,' not 'now I want to help.' It seems to me that I've learned through my experience that when we *can* meet, then help does occur, but that's a by-product." (Italics in the original.)[46] A psychotherapist does not direct the client to a certain goal but accepts a real willingness for this other person to be what he is. The therapist is willing to possess the feelings the client possesses, to be the person he is. In those moments, the therapist is able to see how the client's experiences seem to him. He views it from within the client, and the client is able to sense something of those attitudes in the therapist. This is a meeting of a mutual inclusive relationship for Rogers.

Buber replied that neither in the psychotherapist-client nor in the educator-educatee meeting can we have a mutually inclusive relationship: it is a one-sided experiential inclusion. Buber had previously written: "Aber diese Gegenseitigkeit---das macht die Besonderheit des erzieherischen Verhältnisses aus---kann nicht eine Umfassung sein, obgleich die wahre Beziehung des Erziehers zum Zögling auf eben dieser gegründet ist."[47] We shall discuss the teacher-student relation later. For now, it is enough to recognize that the teacher and the student, according to Buber's view as given on this conference, are not equals and cannot be, because the former sees the situation from two sides (his and the student's), the latter only from one side. The teacher can see the student, really as he "is," the latter cannot do this. In 1925, Buber wrote: "Er der Erzieher erfährt das Erzogen werden des Zöglings, aber der kann das Erziehen des Erziehers nicht erfahren."[48] The teacher does something, tries something, wills something. Directionlessness, non-interference, negative education do not have a place in such a one-sided relationship of inclusion ("Umfassung"). Moreover, there is another vital difference between Buber's philosophy of education and that of a permissivist educator. The latter is non-directive and non-interferent. He accepts and confirms the student as he is and believes as Rousseau did that "nature provides for the child's growth in her own way and this should never be thwarted."[49] On the other hand, Buber says that "by acceptance I mean being able to tell, or rather not to tell, but only to make it felt by the other person, that I accept him just as he is. I take you just as you are."[50] But does this imply or mean that the teacher does not want to change the student? It means the very opposite, as Buber points out. "Just by my accepting love, I discover in you what you are meant to become."[51] Acceptance, therefore, for Buber is only to accept him as he is in this very moment; the teacher also accepts the student's potentiality and attempts to make a decisive difference in his potentiality. Buber writes:

> And now I not only accept the Other as he is, but I confirm him, in myself, and then in him, in relation to this potentiality that is meant by him and it can now be developed, it can evolve, it can answer the reality of life. He can do more or less to this scope [to realize his potentiality] but I can, too, do something. And this is with goals even deeper than acceptance.[52]

To sum it up, permissivism in education has been rejected by Buber because the originative instinct of a student, left to itself, cannot lead to sharing in an undertaking and to entering into mutuality. Besides this, the teacher who experiences the "other side" of the relation draws the pupil into the world, and helps educate him by accepting him as he is in this moment, but by seeking to promote his potentiality.

B. The Teacher-Student Relationship

(1) The Integration of Educator and Educatee

We saw in Section A Buber's rejection of both indoctrination and permissivism. The early and the later Sartre also speak very clearly against permissivism on the one hand and domination on the other. But the earlier Sartre did not become very explicit as to how he would advise going about mediating the permissivist-authoritarian dilemma, though there are indications that the preferred teaching method would be to "guide" the student. However, it has to be kept in mind that such togetherness of two persons---the teacher and the student---implied conflict and at times even "hatred." So it has to be kept in mind for the teacher as well as for the student that their "sociality" is not "an unmixed blessing." The later Sartre attempts to avoid the permissivist-authoritarian dilemma by introducing group-activities or "common praxis." Cooperation and solidarity are possible.

In Buber's social philosophy of education, the teacher first of all tries to establish a mutual relationship between himself and the student. How is this done? The teacher strives to make of the student a Thou and not an It; that is, he does not want to take advantage of the student, he does not disregard the student's own integrity. His aim is not to manipulate, possess, or use the student for his own ends. His interest is for the "person" as a Thou. His whole being is involved when he meets the student; he is really present for the student. He sacrifices other possibilities to the demand of this relation. In our rapid-moving age, teachers have to carry on so many curricular and extra-curricular activities that the time for meeting a student is minimal. So the teacher is neither actually nor potentially avoidable. No I-Thou relationship can be established if the principle of "exclusiveness" is followed. The teacher does not need any perfection or near-perfections; what he needs is that "er muss wirklich da sein" (he must be really there);[53] there when the student wants to address himself to him. Trust is a necessary element in the I-Thou relationship and it can only be established when the teacher gives up his "Verschlossenheit" (reserve) and opens himself to the student. Buber writes at one place, that there is

> nur einen Zugang zum Zögling gibt, dessen Vertrauen. Vertrauen bedeutet die für den Jugendlichen, den die unzuverlässige Welt erschreckt und enttäuscht, befreiende Einsicht, dass es eine menschliche Wahrheit, die Wahrheit menschlicher Existenz gibt. In der Sphäre des Vertrauens tritt an die Stelle jenes Widerstandes gegen das Erzogenwerden ein eigentümlicher Vorgang: der Zögling nimmt den Erzieher als Person an. Er fühlt, dass er diesem Menschen vertrauen darf; dass dieser Mensch nicht ein Geschäft an ihm betreibt, sondern an seinem Leben teilnimmt; dass dieser ihn bestätigt, ehe er ihn beeinflussen will. Und so lernt er fragen.[54]

Moreover, the educator loves his educatee. The teacher's help is sure whenever it is needed by the student; a teacher's answer or advice is certain whenever the student addresses a question to him.

The tense situation of the earlier Sartre has been transformed by Buber into that of unmixed blessing. Conflict, uncertainty, and hate are gone in the educational process and the relation between teacher and student has become one of love, trust, hope, and help. A unity (communion) of teacher and student is possible and in this union the "otherness" of the student does not have to disappear but is just this "otherness" that the teacher wishes, because he wishes this particular being to exist.

This communion of teacher and student, however, is only possible if the student is free. In an authoritarian program of education, the need for freedom is not understood by the teacher. In a freedom-centered educational program, the meaning of freedom is misunderstood (freedom is the whole). In the communion-centered program, the child is free from compulsion, he ventures on his own, and then encounters the real values of the teacher, which draw him closer to the heart of the teacher. Such an atmosphere is a prerequisite for genuine communication between teacher and student. Then, when a teacher exercises "Kritik und Anleitung" (criticism and guidance), when he lifts his finger, when he asks questions, the student meets him with confidence and trust, feeling and knowing that the teacher wants only the very best for him.

Buber differentiates between "Unterricht" (instruction) and "Erziehung" (education). (Nietzsche already differentiated between "Bildung" (education) and "Wissen" (knowledge).) In the former the teacher intends to influence the thinking of the students (to think logically and reflectively); in the latter he wants to influence the being and life of students. "Nicht der Unterricht erzieht, aber der Unterrichtende."[55] The best example of this thesis is set forth in moral education in the classroom. What will instruction achieve in this area? The educator speaks:

> Ich versuche es, meinen Schülern zu erklaren, dass Neid schändlich ist, und schon spüre ich den heimlichen Widerstand derer, die weniger besitzen als ihre Kameraden; ich versuche zu erklaren, dass es unanständig ist, den Schwächeren zu schlagen, und schon sehe ich ein unterdrücktes Lächeln in den Mundwinkeln der Stärkeren;... Ich habe den fatalen Fehler begangen, Ethos zu *unterrichten*,...nichts davon verwandelt sich in Substanz, die den Charakter aufbaut. (Italics in the original)[56]

Character cannot be instructed. Good attitudes are not taught but rather caught. The educator does not have to be a moral genius to educate characters; what he has to be is a whole person who radiates the liveliness of Thou-ness, and thus influences the student. For Buber, it is not only the intention but especially the meeting between student and teacher which is fruitful in pedagogy. Buber attempts to resolve the dualism between the individual and society. By breaking down this separation between individual and society, he hopes to achieve a reintegration of the educator and the educatee (a communion of both). Social education for Buber "means to arouse and to develop in the minds of its pupils the spontaneity of fellowship which is innate in all unravaged human souls and which harmonizes very well with the development of personal existence and personal thought."[57] The work of education is thus the formation of the great community which grows out of persons and their relations.

(2) The Educational Process of Dialogue between Teacher and Student

The earlier Sartre made no mention of dialogue in his philosophical writings and it also seems unlikely that a genuine dialogue would find its place in a social philosophy which does not allow for a subject-to-subject relation. In Sartre's later philosophy, this subject-object relation disappears; all can now be subjects, working in a common cause. But the defect is that the later Sartre speaks of "common praxis" of a group, but does not go into mutuality between one person and another such as dialogue, speech, and conversation, and is it not in keeping with the idea that the future of man as man depends upon a rebirth of dialogue? For Buber, fighting begins where speech and dialogue have ceased.

What for Buber is dialogue? It is genuine teacher-to-student communication that Buber has in mind; and, to see clearly what it is not, he differentiates it from two other kinds of dialogue---the technical and the disguised (the latter actually being monologue).

(i) The technical dialogue in education

The technical dialogue is "lediglich von der Notdurft der sachlichen Verständigung eingegeben" (only given by the necessity of objective understanding).[58] In this kind of dialogue, the student may ask questions to get information, about matters such as grammatical difficulties in English and events in history; he may wish to go in depth in a field of his particular interest and may need some advice from the teacher. But all this quest for knowledge in such dialogue is merely technical, i.e., useful, for the student. There has been no establishment of a mutual human relationship; it is still in the world of It, the impersonal world where using and experiencing dominates. The teacher, on the other hand, may ask the student questions in order to know whether his grasp of the "world" into which he is "thrown" has been increased. This, of course, does not imply that it is wrong to do so---teacher and student have after all to live in the world of It---it only means that this is not all of what is meant by dialogue.

(ii) The disguised dialogue in education

This kind of dialogue could be divided into (a)the debate and (b)the conversation. According to Buber, a teacher who debates with a student or with a colleague does not regard the other as being present as person. The extreme we see realized today in the debates between statesmen, which the radio or TV conveys to us. Such encounters do not longer have anything in common with a human dialogue. The representatives of various countries do not even address one another. A conversation between a teacher and a student, not permeated by the need to communicate something but by the desire to have one's own self-esteem confirmed by demonstrating how good a speaker one is or how well one knows his topic. (Traditionally oriented philosophers of education, especially those who put subject matter before the child, often fall prey to disguised dialogue such as this.)

(iii) Genuine dialogue in education

Deficiency of the technical and the disguised dialogue is that they do not imply a mutual human relation, a valid sense of reciprocity. A genuine dialogue does not have to be worked out (possibly even cannot be worked out) prior to a meeting between the teacher and student, because in a genuine dialogue there is always a moment of surprise. Buber writes that "the dialogue is like a game of chess. The whole charm of chess is that I do not know cannot know what my partner will do. I am surprised by what he does and on this surprise the whole play is based."[59] A second feature of a true dialogue is that which is different in the other person---his otherness---is prized. A teacher wishes his student's otherness to exist, because he wishes this particular student to exist. This is an element of inclusion ("Umfassung") that the teacher wants to experience from the other side, and to be able to do so, he acknowledges the "So-Sein" (Being such and such) of the student. Disagreement among views and standpoints is quite common, because the otherness of the student has not been destroyed (as is done in a collectivity). In spite of their disagreement, both partners of genuine dialogue are open to each other; they show mutual respect and understanding. The most genuine dialoge between student and teacher exists when the partners have different beliefs, opinions, and convictions in religious, political, and social matters and both accept each other as persons. But this does not imply that a teacher, because he prizes the otherness of his student, is indifferent to influencing, modifying, or changing the student's opinion or belief. For Buber, the student is accepted as he ever is in this moment, in "this actuality of his."[60] The teacher, however, wants to confirm the student, too; that is, he accepts the whole potentiality of the student and even wants to make a decisive difference in his potentiality.[61] In other words, a teacher who accepts a student in a dialogue, shows interest and understanding for what the student has to say, but he also wants to confirm him in his potentiality, in what he can become.

Nothing stands so much in the way of genuine dialogue as the "demonry" of basic mistrust or untrustworthiness. For Buber, the presupposition for genuine dialogue between teacher and student is trust. But the student can only have trust in the teacher if he considers the former a "Thou." This will bridge the gap between the I (the teacher) and the Thou (the student).

C. The Student-Student Relationship

(1) Competition

In Chapters II and III we have presented the earlier and the later Sartre's rejection of competition on the grounds that the students in a competitive educational system practice a kind of (factual) ontological solipsism. Students act only at a distance from one another; each student acts as if he were alone in spite of the fact that (as Sartre asserts) his being is "being-with-others." Buber would go along with Sartre in this respect. He states very explicitly that the goal of any education should be primarily that for mutuality and relation. The teacher should stand out as an example, or be a light within the classroom which shines forth in the liveliness of his personality and brings forth the real fruits of education in the meeting; not students in isolation (solitude), but students in relation, who address each other and who respond to each other.

(2) Conformity

The earlier and the later Sartre reject conformity and collectivity in education, because this "being-with" would dissolve a student's own being; he would wholly abandon his self-ness and become like others (think and act like others, without shouldering the responsibility for his actions). Buber writes in The Way of Man, that "everyman's foremost task is the actualization of his unique, unprecedented and never-recurring potentialities, and not the repetition of something that another, and be it even the greatest has already achieved."[62]

For Buber, students are essentially unlike one another and a teacher should therefore not try to make them alike. To be like the other, a student would miss precisely, according to Buber, what he alone is called upon to do. "Everyone has in him something precious that is in no one else."[63] Moreover, an I-Thou relationship between students can only be established *if* the "otherness" of each student is (kept) preserved, because the "I" of one student wishes the "otherness" of his fellow student to exist, since he wishes this particular, unique being to exist.

(3) Mutuality

In sections (1) and (2) of this Chapter, we have presented the dilemma of competition on the one hand and conformity and collectivity on the other. Now a clear way out has to be furnished by Buber to avoid both horns of a possible dilemma. The earlier Sartre was not explicit on this point. The later Sartre attempted to avoid the dilemma by recommending that an individual student should freely join the group of students and work together with other students for a common cause. For Buber, a group might be a solution for the dilemma above presented, but it is not yet "personal" enough. A group might be based on a community of views and aspirations of students; they might have a feeling of solidarity and cooperation, but they do not necessarily have to have an I-Thou relation between one another. Mutual access to and readiness for one another might be entirely missing. Buber rejects a competitive and a conforming or collective classroom, and recommends a "communal classroom." Each student says Thou to the other, and vice versa. Buber's "communal classroom" grows out of the free decision of every individual student who lives authentically with his fellow student in an I-Thou relation.

In the final Chapter, we shall attempt to point out how Sartre (both the earlier and the later) supplemented and enriched by Buber, can benefit American education and what relevance they have in an age of teaching-machines and mass technology.

REFERENCES

[1] Martin Buber, "Gottesfinsternis," *Werke: Band I Philosophie* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider Verlag, 1962), p.552. "
"But how...if there is between me and the Other not primarily the mutual relation between subject and object, but the mutual relation of I and Thou." (Translation by the present writer)

[2] *Ibid*.
"God can never become an object; I can have no other relation to him than that of the I to his eternal Thou---that of Thou to his eternal I." (Translation by the present writer)

[3] *Ibid*., p.553.
"The claim made that man should get back the'creative freedom,' is like a demagogic phrase. What in 'creative freedom' belongs to us, our participation in the creation, is given to us as we ourselves, too; but the point is, to use this freedom in the right way, to the dignity of its givenness; nothing more or less. Who, however, substitutes this notion with a postulate of the reinstatement of freedom, is not doing justice to the true human existence which is destiny and duty." (Translation by the present writer)

[4] Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," *The Knowledge of Man*, translated by M.Friedman and R. G. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p.79.

[5] Buber, "Die Frage an den Einzelnen," *Das Dialogische Leben* (Zürich: Muller Verlag, 1947), p.224.
"The mass (crowd) is actualized,...and the person, overwhelmed in intoxicated ecstasis, is submerged in the public life. Here there is no counteracting or repelling knowledge of the 'otherness' of other persons: the glorification of the mass outshines all otherness and the fiery desire to be identical can produce a real 'family-feeling' for the unknown.... The other attitude is a passive and steady one: it is to follow the public opinion and view-point. (Translation by the present writer)

[6] E. Breisach, *Introduction to Modern Existentialism* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1962), p.168.

[7] Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, translated by R. Hull (London: Kegan Paul, 1949), p.132.

[8] Buber, "Über das Erzieherische," *Das Dialogische Leben*, p.271.

[9] *Ibid.*
"Domination is a negative reality, and relation is the positive; freedom is a possibility, the reacquired possibility. To be dominated by destiny, nature, and people: the counterpole is not, to be free from destiny, nature, and people, but to be related to and associated with them; to become this, one has to have become already free, but this independence is a path and not a living-room." (Translation by the present writer)

[10] E. Breisach, *op. cit.*, p.165.

[11] Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," p.80.

[12] Buber, "Ich und Du," *Das Dialogische Leben*, p.17.

[13] *Ibid.*, p.46.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Paul Pfuetze, *The Social Self* (New York: Lookman Associates, 1954), p.147.

[16] Buber, "Bilder von Gut und Böse," *Werke Band I Philosophie*, p.646.
"Man as man is a risk of life, indetermined and without hold; hence, he has to be confirmed and this confirmation can be received only as the individual man. The others and he himself confirm his particularity of being. It is necessary that a Yes is spoken to him, by the look of a trustworthy person and by the motion of his own heart, to deliver him from the anxiety of abandonment, which is a fore-taste of death." (Translation by the present writer)

[17] Buber, "Distance and Relation," *The Knowledge of Man*, p.71.

[18] Buber, "Ich und Du," p.26.
"Sentiments do accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of love, but they do not constitute it; and the sentiments (feelings) which accompany it, can be of a different kind. The feeling of Jesu for the demoniac is quite different from that to his beloved disciple; but the love is one." (Translation by the present writer)

[19] *Ibid.*, pp.26-27.

[20] Buber, "Die Frage an den Einzelnen," *op. cit*., p.22. "This man is different, different in his being, and this otherness of his, I accept and mean, because I mean him; I acknowledge it, I want to have his otherness, because I want his 'being-such.'" (Translation by the present writer)

[21] Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," *op. cit*., p.85.

[22] Buber, "Ich und Du," *op. cit*., p.55. "The community is built up of the living mutual relation, but the architect is the living center." (Translation by the present writer)

[23] Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp.66-67.

[24] Buber, "Die Frage an den Einzelnen," *op. cit*., p.226. "The man in the crowd---that is a splinter pressed in a bundle ---who handed over to streaming...drives in the water." (Translation by the present writer)

[25] Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, p.134.

[26] *Ibid*., p.140.

[27] *Ibid*., p.148.

[28] Paul Pfuetze, *The Social Self*, p.156.

[29] Buber, "Distance and Relation," *op. cit*., p.67.

[30] Buber, "Zwiesprache," *Das Dialogische Leben*, p.175. "Bundling together: packed together, one individual beside the other, commonly equipped, commonly oriented, from one man to another only so much life that it fires marching." (Translation by the present writer)

[31] *Ibid*., p.176.

[32] Buber, "Ich und Du," *op. cit*., p.54. "That institutions do not yield any public life, people feel today in increasing number, they feel it with increasing sorrow; this is the place, where the searching trouble of our age is." (Translation by the present writer)

[33] P. Pfuetze, *op. cit*., p.179.

[34] Buber, "Über das Erzieherische," op. cit., pp.268-9. "What we call education,..., means the selection of the 'world of effect' by man; means, a selection of the world, concentrated and represented in the educator, to give the decisive effectiveness. Taken out of the unintentional all-education is this education as intention." (Translation by the present writer)

[35] Ibid., pp.269-70.

[36] Ibid., p.268.

[37] E. E. Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p.210.

[38] Carl Rogers, "Experience of Learning to be free," Quoted in Glen Hass and Kimball Wiles, Readings in Curriculum, 1963.

[39] Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," op. cit., p.82.

[40] Buber, "Uber Charaktiererziehung" Das Dialogische Leben, p.297.

[41] Buber, "Uber das Erzieherische," op. cit., p.264. "The decisive influence is not to free instincts, but to direct (meet) them: this is the task of education." (Translation by the present writer)

[42] Ibid., p.267.

[43] John Dewey, The School and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1900), p.41.

[44] Buber, "Uber das Erzieherische," op. cit., p.265. "Man as originator is solitary. He is totally without relation in the echoing room of his creative acts." (Translation by the present writer)

[45] Ibid., p.266. "An education based solely on the originative instincts would be a new, painful loneliness of man." (Translation by the present writer)

[46] Buber, The Knowledge of Man, Appendix, p.176.

[47] Buber, "Über das Erzieherische," *op. cit.*, p.282. "Mutuality---this is the peculiarity of an educational system ---cannot be an inclusion, though the true relation between the educator to his educatee is founded on just this inclusion." (Translation by the present writer)

[48] *Ibid.*, p.286. "The educator experiences the education of the educatee, but he [the educatee] can not experience the education of the educator." (Translation by the present writer)

[49] J. J. Rousseau, *Emile*, Translated by Barbara Foxley (New York: Dutton, 1911), p.50.

[50] Buber, *The Knowledge of Man*, p.181.

[51] *Ibid.*, p.182.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] Buber, "Über das Erzieherische," *op. cit.*, p.282.

[54] *Ibid.*, p.282. "Only one access to the educatee, his confidence (trust). Trust means for the youngster, who is frightened and disappointed in the world, deliberated insight, that there is a human truth, the truth of human existence. In the sphere of trust, the opposition to be educated on the side of the student, gives ground to his acceptance of the educator as a person. He feels that he can trust this person, that he (this person) does not want to make business with him but rather participate in his life; that this person accepts him before he wants to influence him. So he learns to ask questions." (Translation by the present writer)

[55] Buber, *Nachlese* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1965) p.93. "Not the instruction educates but the educator." (Translation by the present writer)

[56] Buber, "Uber Charaktererziehung," *op. cit.*, p.294. "I try to explain it to my students, that envy is bad, and I feel already the concealed opposition of those who have less than their comrades; I try to explain that it is not honest to beat the weaker fellow student, and I can recognize already a suppressed smile of the stronger;... I have done the fatal mistake, to *instruct* moral behavior...nothing of all this is

transformed into substance, which builds up the character." (Translation by the present writer)

[57] Buber, Pointing the Way, Translated by M. Friedman (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p.176.

[58] Buber, "Zwiesprache," op. cit., p.157.

[59] Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p.178.

[60] Ibid., p.182.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Buber, The Way of Man (Chicago: Wilcox and Follett Co., 1957), p.17.

[63] Ibid., p.19.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

The first purpose of this study was to bring into focus a new understanding of the earlier Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education, and we have arrived at this new understanding by illustrating the earlier Sartre's notion of "being-with" from two different perspectives: (i) the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation and (ii) the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation (educator-educatee and educatee-educatee).

In the first relation, we tried to show that in Sartre's philosophy we can find implicitly the view that a teacher is necessary in order to place the student in as many situations as possible, which helps to increase the student's grasp of his "world of effect." (Buber's term of the "world of effect" is "die wirkende Welt"--it includes everything that affects a student, either immediately or remotely.) Thus, a student is enabled to make projections and achieve a greater self in the world. Knowledge opens up new areas of freedom. This was indirectly Sartre's first stroke against permissivism--an educational philosophy which speaks for non-interference on the side of the teacher. (Sartre's existentialism was considered permissivistic because of his emphasis on total freedom.)

The danger of permissivism threatens again, when we take into consideration that the teacher, if he only intends to increase the student's grasp of his "world of effect" but does not want to influence him, is doing nothing else than exercising permissivism. It was shown, however, that it would be indirectly possible for a teacher (in Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education) to guide and criticize students' thinking. This is not in opposition to existentialist education as long as the student does not have to become a certain pre-established figure; as long as the possibilities are still open for students to make free projections or choices in relation to a given facticity. The teacher does not criticize the students according to his own beliefs (this would be an authoritarian type of education), but criticizes students' views according to the standards ("meanings") which have been set up by a jurisdictional body. In the facticity of the "Other," we have presented Sartre's notion that there are already layers of reality in a world of "being-with-others," amid a host of influential factors (standards) that are independent of one's choice. People have set up criteria for judgment before we appeared on the scene. These standards limit the freedom of teacher and student alike. Such limitations do not represent indoctrination or domination by the teacher, he also has to function within them. However, they preclude a laissez-faire policy, wherein students may be indifferent to the criteria or standards which have been so set up.

In regard to the "pour-soi"-"pour-soi" relation, the present writer pointed out that the earlier Sartre speaks against permissivism in his opposition to indifference and blindness in education. Besides this, he speaks against tolerance in education, which was considered by him an empty word because from the moment a person exists he establishes a factual limit to the other's freedom. Whatever our acts may be, we have to accomplish them in a world where there are already others. Thus, Sartre rejects permissivism-individualism in the teacher-student relation. So, to consider Sartre's existentialism as capsulated, complete within itself. or as a philosophy of education which encourages withdrawal from the social situation, as Brameld interpreted Sartre, does not do justice to Sartre's notion of "being-with" in education.

In the "pour-soi"-"en-soi" relation, we saw his rejection of indoctrination on the grounds that the student is a "pour-soi"--a free being who is never what he is and is what he is not yet, that is, a student is always open to new self-choosing possibilities. Authoritarian educational systems, however, do not allow for this existential goal. The earlier Sartre would favor an educator who guides and criticizes the educatees according to standards (criteria) which have been established by a jurisdictional body, a term used by Professor Bayles, implicitly, however, in Sartre, as we have seen in the facticity of the "Other."

In the educatee-educatee relation, we saw indirectly Sartre's rejection of competition--a form os individualism in education. In a competitive educational system, it is self-help on which students should rely and by means of competitive examinations scholastic proficiency be achieved. Sartre implicitly rejects such an educational system on the ground that students in a competitive classroom practice a kind of ontological solipsism; that is, students act only at a distance from one another in spite of the fact that every student's being is a "being-with-other-students." Individualism violates the social aspect of a student's life; but conformity and collectivity in education do harm to the individual side of the student (his freedom, action, and responsibility). A student who loses himself in the objectness of the crowd abandons his self-ness. He is no longer a "somebody different" from his fellow students. Thus, in student-student relations the earlier Sartre rejects indirectly individualism on the one hand, and conformity-collectivity on the other, but he falls short of furnishing a clear way out. Though his earlier philosophy does not make mention of cooperation, it could allow for such, because students, by their own choice, act or work for an end which others share with them.

The second purpose of the study was to investigate the later Sartre's notion of "being-with" (etre-avec) in education. The study has shown that Sartre's later philosophy differs in several points from Sartre's earlier, and the dissimilarities of the one from the other can be helpful in education to overcome some of the deficiencies of the earlier Sartre. The key-word of the later Sartre is "group." It is the multiplicity of persons directing themselves freely toward a certain "common praxis." "Common" implies that the teacher works together with the students for a common goal. The teacher gives "mots d'ordre" (suggestions, recommendations, advice) as well as the students. The former, however, as the most mature member of the group, can give the most mature "mots d'ordres." Does this mean that Sartre harks back to old-Chinese education of old age as representing the distillation of wisdom? The Chinese custom was that the elders were the wisest. But, for Sartre, it is not where ideas come from--what counts is where they lead. All suggestions or recommendations are subjected to the scrutiny of all members of a group. It might be the case sometimes that a teacher's suggestion would be replaced by a better idea of a student. When we say that the teacher is the most mature person, we only mean that he has a greater grasp of the world of effect than the student, due to his richer and wider experience. Thus, the teacher will give the group a sense of direction or orientation, so that the whole "common praxis" will not be mere hit-or-miss.

In the student-student relation, we have seen that the later Sartre furnishes a clear way out of the competitive-conformist dilemma in education in proposing cooperation. Every student is a "third" who directs himself freely towards a common goal. As in his earlier philosophy, the later Sartre also rejects individualism and conformity in education. He calls both "seriality." The deficiency of the former is that the students are isolated from each other and we do not have, therefore, a cooperative situation. In the latter, there is a group of students who are together, but the defect is that given student's action comes to him from the other; hence, he is acting passively (other-directed). In a group where the members are cooperating, each student realizes his own potentialities and, thus, contributes to enhancement of the common life. There is a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences. A school, which is designed to promote cooperation for the common good, is interested in each student's spontaneity, originality, and resourcefulness. There is equality of opportunity in the classroom, because every student can give "mots d'ordre."

The third purpose of the study was to compare the earlier and later Sartre's philosophy of education with that of Buber to see whether he could supplement Sartre's existentialism in some distinctive ways, so that existentialism in general could become enriched. First of all, the present writer pointed out several similarities between these two thinkers. For example, Buber's "world of effect" ("wirkende Welt") which the educator selects for his educatee is similar to the earlier Sartre's notion of facticity of education, wherein a student has been placed in a new situation, one which enables him to become free for and open to new projections and actions, with the only exception that, for Buber, the goal of education is not freedom but relation ("Verbundenheit"). And it will be this vital difference (the difference between education for freedom and education for relation) which will permeate all the aspects of education. Both philosophers reject indoctrination in education. For the earlier Sartre, indoctrinative education turns out "en-soi"s (predetermined beings) instead of "pour-soi"s (free beings); for Buber, too, the indoctrinator is not in the least concerned with the person and hence no mutual relations are established. Buber and Sartre also reject permissivism in education. The latter on the grounds that a person who practices a "sort of factual solipsism," is in a state of blindness. The former rejected it because a student, left to himself, does not share in an undertaking and, thus, does not enter into mutuality. However, a teacher who experiences the "other side" of the relation wants to seek to promote the student's potentiality. Both mediate the authoritarian-permissivist dilemma by vaguely pointing to democratic relationships--the later Sartre to cooperation (everybody in a classroom has the opportunity to participate in giving "mots d'ordre"), Buber to a genuine mutual relationship, a communion of teacher and student. (The work of education is formation of the great community which grows out of persons and their relations.)

What educational ideas does Buber add to Sartre's philosophy of education? Buber would agree with the later Sartre's notion of the group, in as far as students are bound together by way of their shared experiences and common goals. Solidarity and cooperation within the group are acceptable principles of conduct within the group for Buber. However, all this is not yet enough. The students, forming a group, might work together, have a common goal, even form a unity or union because of their common activities, but the defect could be that they do not live together in an essential relation between person and person, between I and Thou. So what Buber adds to Sartre's philosophy of education is the "I-Thou" relation in its richness and profundity. The teacher strives to make of the student a Thou and not an It. His whole being is involved when he meets the student; the teacher gives up his reserve and opens himself to the student--thus, the student can trust him. He also loves his student, which means that his help is sure when it is needed by the student.

Between teacher and student there is genuine communication. This strong sense of reciprocity finds expression in the dialogue between them. The teacher does not destroy the student's otherness, because he wishes this particular student to exist. In spite of possible disagreement between both partners, they are open to each other and show mutual respect and a never-ending quest for achieving fuller mutual understanding. Buber's recommendation for education is that of mutual relation. He recommends a "communal classroom," in which the teacher lives authentically with his students and vice versa, and the students live authentically with their fellow students.

There are salient features in the earlier and later Sartre's and Buber's notions of "being-with" in education. Is it not of uttermost importance that the teacher in his togetherness with students recognizes that the students are "pour-soi"s--free beings who make projections and thus achieve greater selves in the world--and that the students in their togetherness with other students have the awareness that they are freedom, beings who act and project and who, in shouldering the responsibility to be ready to accept the consequences of their choices, feel the fundamental mood, which is dread? There is still another salient feature in Sartre's earlier philosophy, which is that a student is not an object but is an existing subject whom the teacher has to encounter or meet. He can, therefore, not make his students a "suffered-subjectivity" or a "subjectivity-as-object." For the earlier Sartre, a teacher can be blind and indifferent to objects but never to his students (subjects). The earlier Sartre struggled for the preservation of the "pour-soi-ness" of students, that is, of their freedom to affirm their selves and treat and be treated by others (teachers and fellow students) as subjects.

The later Sartre sees no necessary contradiction between a life that is shared in common with other persons and the fulfilment of personality. The surest way to self-realization is to be found in a cooperative effort to foster the kind of group in which others can also realize their personalities. The school is to be an institution that promotes cooperation for the common good. The teacher and the students will work together in common causes.

The salient features of Buber's educational philosophy are his notions of mutuality, of the I-Thou relation. The teacher (the I) makes a Thou of the student and thus the student addresses himself to the teacher. A dialogue arises--not the technical dialogue which serves the purpose of getting information or an objective understanding, and not the disguised dialogue, be it debate or conversation, in which the teacher wants to confirm his self-esteem--a genuine dialogue in which the otherness of the particular student is affirmed.

These are salient features in the earlier and the later Sartre's philosophy of education, as well as in Buber's. The earlier Sartre furnishes us the existentialist aspect of "being-with," but, since many American educators are preoccupied with making Sartre a permissivist in education, we find little evidence up to now of sufficient appreciation of his existentialist concept in "being-with."

The later Sartre furnishes us the cooperative element of "being-with" and this educational aspect of Sartre, in spite of the fact that it is not something uniquely innovational, does at least show again that he is not a permissivist-individualist, but that he points to democratic relationships. Sartre's emphasis on this aspect can be of help to American educators whose basic worry is whether or not youngsters are becoming too conformist. In a cooperative classroom, a student is not other-directed, in spite of the fact that he works in a common cause. He is inner-directed.

Buber furnishes us the interhuman element in "being-with," and in a society where burgeoning school enrollments and a shortage of teachers seem to be the cause of either taking for granted the idea of larger and larger classes or of introducing more and more teaching-machines into classrooms, so that the student is working all by himself, Buber's emphasis on face-to-face communication and on an I-Thou relationship should be crucial to American education.

The best educational philosophy the present writer thinks of is a union of all these salient features of the earlier and the later Sartre and of Buber. Then, we shall have an integrated educational philosophy of "being-with," one which lacks nothing that is essential. The earlier Sartre furnishes us the *existentialist* aspect of "being-with," the later Sartre the *cooperative* aspect, and Buber, the elements of *interhuman*. These three elements are necessary for and essential to the completeness of "being-with" in education, as we have seen in Chapter I.

Does any educational theory do justice to this integrated notion of "being-with"? Let us, first of all, consider the (neo-)behavioristically oriented educators. Like the logical positivists, their emphasis is away from the humanitarian consequences to the detached, depersonalized objectivity of thought and action. For behaviorists such as Skinner,

> concepts of choice, responsibility, justice, and so on, provide a most inadequate analysis of efficient reinforcing and punishing contingencies because they carry a heavy semantic cargo of a quite different sort, which obscures any attempt to clarify controlling practices or to improve techniques. In particular, they fall to prepare us for techniques based on other than aversive techniques of control.[1]

Thus, Skinner is very explicit in stating that notions such as freedom, choice, responsibility are non-useable in his conception of the development of human behavior. Therewith he destroys the first element of an integral educational philosophy of "being-with." What about cooperation, for Skinner? It is well known that Skinner invented the teaching machine in its modern form in education, a well-programmed, self-instructional device which is supposedly tailored to each student's individual capacity. In this automated teaching device, every student teaches himself. It might be true that "learning becomes an interesting game,"[2] as Charles Foltz claims. A student can be his own tutor and he can, therefore, progress as fast or as slow as he desires. A brilliant student will not get bored with the slower progress of his classmates. Individualized instruction follows Quintilian's advice: "Do not neglect the individual student!" But its sponsors seem not to recognize that teaching machines can create and maintain social distance; hence, no associated or joint activity, no cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition of interests, is fostered. Does this mean that, for the earlier Sartre, the later Sartre, and Buber, the teaching machine is out altogether, or is simply not to be made the whole of education? The earlier Sartre speaks implicitly about the facticity of education. The teacher is very necessary in the educational process to establish new situations for the students, such as will enable them realize themselves in the world. If this is so, the question arises as to whether the teaching machine might not be a good substitute for the teacher in establishing new "facts"? It is claimed by their sponsors, including Skinner, that teaching machines can provide the advantages of the tutorial method in a way that is economically feasible. But we need to examine more closely these self-instructional devices, which can be divided roughly into two categories, depending on the type of response--constructed (the student must compose his response) or multiple choice--the student is required to make. Only one response is the right one, and it is this answer the student must select from the various possibilities, or must formulate. Is it, however, not the case that teaching machines, with their dependence on establishing a certain response and none other, prevent the student from transcending the present situation toward a future one? Thus, the student becomes fixated to and closed within certain predetermined responses. He becomes an "en-soi." The present writer sees only one possibility which could somehow avoid the student's becoming an "en-soi" in an educational enterprise dominated by teaching machines, and this would be if the student, should he construct a tenable answer that is not in line with the predetermined one, can consult the teacher and state his reasons for believing he has surpassed the "given." The student would then be less likely to become fixated or closed, but would be encouraged to be always open to new projections. This, however, would have the deficiency that instead of reducing the number of teachers, many more would be required than now.

For Sartre, cooperation is the beginning of humanity in education. Teaching machines may lead to a social distance between teacher-student and student-student. They may have the effect of making each student extremely solitary. In a classroom where teaching machines are dominant, the students would be a plurality of solitudes or isolated beings, and it is just the opposite of what the later Sartre's goal would be: To share in associated actions, or activities in which the entire group can participate and where each member contributes something to accomplish a common goal. But does this necessarily imply that the later Sartre would reject modern programmed instruction? The present writer thinks that the later Sartre could accept this instruction under two conditions: (i) that there is the possibility of frequent consultations with the teacher so that mutual sharing in human, give-and-take experience, is maintained, and (ii) that there is a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences among students, so that the growth of students does not get arrested.

When we approach Buber, there are two reactions to teaching machines that seem logical. On the one hand, Buber writes that as all real living is meeting, so is all teaching an intimate human relation between teacher and student. Youngsters are by nature originators, and the teacher enters into an I-Thou relationship with the student to guide and direct him. In a classroom of teaching machines, there is no teaching in meeting the student and no learning in being met by the teacher. Another interpretation, however, could be the following: Buber writes that the I-It attitude is not bad, because without It man can not live; however, one who lives with It alone is not a human being. Accordingly, teaching machines (Its) could have a place in education under the condition that they are not the whole of education, but that they are to be supplemented extensively by teacher-student meetings. There are a few extremely enthusiastic neo-behaviorist educators who speak of the teacher as being out of place as an educator in a classroom in which teaching machines are dominant. Nevertheless, we have to give Skinner and some of his cohorts credit for admitting teacher-student meeting. Skinner writes, in an article titled "Teaching Machines,"

> Will teaching machines replace teachers? On the contrary, they are capital equipment to be used by teachers to save time and labor. In assigning certain mechanizable functions to machines, the teacher emerges in his proper role as an indispensable human being.[3]

But one will look in vain for any elaboration of what is implied in the statement that the teacher is an indispensable human being. If it means that the teacher is indispensable as a "stimulator and clarifier of problems,"[4] as Charles Foltz points out, we still could remain in the It-world.

Stimulation and clarification are not necessarily features of the Thou-world. They are becoming only Thou-like if a mutual human (or person-to-person) relation has been established. Only a person-to-person relationship brings teacher and student out of the mechanization of the It-world (teaching machines and objective understanding) to the world of Thou. What neo-behaviorists seem to think of the person-to-person relationship, we shall consider next.

In regard to the third element of "being-with"--the interhuman--Skinner speaks of person-to-person relationships. But they are included in the area of personal control. "People living together in groups come to control one another with a technique which is not inappropriately called 'ethical.'"[5] Such a person-to-person relationship does, however, not belong to the world of Thou (the human world) but to the It-world. Thus, the interhuman element is missing in "being-with."

At this point, it is worthwhile to ask the question of what the earlier Sartre, the later Sartre, and Buber would have to say to such modern techniques for mass-instruction as TV, radio, and instructional films. These mass-media tend to automate group instruction by means of the lecture-demonstration form. For the earlier Sartre, these mass-media can place the student in new situations and can increase a student's "grasp" of the "world" into which he is "thrown."

This can enable him to make better and more enlightened choices. For the later Sartre, these mass-media can offer an opportunity to students to get enriched in their experience of or interest for a certain topic or area. These mass-media can awaken new insights and, since education is to serve social function, a student with initiative can contribute for a common goal. The various experiences the students have, will be shared in common. This can best be done by a discussion which follows the presentation of these instructional mass-media.

As for Buber, two interpretations are possible. On the one hand, Buber could be taken to reject mass-media in education on the ground that they automate group instruction in the lecture-demonstration form but that there is no meeting between the I (the teacher) and the Thou (the student), hence no education. Education is the formation of the great community which grows out of persons and their relation. On the other hand, however, Buber could be taken to approve mass-media in as far as they are only a part of the curriculum. Buber writes that man has to live in the It-world, but one who lives with It alone is not man. The mass-medial instruction would have to be followed up by a constructive discussion or dialogue between teacher and students to establish the world of Thou.

We now turn to the Progressivists in education, who can perhaps be thought to have originated with Rousseau, to have been popularized in American education by Kilpatrick, and whose present counterpart in Neill went all-out for permissivism in his school, "Summerhill." Rousseau's theory was that unspoiled child-nature should reign, Kilpatrick's was the formula of "pupil purposing, pupil planning, pupil executing, pupil judging."[6] The "demonstration school," Summerhill, is supposed to have demonstrated that freedom works. Neill writes that

> we set out to make a school in which we should allow children freedom to be themselves. In order to do this, we had to renounce all discipline, all direction, all suggestion, all moral training, all religious training, all religious instruction. We have been called brave, but it did not require courage.[7]

Neill, like Rousseau and Kilpatrick, is a believer in freedom, in creative self-expression, and in pupil self-regulation. Could he, therefore, be considered to apply the existentialist element to his social philosophy? Our answer is that the educational Progressivist goes only part way. A reader will look in vain for such concepts as responsibility, dread, commitment, sincerity. Besides this, the existentialist element in "being-with" also implies that one person should not be indifferent, blind, and utterly tolerant towards others. But Neill's "hands-off" or non-interference educational philosophy does not take into consideration this principle. When we inquire about the cooperative and interhuman aspects of "being-with" in Neill's demonstration school, dark clouds appear on the horizon. Neill commits the seeming error of considering freedom, or life as he at times calls it, the counterpole of "deadness," restriction, control, discipline, and coercion. "We must be on one side or the other."[8] He does not see the real other side, which is not freedom but interhuman relation. Freedom is not an end or goal but a path to mutuality. Besides this, the child is given freedom to live his own life. But he remains in a state of "seriality" because he does not cooperate on the basis of mutual recognition of interests. Thus, although the existentialist element is partially at work in Neill's school on Summerhill, existentialism's cooperative and interhuman aspects are missing.

There is another educational theory in the U.S., which has received wide attention in theoretical, academic circles though perhaps not effecting much actual change in practice--reconstructionism. Ardent advocates write about it with great enthusiasm. But it, too, does not seem to fulfill the three criteria for genuine "being-with." It might satisfy the second criterion (cooperation), because group endeavor is emphasized in school, and reconstructionist slogans are that "America had reached a point where competition would have to be replaced by cooperation."[9] Reconstructionism in education shift the emphasis from the "child-centered" to the "group-centered" school in which "learning itself takes place by joint study and action."[10] The more collective action of the reconstructionists may lead, however, to a corresponding decrease in individual action. The existentialist notions, such as, freedom, choice, responsibility, become dim as a consequence of the sovereignty of social consensus. Social consensus is a process by which the people agree upon broad social goals. The schools ought to direct their efforts toward achieving these goals, even to the extent of demonstrating "defensible partiality." Brameld writes that "philosophy should attempt to establish by discussion and consensus the institutional patterns needed now and in the future in order that human beings may achieve utmost fulfillment of those values they possess most universally."[11] Here the danger of violating the existentialist criterion in "being-with" threatens, because

> reconstructionism depends upon and necessitates more collective action with a corresponding decrease in individual action and initiative. Collectivism tends to increase the functions and power of government. As governmental functions increase, individual liberties decrease.[12] (Italics in the original)

What about the third criterion of "being-with" in education? Brameld writes that "the study of culture is the study of human relations,"[13] and continues:

> Therefore if, as I have argued, culture is the key to a new and vital approach to education, then it can also be argued that human relations are the proper and central theme os education...yet...the

> view that effective human relations should be an important, if not the most important, concern of public education is no less imperative today than it ever was.[14]

So, it seems as if Brameld were a spokesman for the interhuman aspect of "being-with." If one reads on, however, one will look in vain for a person-to-person or I-Thou relationship. On the contrary, he writes that "we are coming to recognize as never before that the scientific method must be applied to human relations,"[15] and when he speaks of scientific method, diagnosis of a conflictual or tense situation is considered to be the first stage and prognosis the second stage. Brameld gives illustrations of his scientific method to improve human relations. In one instance human relations in a family might be improved by a few children, in other instances it might require vast expenditures of money and decades of time. But these scientific methods of Brameld to improve human relations do only touch Buber's interhuman or I-Thou relation. For Brameld, disunifying experiences between individuals may be reduced by the therapies of science; for Buber, such an approach to human relations could be effective to a certain extent, but the most it can do is to bring a person to the boundaries of the Thou-world, not into it. To live in the Thou-world means to establish an I-Thou relationship, face-to-face intercourse. Face-to-face relation has to breathe life into the scientific

It-machinery of Brameld.

So far, we have seen that no educational philosophy has satisfied the existentialist, cooperative, and interhuman criteria established by an integration of Sartre and Buber. One important philosophy of education has so far been left untouched, and this is Dewey's pragmatism. Does he satisfy our criteria for an integral "being-with"?

As he did with other matters vital to education, Dewey attempted and set up plans to resolve the dualism between individual and society. The school becomes the place in which students join freely in shared or common activities. For Dewey, social efficiency is achieved when there is mutual sharing in human, give-and-take experience. It is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable and communicated. Dewey's criterion for the social ideal, as we find it in Democracy and Education, is that the worth of a form of social life is "the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members."[16] A few pages prior, Dewey writes that

> in order to have a large number of values in common all the members of the group must have an equable opportunity to receive and take from others. There must be a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences. Otherwise, the influences which educate some into masters, educate others into slaves. And the experience of each party loses in meaning, when the free interchange of varying modes of life-experience is arrested.[17]

Thus, Dewey satisfies our second criterion. What about the first criterion? It is often held that his educational philosophy holds individuality and human differences as subordinate to the social order. But this is not so; Dewey recognizes the individual in the social world; he speaks of the capacity for progressive and continuous "reconstruction of experience," and how else can this be done than when the individual student is not subordinated to a higher social order. In Democracy and Education, Dewey writes that "a society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occuring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative."[18] Personal initiative implies freedom, resourcefulness, originality, and responsibility. The latter term implies that a student does not crutch to dogma and beliefs fixed by authority to relieve them of the trouble of thinking, but that he rather accepts responsibility "for the consequences of one's activity including thought."[19] At another place, Dewey speaks of the existentialist notion of sincerity.[20] Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that Dewey also does justice to the existentialist notion of "being-with."

In regard to the interhuman element of "being-with," Dewey speaks of "shared experiences" in the educational process, he speaks of associated activities or joint activities as a condition of the creation of a community.[21] He even speaks of a "subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication," which must "take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life into it."[22] In short, the community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse or of free and full intercommunication. Dewey speaks of the "great society" which may become a "great community."[23] "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse."[24] The final actuality of a face-to-face relationship is accomplished in a dialogue, in which ideas are communicated and shared.[25] We can recognize here the high similarities with Buber. Hence, we are able to conclude that Dewey also satisfies the third criterion of "being-with."

To sum it up, we can say that there is no school of thought which has satisfied the existentialist, cooperative, and interhuman criteria of "being-with" fully, save John Dewey's pragmatism in education. So, in order to find the three criteria of the earlier Sartre, the later Sartre, and Buber implemented in an educational system, we have to go to the pragmatic theory of Dewey himself (not to certain "interpreters" of Dewey, because many of them speak of the individual's subordination to the social order and, thus, miss the existentialist notion of "being-with," as well as the "common praxis," wherein are the existentialist notions of freedom, action, choice, responsibility, commitment, and authenticity, as well as the I-Thou relationship and the constructive genuine dialogues).

As for "being-with" in education, Dewey's pragmatism and the integral existentialism (composed of the earlier Sartre, and Buber) can join hands and work together for the education and the realization of a new mankind or an integral humanity, permeated by the existentialist, cooperative, and interhuman criteria of "being-with."

What about the other schools of thought? The neo-behaviorists might deny the authenticity of this study, because they shifted the emphasis from the humanitarian consequences to the detached, depersonalized world of It. Existentialist notions, such as freedom, choice, responsibility, anguish, might sound like sheer nonsense to them, and interhuman elements as irrelevant in a world where people control one another. But they have to decide whether they want to train controlled, mechanized, depersonalized existents, or to educate human beings.

For reconstructionists, it could be helpful to add the existentialist notion of "being-with," which could enable them to keep the individual from being submerged in an amorphous, stifling mass. The interhuman element of Buber would bring more individuality and interrelatedness to the reconstructionist notion of group.

The Progressivists could profit from the integral notion of "being-with" by changing their polar educational system from restriction-freedom to restriction-relation. Freedom is not a goal but only a path towards relation. To give freedom is not to allow the child to do what he wants to do (to live his own life); education is to free the child from authoritarian control and restriction, and thereby enable him to relate himself to his fellow pupils and to the teacher (interhuman).

Suggestions have been made above; the choices of seriously taking the existentialist, cooperative, and interhuman elements in "being-with" in education, however, have to be made by the educators of the various philosophies and this choice again is an existentialist one.

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